Document 1
Papers submitted on the
Ratna Memorial Conference:
“
Organised by
The
Venue: Elvin Hall, The
Date: Saturday, the 24th of March 2007
Time: 10.00 – 16.30
Content:
1. Tamil Speaking People of Islamic faith and the Tamil Liberation Struggle: Dr. V. Ameerdeen (Pages 02 – 17)
2. Working Class Movements and Tamil National Struggle: Lionel Bopage (Pages 17 – 34)
3. Political Demarcation of the Tamil Speaking People:
4. Concept of Security in the Uni-polar word
and its implications in and aroud the region: Dr. S. Chandrasekharan (pages 39- 47)
5. Constitutional Restructuring? Need for Interim-Administration for the Northeast: V. Kuhanendran (pages 47 – 59)
Paper 1
Tamil Speaking People of Islamic Faith and the
Tamil Liberation Struggle in the Northeast
By
Dr. Vellaithamby Ameerdeen
Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science,
Introduction
Muslims and Tamils in
the majority Sinhalese, have serious differences between themselves. The Tamils, being
placed in powerful bureaucratic positions and with their educational attainments, tended
to ignore their constitutional subjection to minority status but voiced their grievances
politically. But the Tamils resented the Muslims’ prosperity and also the fact that the
Muslims were favoured in government and private sector employment because the
Muslim leaders made it clear that they were opposed to the Tamils’ separatist activities.1
The Tamils felt that the Muslims were benefiting at the cost of the Tamils’ struggle.
Both Tamil militants and the majority Buddhist tormented the Muslim community
equally. Liberation movements attempted to absorb the Muslims of the north east towards
the course of fight for Tamil Eelam by announcing them as “Tamil speaking people”, or
1 M.I.M. Mohideen, Muslim Dimension in the Sri Lanka Ethnic Conflict, in Rappoteurs Report,
Consultation on the Muslim Dimension in the Sri Lankan Ethnic conflict, Organized by Sri Lanka Muslims
Congress (
“Islamic Tamils”. Muslims of the north east did not have a comprehensive political
knowledge of their activities and involvements were limited only in voting for the
Sinhala political parties to which they were committed. They did not realize the dangers
being done to their traditional lands, economy, population density and their political
activities. The Muslims were also not in a position to deem themselves as a section to
join hands with the Tamils to fight for their nation against the Sinhala communalism. as a
result, when the ethnic tension expedited by July 1983 riots, “the accelerated terrorist
activities that have gone on unabated since then and the endless war in the north and east
have snuffed out innocent Sri Lankan lives belonging to all communities in this country”2
2 Uvais Ahamed, “Sri Lanka Ethnic Crisis A Muslims Perspective”, in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.),
Negotiating Peace in
3 University Teachers for Human Rights (
the Batticaloa and Ampara Districts”, Report No.7 (
4 G.H. Peiris, “Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reconciliation: A Retrospect”, in K.M. de Silva and
G.H.Peiris (eds.), Pursuit of Peace in
p. 356.
In spite of the differences between the two communities, the gulf in terms of cultural
ethos at least in the beginning did not sow the seeds for an antagonistic, rival attitude
towards each other. The Muslims deplored the fact that these evicted people’s plight and
the Muslims’ place in the nation’s life were not included in the talks on ethnic issues. The
Muslims did not consider Tamil activism as a threat to their day-to-day life, culture and
identity but the political activism of the Tamils interfered with the lives of the Muslim
population in the north and the east in the later phase.3In the early phase of the ethnic
conflict, there was peaceful coexistence between the Tamil and Muslim communities
until about the late 1980s, when the Muslims began to be directly affected by the violence
associated with the ethnic conflict.4
However, the Muslims had been sympathetic towards the struggle of the liberation
movements. They offered refuge to the Tamils who were displaced of onslaught of
security forces. They have safeguarded the Tamils, their belongings and even the fighters
at the time of dangers. After 1983, there was very great danger of Muslims being
engulfed into the struggle as ‘Tamil speaking people’ rather than as Muslims.
5 S.M Yusoof, “
(Colombo: Ceylon University Press, 1960), p.704.
6 Karl Goonewardena, “Some Notes on the History of the Muslims in
Occupation”, Journal of the Muslim Majlis, 9 (1959/60), p. 84.
This gradually would have undermined the identity of Muslims as the third significant
community in the nation, not to speak of its position as a minority.
Muslims of
Throughout the history, Muslim community faced a crucial evolution and consequently
emerged as a distinctively identifiable group in
noteworthy that, though there are different groups within Muslims, the followers of Islam
are generally referred as Muslims in the present socio-political context.
The first Muslims in
recorded the early contacts of Arabs with Sri Lanka.5 After the fall of the
Muslims monopolized the trade with the East. They began with a mercantile motive but
soon enough Islam sprang roots in these places. The Arabs settled in
intermarried with these emigrants. In consequence of these intermarriages as a result of
long stay in the island, a community of mixed descent, Arab-Tamil and Arab-Sinhalese6
descent originated.
It is notable that during Portuguese, Dutch and British periods, they were neglected as a
community. Particularly, during the period of Portuguese and Dutch, the animosity and
antagonism arrived its peak. The arrival of British to the island brought many changes in
the entire system in
Muslims were neglected. Education reforms they introduced benefited the community, to
have a perspective in the future with a bird’s eye view. But the gradual migration into the
eastern province, led them prevented having the chance of modern education.
Historical pressure faced by Muslims community, caused to spread the distribution of
settlements. Basically they can be seen all over the island. the population census of 1911,
7 M.A.M. Hussain, “Muslims in Sri Lanka Polity” (unpublished), cited in Vasundhara Mohan, The Muslims
of
1971,1981, and 2001 show clear growth of Muslims population. Especially, the
distribution of Muslims widely spread in five districts, Ampara, Trincomalee, Mannar,
Batticaloa and
proportion of population, which provide a political strength to Muslim political parties at
regional as well as at national level.
Eastern Concentrations
In the eastern province, comprising three administrative districts—Trincomalee,
Batticaloa and Ampara—Muslims are about one-third of the population and Tamils are
the majority (42 per cent). The Muslim population in Trincomalee district in 1981 was
29.90 per cent, about 41.60 per cent in Ampara district and about one-fourth of the
Batticaloa district. This population concentration provides political strength to the
Muslim community parties at the regional as well as at the national level. With the
ingress of the Sinhalese due to the colonization programme carried out in the Ampara and
Trincomalee districts in recent decades, aided by the government, however, the
proportion of the Muslim population has begun declining. Hussain says, “it is a mere
matter of time for the Muslims to be turned into minorities and denied representation in
these areas”7. It is notable that most of the Muslim villages are adjoining with Tamil
villages.
Languages and Muslims
Muslims in
their compatriots are recognized by language. This issue of the criteria for Muslim
identity has been continuously facing the controversy in politics as well as in academic
discussions. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the position of language among
Muslim community in
middle east region, but the language and culture from their Dravidian background.
8 S. Arasaratnam,
9 S. Arasaratnam,
10 Mohamed Mauroof, “Aspects of Religion, Economy and Society among
to Indian Sociology: New Series, No. 6, 1972, p. 68.
11 ibid
Arasaratnam explains the preponderance of Tamil Dravidian influence on Muslim life in
terms of the considerable migration of Indian Muslims into the island during the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries.8 Muslims adopted Tamil as their language more as a matter of
convenience than compulsion. It was perhaps due to their interaction with Tamil traders
of
Subsequently, Muslims adopted the language of the area of their habitation as their
mother tongue. In north and east
has become Tamil. In the rest of the country, they have become bilingual or trilingual,
with fluency in Tamil, Sinhala and English. Tamil influences, however, outweighed those
of the Sinhalese language even in the interior of the island, largely because it was a Tamil
community that the traders mainly interacted with. Their language, however, is a
derivative of the original Tamil language, accommodating the Arabic script. The
Muslims’ Tamil contains a number of Arabic words and also Arabic phonemes and
morphemes,10 analogous to the growth of the Urdu language with the influence both of
Hindi and Persian. Mauroof says about the Tamil used by the Muslims of Sri Lanka:
it is written in Arabic script, adding Arabic phonemes and morphemes
to those of Tamil, using Arabic words to express ideas and concepts
not known to the Dravidian worldview. The syntax of its spoken
version is considerably different from the Tamil spoken elsewhere in
the country. Arabic-Tamil in its historic pattern shows many
similarities to the structure and syntax of Maldivian—the language of
another people who probably came under the influence of Islam under
similar circumstances.11
12 M.A.M. Shukri (ed.), Muslims of
Institute, 1986), p. 70
13 Dr. Al Haj Badudin Mahmud, is a Minister of education in two governments (1960 and 1970). He was
the first Muslim to be made a Minister of education, did great service in the foundation of post-
independence education for the Muslims.
14 Ponnambalam Ramanathan, “The Ethnology of the Moors of
15 P. Ramanathan had earlier represented the Muslims too in his capacity as representative of the Tamil-speaking people in the Legislative Council.
16 P. Ramanathan made a more comprehensive restatement of these views in 1888 in The Journal of the
Royal Asiatic
of
origin. He said that the Muslims were “ ‘Mohammedans’ in religion and ‘Tamil’ in nationality.” After the
Sinhala-Muslims riots, he spoke on behalf of the Sinhalese from his position as the Educated Ceylonese
Most significantly, even though the Muslims spoke ‘Arabic Tamil’, they did not
significantly identify from the language. They hardly developed a sense of affinity with
the language. They did not agitate that education for the Muslims are imparted in that
language. “Unlike the Tamil they have no great emotional commitment to language, and
they have demonstrated little reluctance to adopt Sinhalese as the language in which their
children shall be educated”.12 Further, it is notable that, Badiud-din Mahmud13 had
commented that the Muslims did not have a language of their own.
Muslim -Tamil Relations
Ethnic and political awareness was low among the Muslims for two reasons. First, they
had emigrated to the island from various parts of the world. Secondly, they were mostly
concentrated in trade and commercial activities. But the riots against Muslims in Sri
Lanka forced political consciousness upon them, making them realize that the island is
their only home. By then, Muslims were generally considered as Mohammedans in
religion and Tamil in nationality.14
After the 1915 riots, the disagreements between Tamils and Muslims reached at peak.
The Muslims, however, felt betrayed when after the riots, Ponnambalam Ramanathan
spoke on behalf of the Sinhalese, stating that Muslims were opportunistic and hostile.
The statements made by the Ponnambalam Ramanathan15 at different times, after the
1915 riots,16,who represented the Tamil-speaking community, i.e., both Tamils and
Member of the Legislative Council; he saw the Muslims as opportunistic and hostile. The Muslims were
already prejudiced against him as he had portrayed them as “Tamils in everything but religion””. His
speech, and indeed his intentions, were completely misunderstood by N.H.M Abdul Cader, who took amiss
his desire to differentiate the Indian Muslim (as ‘Hambaya’) from the Sri Lankan Moor.
Muslims in the legislative council (1879-1891), were disputed among the Muslim
community. Some of the Muslims leadership felt that he had been unfair to them
therefore; they became distrustful of the Tamils. Muslims feels that this is a first attempt
of Tamil leaders to suppress their political rights.
I.L.M. Abdul Azeez criticized Ramanathan’s “ethnology of the moors of
spoke of the “Arab blood” of the Sri Lankan Muslims as a counter to the Tamil claim of
the Muslims being of Tamil origin. This was the beginning of the Muslims asserting their
distinctness. The Muslim associations, which had been formed for social and cultural
reasons, adopted political objectives to achieve the demands of the community and acted
as a pressure group on several crucial occasions to secure their political rights. Also, the
Muslim political leadership began to bargain for power in their political career, especially
by joining the ruling majority party.
With this background, Muslims community attempts to have separate ethnic identity and
representation in legislative councils of pre- independence
differences and disagreement between the Tamil and Muslim communities, the outer
appearance of the relationship between the Tamils and Muslims in
independence in 1948 had been seems to be peaceful.
Ethnic tensions became increasingly visible in
The scarcity of land and other resources in the absence of technological alternatives,
coupled with a sharp population increase contributed to disparities in the economic and
social welfare of minority communities, giving rise to ethnic strife. The national and
regional parties manipulated the ethnic issues for electoral benefits and political
affiliation became largely polarized along ethnic lines.
The political association between Tamils and Muslims came apart over conflicting
attitudes to the transfer of power, with the Muslims supporting the Sinhalese leadership
and the Tamils reacting to it with understandable antagonism. Since 1956 Tamil leaders
17 A. Jeyaratnam
1988), pp. 56-133.
18 The Sunday Observer, 9 June 2002.
were uncomfortable with the separate identity maintained by the Muslim community as
distinct from the Tamils.
The conflict began between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority.17 It began
over issues such as the use of language, share in state land, and educational and
employment opportunities, culminating in the demand first for greater autonomy for the
region where the Tamils formed the majority and later for a separate state. Among
Muslims, several reasons gave momentum to the rise of the new political force on
religious-ethnic lines.
A document published in 1988 by the political wing of the liberation tigers of Tamil
Eeelam (ltte) states:
Given the reality that it is the Muslim people who have suffered most
through state aided Sinhala colonization and encroachments in their
traditional areas of habitation, our determination to preserve every
inch of our homeland itself is an expression of Muslims’ grievance
and is a tangible step toward protection of Muslim rights. It therefore
becomes absolutely vital for all Muslims to stand shoulder to shoulder
with us in the struggle if they are to safeguard their own land and all
that they hold sacred in order to survive as a people.18
Tamil Liberation Struggle and Violence against to Muslims
The political activism of Sri Lankan Tamils also interfered with the affairs of the Muslim
population in the north and the east. “The lesson that has been tragically brought home to
19 University Teachers for Human Rights (
the Batticaloa and Amparai Districts”, Report No.7 (
20 M.I.M Mohideen, The need for power sharing arrangement for the Muslims in the
(
both Muslims and Tamils is that the two communities are inseparably linked and that a
sound basis for co-existence.”19
However, the Muslims have been sympathetic towards the Tamil Eelam movement. They
offered refuge to the Tamils who were displaced by the onslaught of the security forces.
They protected the Tamils, their belongings and even the fighters in times of danger. In
spite of Muslim support for their cause, the Tamils unleashed terror against the Muslim
farmers, looting property worth millions of rupees. “The breaking point of the Muslims
came when the Tamil separatist tried, in the course of robbing a rich Muslim trader, to
take his daughter as hostage in Akkaripathu. Angered by this, the Muslims registered
protest by peaceful hartal in Akkaripathu, from 8 to 12 april 1985.”20 Tamil separatists
murdered Habeeb Mohamed, the assistant government agent (AGA) of Muttur on 3
September 1987, which led to widespread protest demonstration by the Muslims
throughout the eastern province. A.L.A. Majeed, a former Member of Parliament and
deputy minister were killed in cold blood on 13 November 1987. In December 1987
Kattankudy, a village with a population of over 30,000 Muslims, came under the attack
of armed fighters. Over 60 people were killed and more than 200 injured. Property worth
over Rs. 200 million was set on fire. In March 1988, the former chairman of Kattankudy
town council was assassinated. In November 1989 the Tamil national army massacred 41
Muslim policemen at the Karaithivu police station but did not touch the Tamil policemen.
More than 200 Muslims were kidnapped and murdered by Tamil terrorists. on 14 may
1988, terrorists stormed into the mosque located at
shot dead a Muslim policeman. The terrorists’ grudge was that certain Muslims had
tipped off the army personnel about the whereabouts of members of the terrorist groups.
The Muslims thought because of their faith in Islam they have been targeted by the Tamil
terrorist.
21 The
22 On 6 June 1990.
23 S.H. Hasbullah, “Muslims and the Ethnic Conflict: Dynamics of Muslim Politics with Special reference
to the Indo-Lanka Accord”. (
24 Ibid
In the beginning, the Muslims considered the ethnic conflict to be a problem between the
Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils. But as the conflict progressed, Tamil-Muslim violence
evolved on account of the disagreement on the issue of Tamil homeland and the status of
eastern province Muslims. The Muslims in
between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Their precarious position has been worsened by
the subsequent militarization of the region. The northern and eastern Muslims have also
been terrorized by the LTTE, killing many and forcing many to flee. in spite of the
damage caused by the Tamil militants to the Muslims some Muslims continued in the
armed groups.21
However, in early 1990, a decisive change in Tamil-Muslim relations occurred,
particularly in the eastern province, when the Muslims resisted the Tamil militants’
demand for money for the Eelam movement. After the LTTE declared the “second Eelam
war”,22 they began a process of “ethnic cleansing” of northern and eastern Muslims. In
late July 1990, more than 75 Muslims, most of whom were returning from the pilgrimage
to
gave Muslims a two-hour warning to evacuate the area and desert their homes, creating
90,000 Muslim refugees.23 This is a great blow to the Tamil-Muslim unity. Having lost
the properties and pleasure, they are now living with sorrow and grief24. The differences
between the Tamils and Muslims mainly recline on their religious beliefs.
The tragic expulsion of the Muslims from the north in 1990 followed by the massacre of
123 Muslims who were praying in the mosque at Kattankudy, the slaughter of same
number in Eravur are examples “LTTE cadre arrived in Eravur about 10.30 P.M and went
about massacring Muslims until the early hours of the morning. they went through the
Muslims areas of Suranttyankuda, Michnagar, Meerakernai, Saddam Hussein village and
Punnakuda killing 121 persons. among the worst reported incidents was that cutting of a
25 University Teachers for Human Rights (
the Batticaloa and Amparai Districts”, Report No.7 (
26 Betram Bastiampillai, “
(Colombo: 15 February 1994), pp. 1-2.
27 The
28 Peiris, “Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reconciliation: A Retrospect”, In K.M. de Silva and
G.H.Peiris,(eds), Pursuit of Peace in
357.
29 C. Suriyakumaran,
pregnant lady’s stomach. the baby is said to have been pulled out and stabbed”.25 The
Muslims have been evicted from the north especially Mannar,
the east, they live in fear of Tamils, especially in areas like Batticaloa and Kalmunai.26
Both in the eastern province and
public servants, village leaders, robbery and killing, removed every sympathy that the
Muslims had for the Eelamists. in the eastern province, Muslim paddy landowners and
Muslim tenant cultivators have been practically evicted from their paddy fields in areas
like Unnichchai, Karadiyanaru, Pullumali, and Paduvankarai in the Batticaloa district.”27
“Surprise attacks on Muslim communities continued throughout the 1990s interspersed
with occasional large-scale massacres such as those of Alinchipotana in April 1992,
Saindamaradu (Kalmunai) in September 1992, and Palliyagodella in October 1992.”28
Though they have sacrificed their life and wealth, the general perception is that “it seems
to say that today the whole of
dividends, whether in power or in wealth, from conflict and bloodshed- is united in a
wish for peace”29.thus the Tamils and the Muslims increasingly became suspicious of
each other during this period.
Successive massacres in Kattankudy and Eravur by the Tamil militants had shocked the
Muslims and further increased their distrust on the Sri Lankan Tamils. “The LTTE stance
over Muslims was very hypocritical. They are single-minded in their attempts to establish
a separate Tamil homeland for themselves forgetting the assassinations committed by
them in the 1990s. The manner in which the LTTE cadres were committing crimes
against Muslims was the main driving force for the creation of a political party, such as
Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC).
30 K.M. de Silva, “The Islamic Factor” in idem (ed.), Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic
Politics in
31 See text of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord,
204-212.
Sequence of terrors unleashed against the muslims of the east after 1985 troubles, made
them discern for being Muslims, they were being subjected to such attacks. No other
reasons were found for the killing of innocent Muslims who used to go for fire wood to
jungles, to look after cattle, for fishing and even traveling people. they had to scare and
fear that being Muslims at any moment they would be in the grip of terrorists.
In this situation, the SLMC came forward to effectively organize the Muslim disaffection
on several occasions. Even though the SLMC was from the eastern province, when the
ethnic conflict made the eastern Muslims most vulnerable in the 1990s, Muslim traders in
parts of
SLMC to protest the killings of Muslims in the eastern province by the LTTE.30
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord -1987
When peace negotiations to resolve the ethnic problem commenced, the Muslims were
not involved in them as a concerned, distinct community. The mechanism offered
through the India-Sri Lanka accord in 1987 also did not meet the aspirations of the
Muslims.
It contained three core elements.31 First, it acknowledged that
and multilingual state, in which all citizens born in
be no discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and language. The second core issue agreed
in the India-Sri Lanka accord was that the northern and eastern provinces were the
historical habitation sites of the Tamil-speaking people. Disagreeing on this broad
categorization, the Muslims thought it necessary to specify communities residing in the
region. The third point of agreement in the India-Sri Lanka accord was on deciding the
merger of northern and eastern provinces through a referendum. Muslims of all walks of
life opposed this point. After the merger the percentage of the Muslim population would
32 Memorandum sent to President J.R. Jayawardene by the Council of Muslims of Sri Lanka, “ Indo-Sri
Lanka Agreement and
September 1987).
33 Parliamentary Debate, 8 June 1993, p. 228.
decline from 33 per cent in the eastern province to 17 per cent in the combined north-
east. Reflecting a similar viewpoint, the council of Muslims of Sri Lanka stated, “In the
creation of the unit of devolution of power, the interest of the Muslims ethnic community
has been completely disregarded and no opportunity has been given to enable this
community to work out and ensure its own safeguards in terms for the principles
enunciated above.”32
The indo-Sri Lanka accord, however, came as a thunderbolt to the Muslims, reducing
their political strength. Former SLMC leader, Ashraff said that the accord totally ignored
the existence of the Muslim community. he believed that without adequate sharing of
power by the Muslim community of the north-eastern province this problem could not be
resolved.33 the proposed merger of the provinces also aggravated the political problems
of the Muslims.
One of the major steps in the direction of solving the ethnic crisis in the country in the
1990s was the setting up of the parliamentary select committee (PSC) on 9 august 1991.
Its salient features were: unconditional permanent merger of the north-east; greater
devolution of power to the provincial councils and institutional units and constitutional
safeguards to protect the interest of the Sinhalese and the Muslims living in the north and
the east. The strategy was to forge an alliance with the Muslims. The SLMC agreed to the
merger subject to an ‘institutional mechanism’ that provided for a separate unit for the
Muslims in the eastern province.
After 1994, Ashraff was able to convince president Kumaratunga and the
Freedom Party (SLFP) of the need to offer adequate recognition and protection to the
34 See for details, The Daily News, 13 August 2002.
35 Rappoteurs Report, Consultation On the Muslims Dimension in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, Organized
by
eastern Muslims by appropriate constitutional provisions. These were contained in the
draft proposals presented to parliament in 2002.34
Ethnic Question and Muslim Aspirations
In a centralist form of government, Tamil political aspirations have not been fulfilled.
This has been at the core of the ethnic problem in
there is a concentration of Tamil people and there is a widespread view that giving power
of self-government to Tamils can fulfil the political aspirations of the people in these
regions. One view is that there should be devolution on the basis that the north and the
east should be separate units. In order to safeguard the Muslims’ interest in the resolution
of the ethnic conflict the Muslim United Front demanded unification of the Muslim-
majority areas of the North and the East to form a Muslim-majority territory
The Muslim demand is for two or more provincial councils for the east, with provisions
for the merger of adjoining councils beyond provincial boundaries after a referendum.
The creation of one provincial council for the
These provinces would enable to Tamils the have their share of power in the north where
they are a majority. Three provincial councils are envisaged in the east, namely eastern
provincial council, south eastern provincial council and Ampara provincial council,35
with greater Muslim representation. The eastern provincial council would comprise
Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts, which have around 18 per cent Muslim population.
The South Eastern council would encompass Kalmunai, Pottuvil and Sammanthurai
electorates, where again Muslims predominate. Ampara provincial council would be a
dream of a Muslim homeland come true.
President Kumaratunga, while reining in the warmongers in her government, set out to
formulate a constitutional framework to offer the minority communities their rightful
place, calling on the representatives of the three communities to attempt a consensual
solution. As a partner of the coalition government, the SLMC sent a proposal on
establishing a predominantly Muslim unit in the Tamil-speaking area of the northern and
eastern provinces. The proposal reads:
1. A separate Muslim majority administrative district should be created in the
present Ampara district comprising the former four DRO’s division of
Panamapattu, Akkaripattu, Wewegampattu south AGA division (south Gal Oya
river). area 920 sq. miles.
2. Creation of ethnic oriented Pradeshiya Sabhas/AGA division including the
agriculture lands and natural resources in proportion to the population of each
community in the administrative district mentioned 1 above.
3. creation of Muslim majority Pradeshiya Sabhas in Kathankudi, Eravur,
Ottamawadi/Vallichenai comprising the agricultural lands and natural resources in
proportion to the 24% Muslim population in Batticaloa district.
4. Creation of Muslim majority Pradeshiya Sabhas/AGA division in Trincomalee
district in Muthur, Kinniya, Thampalakamam, Thoppur and Kuchchaveli
comprising the agricultural lands and natural resources in proportion to the
Muslim population of 29% in the Trincomalee district. area 414 sq. miles.
5. Creation of Muslim majority Pradeshiya Sabhas/AGA division in Mannar district
in Musali and Erikalampiti comprising the agricultural lands and natural resources
in proportion to the Muslim population of 27% in Mannar district. Area 278 sq.
miles.
6. Urban council should be created in Kalmunai, Sammanthuri, Kathankudi and
Kinniya without reducing the Muslim majority in the balance areas of the
Pradeshiya Sabhas/AGA divisions.
36 A Summary of the Submission made to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Reforms
by Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, 26 May 1995, p. v.
37 After the 1987 Accord, Prabhakaran made the historical speech related to the
7. Separate Muslim majority administrative districts should be created linking the
Muslim majority Pradeshiya Sabhas/AGA divisions in Batticaloa, Trincomalee
and Mannar districts.
8. All Muslim majority administrative districts created in the north-east region
should be considered as separate electoral districts.
9. all Muslim majority administrative/electoral districts in the north-east region, land
area approximately 1,958 sq. miles or 5,071 sq. km and population approximately
480,000, shall be the Muslim majority power sharing unit in the north-east
region.36
Sudhumalai Declaration and Hero day Speeches
Against such a backdrop came the “Sudhumalai declaration”,37 by which the LTTE for
the first time recognized the ethnic identity of the Muslims. The declaration promised to
safeguard the political interest of the Muslims once Eelam was established. It also gave
expression to its understanding of the need of cooperation of the Muslims of the north
and the east to achieve the Tamils’ political goals. Several confidence-building measures
were also introduced. The convention of meeting mosque committees was reintroduced.
Also, various political meetings were held in the Muslim settlements of the north and the
east, in which prominent leaders such as yogi, Mahattaya and Balasingham participated.
The Muslims looked askance at the Eelam idea of the LTTE. They wanted to remain
within
mutual harmony and equality of status. However, while not supporting the Eelam cause
they did not openly profess their indifference to it. The LTTE on its part became
vindictive towards the Muslims, emboldened by the departure of the IPKF and the
government’s kid glove treatment of the armed groups.
38 He was an eminent conventional Muslim leader from the UNP and was Foreign Minister under President
Jayawardene.
Before the IPKF left and the JVP was tamed, the Premadasa government passively
engaged the LTTE in negotiations. in the first stage of the negotiations A.C.S. Hameed38
spearheaded the talks. In the 1989-1990 talks, the mediation by A.C.S. Hameed at least
gave symbolic importance for the Muslim community.
The high point of the Premadasa-LTTE negotiations was reached when the latter
demanded the repeal of the sixth amendment of the constitution, dissolution of the north
east provincial council and holding of elections in which the LTTE/PFLT would be
enabled to contest. in any event, the aftermath of the Premadasa-LTTE negotiations was
that the LTTE’s anger turned towards both the government and the SLMC. the LTTE
massacred hundreds of Muslims in the east. in the north, the LTTE passed an ultimatum
demanding the evacuation of Muslims within 48 hours as a precursor to attaining its
desire of having a separate Tamil land.
Compared to the negotiations between the government and the LTEE in 1989-1990, the
talks in 1994 and 1995 appeared more military oriented than diplomatic, with the LTTE
clearly taking an aggressive stance, talking only of a Tamil homeland, without
considering the aspirations of Muslims.
It is notable that the LTTE and its leadershlp make speeches related to Eelam and Tamil
nationalism they have never made a statement related to accommodate the Muslims
aspirations and their needs. Therefore, a Muslim also trying to develop separate
nationalism.
2002 Memorandum of Understanding
When the United National Front (UNF) government came to power in 2001, it made a
ceasefire agreement with the LTTE through international support, especially with the
help of the Norwegian government. the peace process, involving the northern and the
39 See the Original Agreement made between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE on 22 February
2002.
40 The Sunday Times, 5 May 2002
41 Ibid, 7 April 2002.
42 Ibid, 13 April 2002.
eastern province of the country was set to move towards direct negotiations aimed at
securing a final settlement to the conflict. the ceasefire agreement, signed by the
government of
Muslims, who extended overwhelming support and provided a mandate for the
government to ensure the objective of peace, as a group of people not directly a party to
the north-east conflict.39 The ongoing peace process is trying to set up an interim
administrative structure that seeks to enable the LTTE to run the north-east for the benefit
of the Tamils. The Muslims are concerned about their future in the north-east under an
LTTE dispensation. Since most of the north-east Muslims have supported the SLMC, it is
the responsibility of the SLMC leader Rauff Hakeem to quickly negotiate with the
government and the LTTE for constitutional safeguards and effective power sharing
arrangements for the Muslims in the administrative setup in the north-east.40
LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham in a statement apologized for the LTTE’s past
mistakes. “let us forget and forgive the mistakes made in the past. Tamil Eelam (nation)
is also the homeland of the Muslims and we have to live in harmony,” Balasingham said.
“We do recognize the unique cultural identity of the Muslim community.” It was
announced that he and the LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran planned to meet Muslim
leaders soon. “Linguistically, economically and territorially the Muslims and Tamils are
inextricably inter-related and therefore they have to co-exist as brothers in the north-east.
there are a lot of misapprehensions amongst the Islamic community with regard to the
LTTE’s political strategy,” Balasingham said.41 on an invitation from the LTTE leader V.
Pirapaharan, the leader of the SLMC and cabinet minister Hakeem flew to the north with
five of his party colleagues and with a mutual understanding of both parties. They signed
the agreement between the LTTE and the SLMC.42
LTTE-SLMC Joint Statement
43 The Sunday Observer, 9 June 2002.
44 Ibid.
Politics of expediency have been the hallmark of the LTTE’s dealings with the Muslim
community. In 1988, it professed its realization about recognizing the Muslim
community as an integral part of
which created waves of Muslim refugees. Developments since the issuing of the LTTE-
SLMC joint statement on13 April 2002 have followed a similar pattern. Prabhakaran
called back the displaced Muslims to their historical habitation and it was also decided to
create favourable conditions for the resettlement of the Muslims who had been displaced
from small Muslim villages in the eastern province.43 The LTTE expressed its intention
to help the Muslims to re-cultivate the uncultivated agricultural lands historically
belonging to them.
The LTTE also went a step ahead and intended to form a new triangular relationship with
the government along with SLMC. since the SLMC had obtained the majority support of
the Muslims, it was decided to talk to the SLMC on matters pertaining to the Muslims in
the north east, giving it an equal partner status. it was decided that the SLMC
representatives would participate as a group on behalf of the Muslims at the negotiations
to be commenced between the government and the LTTE. The LTTE-SLMC joint
statement also spoke about approaching the political issues of the Muslims in the north
east on a policy basis and continuing discussions to foster their unique political and
cultural rights.44
But there was a sharp wedge between the LTTE’s declarations and its actions. it may be
that the leadership behaves lethargically or its control over the cadres is very loose. From
the recent incidents such as the schism caused by Karuna of the eastern province.
Even though the LTTE and the SLMC issued a joint statement for making a breakthrough
in their relations on 13 April 2002, neither party followed up with action on the ground.
Fresh disturbances arose between Tamils and Muslims in the third week of June 2002.
The immediate provocation was the beating up of a Muslim three-wheeler driver by the
LTTE cadres on Muthur–Thoppur road in Trincomalee district on 20 June 2002 without
45 M.I.M. Mohideen, Tamil-Muslim Ethnic Conflict in the East, June 20-30, 2002 (
Publication, n.d.).
46 Ibid
47 The
48 Ibid, 7 July, 2002
49 The Daily Mirror, 5 September 2002.
any provocation by the victim. The victim’s family and relatives then went to the LTTE
local office, and in the ensuing confrontation the LTTE office was damaged. The
following day, some LTTE members gathered on Muthur–Thoppur road and started
harassing Muslims.
The hostilities in Muthur and Thoppur spread to Batticaloa district when a peaceful
Hartal was organized by the north-east Muslim brotherhood movement and Muslim
students union to protest the LTTE attack on Muthur Muslims and unlawful extortion and
abduction by the LTTE in the eastern province.45
Even after the government authorities took steps to calm matters, the LTEE continued to
aggravate the situation. When two Muslim cooks went to the house of a Tamil in
Valaichchenai to prepare a wedding meal, the LTTE cadres abducted, killed and buried
them in a paddy field46
It was considered that this was a conspiracy to grab the business from the Muslims, the
fishing trade and so on. he said, “it is a sinister design to target the Muslim economy.”47
Hakeem said that the violation of certain aspects of the statement of conciliation issued
jointly by him and the LTTE leader had put the LTTE’s credibility into question among
Muslims.48
The Muslims consider that the crisis faced by them is a national one and hence should not
be confined to a regional dispute, as the Hakeem-Prabhakaran accord seeks to make out.
The need to offer adequate recognition to the Muslims is a must, without which a lasting
solution cannot be reached. in any event, Muslim grievances must be addressed and their
political aspirations fulfilled in a manner in which all communities will be treated
equally.49 The state law enforcement authorities could not do much to stop the escalating
violence for about a week when LTTE cadres attacked the helpless Muslims. The
50 The Hindu , 17 June 2003.
51 The Hindu, 20 June 2003.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid, 22 August 2003.
Muslims also feared that in the forthcoming peace process and the interim council the
security of the Muslims might not be guaranteed.
Peace Process
In the ongoing peace process, the government has been trying various methods to give
due representation to minorities at all levels. First, the Sub-committee for Immediate
Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs [SIHRAN] was formed at the second round of
talks.50 Now proposals for the provincial administrative structure in the north-east are
under consideration by all the three parties. The primary object of all these arrangements
is to transfer the power vested with the centre to north-east or rather to the LTTE with
international recognition. by this process, the LTTE is trying to get legitimacy and
international support for its role as the sole representative in the historical area of
habitation of the Tamils and Muslims in the north-east.
In June 2003, the prime minister called upon the LTTE to hold discussions on an
‘interim administrative council’ since the LTTE unilaterally pulled out of the peace talks
on 21 April 2003. But the LTTE subsequently demanded a ‘politico-administrative’
interim structure outside the island’s unitary constitution, as proposed by its leader.51
There was no provision in this demand for the cohabitation of all the communities in the
north and the east provinces. the Muslim community wanted that their grievances also
should be included in the interim administrative council.
After months of uneasy clam, tension gripped eastern
general closure to protest the killing of two Muslims by “unidentified gunmen”, which
affected normal life in the Muslim-majority Ampara district.52 Four Muslims had been
killed in the previous week in two separate incidents by “unidentified gunmen”, which
caused a Hartal in Muslim-majority areas. The Muslims blamed the LTTE for the
killings.53 The leader of the political wing of the LTTE, S.P Tamilchelvan, visited the
54 Ibid, 28 July, 2003
sensitive eastern districts for a “first-hand appraisal of the ground situation”.54 Even
though both the LTTE and the SLMC worked to bring unity between the two
communities, violence against the Muslims is continuing by the LTTE cadres.
Conclusion
Though attempts have been made to address the issues of power sharing for a permanent
and just solution to the problems of all the ethnic communities in
have been based on shifting sands, since the LTTE does not recognize the historical
legitimacy of the Muslim community. The Muslims in the north and the east are trying
through the SLMC to get their distinct nationality recognized and they demand that when
the settlement comes to give separate autonomy for the Tamils, there should be a
homeland for the Muslims to guarantee their territorial integrity, based on the recognition
of the historical legitimacy of the Muslim community. They wish to have self-
determination to preserve and protect their interests.
Due to the ongoing ethnic violence against them by the Tamil militants, it is important for
the Muslims to ensure their physical safety and economic security. The Muslims are
trying to achieve this through the political process. It is imperative to have peace talks to
bring lasting peace in
settlement that can be accepted by all minority communities, it would not be a lasting
one.
The Muslim participation in the peace negotiations is also hamstrung. There is opposition
from the government as well as from the militant groups whenever the Muslims tried to
carve its space in the peace process. in the recent phase of peace negotiations, SLMC
representation has been objected to with the palliative that in subsequent time they will be
included. While the peace talks are continuing between the two parties, the SLMC is
making an effort to ensure acquire to accommodation of the aspirations of the Muslims of
the north and the east.
55 Hasbullah, n.23, p. 26.
The Muslims feel that they are not asking anything more than what is legitimately due to
them. They do not like the way the governments are trying to woo the LTTE at the
expense of the interests of the Muslim community. The government has an obligation to
protect the interest of the Muslims. By solving the Tamils’ problems, the government
should not create a Muslim community as political and social slaves in the merged north
and eastern province. The continuing violence against the Muslims in the east, which
forebodes ill for the Muslims in an LTTE-ruled dispensation, is the biggest challenge
ahead to the ongoing peace process.
At the concluding remarks, it is worthwhile to pinpoint the statement made by former
SLMC leader, late Mr. Ashraff “permanent peace will be possible between the Tamils
and Muslims only if the Tamil community wholeheartedly recognizes the political
individuality and independence of the Muslim community. Tamils must realize that the
Muslims are a separate entity although both communities speak the same language. As
much as there should be devolution of power from the centre to the Tamil community, it
is equally important that power should be directly devolved to the Muslim community as
well. The equilibrium could be maintained if political power could be vested in both
communities.55
End
Paper 2
Working Class Movements and Tamil National Struggle
By Lionel Bopage
Introduction
Mutual relationships and interactions between working class movements and nationalist movements have given rise to the most complex issues in social development as can be witnessed in
Although nationalism did not play a major role in the original writings of Marx, in the early 20th Century Lenin and his contemporaries analysed, in detail, the national question and arrived at divergent conclusions on this subject matter. Leninist views on the national question lies at the basis of the national policy followed by the working class movements. Lenin distinguished between two aspects of the national policy of the working class, the slogan of national self-determination and the slogan of the unity of all nationalities. The working class movements are fighting for full equality and unity of nations, and at the same time, seeking to maintain the unity of their class struggle and their organisations despite the bourgeois push for national isolation.[1]
The solution to the national question in a specific country has its own specific features stemming from the nature of its historical development, the composition of its population, its social structure, and the degree of its economic and cultural development.[2] In the case of
The aim of this paper is to look at the complex relationship between class and ethnic aspects of the current conflict, the national question of
Marxist Viewpoint
Marxists seek to build international working-class unity by fighting against all forms of privilege and oppression. They support the right of all nations to self-determination, but do not advocate a particular form of self-determination such as the formation of a separate state. It is rather a recognition that every single nation is entitled to the same rights.
Marxists advocate solidarity and unity of the workers of all nations against capitalist exploitation. While opposing the nationalism of the bourgeoisie of every nation, they support the struggle of the oppressed nations against national oppression because of the "general democratic content" of their struggle against oppression.
At the present stage of global expansion of capitalism, genuine national liberation can be finally achieved under the leadership of the working class, by organising the workers and peasants independently of the ruling capitalist classes. However, it is incorrect to conclude that a solution to an ethnic conflict cannot be achieved under capitalism but such a solution can be achieved only under socialism. This is a misinterpretation of the Leninist position on national question. Lenin's emphasis was to include in the program of the working class, a policy that addresses the national question.[3]
It is important that working class movements understand how the national question is manipulated by ruling classes for prolonging their capitalist rule, and find effective ways to link national liberation struggles with the class struggle. Trotsky once described the national liberation struggle as one of the “most labyrinthine and complex but at the same time extremely important forms of the class struggle.”[4]
Nations and Right to self-determination
Some who during Lenin’s time and afterwards[5] dismissed the material basis of national question thought that a nation did not require a definite territory, economy or class structure but simple identification as a member of a certain national culture. Directly opposing such views, Lenin and his contemporaries held that a nation should necessarily be connected with territory, economy and class structure. Stalin summarised the Leninist side of the debate with the reformists by stating that “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”[6] Nesiah (2001) defined nationalism as “the ascriptive membership of a politically organised community bound by history, ethnicity and association with an identified territory, and which demands loyalty and sacrifice.”[7] Stalin’s definition still seems to hold ground.
Marx and Engels supported the right of oppressed nations to national self-determination. They accepted this right not on the basis of some abstract concept of fairness and justice, but on the basis of concrete historical analysis of each national movement at the time and its role in the struggle between the two class camps. In regard to the Irish question, Marx stated “….it is in the direct and absolute interests of the English working class to get rid of their present connection with
Simply the right to self-determination implies that an oppressed nation has the right to determine its political relationship to the oppressor nation, including the right to secede and form a separate state. Working class movements defend this right, because "nothing holds up the development and strengthening of proletarian class solidarity so much as national injustice."[9] However, Rosa Luxemburg argued that ‘the famous “right of self-determination of nations” is nothing but hollow, bourgeois phraseology and humbug’.[10]
Lenin and Luxemburg typically represented opposite sides of the contradiction posed by the issue of national self-determination. Lenin approached the issue from an analysis of historical context of oppressive and imperialist Russian nationalism, where as Luxemburg approached it from an analysis of nationalism of the oppressed people in
The right to self-determination has become an essential component of Tamil national struggle. Many have misconceived this right as the right to unilateral secession. However, under international law, this right cannot be exercised unilaterally. Kirgis Jr. (1994) showed that this right has many facets including limited autonomy within confederations, and minority rights within a larger political entity.[12] Judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada, in the matter of Reference by the Governor in Council concerning certain questions relating to the secession of Quebec from Canada, found that “The Constitution vouchsafes order and stability, and accordingly secession of a province "under the Constitution" could not be achieved unilaterally, that is, without principled negotiation with other participants in Confederation within the existing constitutional framework.”[13] Scope of the Right to Self-determination in the judgement distinguished between internal and external self-determination.[14] Effective provision for internal self-determination delegitimises any recourse to unilateral secession while its denial could legitimise a right of secession.
How can we relate these experiences to the Sri Lankan situation? A working class movement that supports the oppression of its ruling class is aligned with that class. Such a movement cannot properly wage a struggle against the ruling classes. Hence, in order to defend its own interests, it should break with its ruling class and actively support the struggle of the oppressed. The working class of the oppressor nation must support the right of the oppressed nation to determine its own future, even up to the point of political separation. What does this say about the political leaderships of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, the Communist Party and the Lanka Sama Samaja Party? If someone said something today about
Tamil national struggle
Nesiah (2001) states that ethnic consciousness was not mobilised among Sri Lankan Tamils even in the pre-Donoughmore period due to lack of institutional mechanisms and fragmentation of the Tamil population. Up to the 1940s, the social and political divisions were not based on language and religion, there was no hostilities based on ethnicity of individuals. The Jaffna Youth Congress (JYC), which was a dominant political force in the North in 1920s and 1930s, also influenced delaying the emergence of Tamil ethnic nationalism in the north. The JYC appreciated the harmonious and tolerant relations existed at the time between Sinhalese and Tamils, Moors and Burghers.[15]
Since 1948, the Tamils in the island have been systematically denied their legitimate rights, mainly relating to equal opportunities in areas of language, education and employment. It is worth noting that such policies even affected Sinhala speaking Sinhalese in the south and led to discriminatory outcomes against them. However, this paper does not focus on how such discriminatory practices affected the Sinhala working people.
The Citizenship Act of 1948, which as the first legislation passed by the parliament, disfranchised close to a million Tamil plantation workers. With the introduction of the Sinhala only language policy in 1956, Tamil political parties strongly demanded a federal framework. The abrogation of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam pact of 1958 and the Dudley-Chelvanayagam Pact of 1968 by the Sinhala political establishment created a lot of anger, frustration and disillusionment among Tamils that eventually led to the birth of separatist currents and tendencies. However, the secessionist movement did not achieve a leadership role of the Tamil people until later. Even when rejecting the 1972 Constitution, the All Ceylon Tamil Conference (not the All Ceylon Tamil Congress) referred to Lanka as "our motherland" and its population as "one people".
The speech of Mr Chelvanayakam in 1975, after the victory at KKS by-election, marked the real turning point in the Tamil national struggle towards the demand for a separate state. This followed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) adopting the Vaddukoddai Resolution in 1976, demanding Tamil Eelam, a separate state for Tamils. According to Nesiah (2001), the Vaddukoddai resolution of 1976 had a massive impact on the political landscape of the island.
Following the communal riots of July 1983, the government rushed through legislation to exclude from the parliament any party that refused to swear allegiance to the unitary Sri Lankan state, effectively disfranchising all TULF members. This significantly weakened and isolated the democratic Tamil opposition and made them ineffective. It also provided the Tamil militant movement with rich and fertile grounds for new recruitments, converting the armed nucleus of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) into a powerful armed group. Tamil population in the north and south remained disfranchised with virtually all their human and democratic rights taken away. The whole of the Tamil society and part of the Sinhala society was affected by post-traumatic disorder intensifying the feelings of fear psychosis and paranoia. Thus the National Question became the major issue that prevailed afterwards to this day.
In late 1980s the LTTE emerged as the dominant Tamil militant group. All other Tamil political groups have now become associates of either the LTTE or the security forces. Lewer and Williams (2002)[16] has characterised the LTTE as an armed group under the control of one person, enjoying broad support from local and diaspora Tamil communities. It maintains a culture of martyrdom and is capable of sustainable violent action. It has consistently stood for the right to self-determination of the Tamil nation while running a parallel government. While not specifically articulating its own alternative to Tamil Eelam, it has consistently demanded that the government offer an alternative based on Thimpu Principles[17]. Successive wars and policies launched against the LTTE for the alleged purpose of weakening them, or isolating them have always boomeranged by further strengthening it. The ultimate result of the new military assaults is yet to be seen in light of the recent setbacks of the LTTE.
Crisis in the Tamil national struggle
According to the LTTE, the traditional left collaborated with the Sinhala capitalist class and was subsumed by chauvinism. Identifying this class collaboration as suicidal and blaming left leaders for disregarding national oppression, they noted: “… by integrating the national struggle with class struggle defining our ultimate objective as national liberation and socialist revolution.”[18] However, in practice, what class interests such a state would serve? The environment created by the international anti-terror campaigns and the rise of capitalist globalisation will undermine attempts to build a separate state principally relying on armed might and mostly based on economic self-reliance.
Following the signing of the cease-fire agreement in February 2002, the LTTE showed flexibility to negotiate with the government a power-sharing arrangement. However, the negotiations between the government and the LTTE broke down in April 2003, after six sessions of peace talks. The failure of peace talks can be mainly attributed to the deep seated mutual mistrust between the two parties and the failure to comply with the cease-fire agreement. For example, the government did not fully implement certain agreed clauses regarding the withdrawal of security forces and high security zones from public locations and the LTTE continued killings and intimidation of political opponents.
In September 2003, the LTTE put forward its first set of political proposals in the form of an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) for the north east. The government declared that ISGA was demanding much more than federalism laying “the legal foundation for a future, separate, sovereign state”[19]. Refusing to hold talks with the LTTE, the government used force to undermine the strength of the LTTE, which led to the escalation of the war.
The LTTE emerged due to systematic discrimination and armed oppression against the Tamil nationality, and is mainly a creation of the successive capitalist governments of
Successive ruling elites have used fear psychosis created by the ‘war on terrorism’ to force the LTTE to the negotiating table, or face massive ‘shock and awe’ aerial bombardments. Prior to the election in 2005, the former government had also admitted to developing a
I have not made reference to other Tamil militant groups as they seem to have, through diverse alliances, become appendages of the main protagonists of the armed conflict. They may have done so due to sheer necessity of survival in front of the assaults by the LTTE, but my view is that they have lost credibility and legitimacy in the Tamil constituency due to their collaborations. As the left movement in the south was driven to opportunism by the post-1948 nationalist polarisation, so were the Tamil militant groups who had Marxist tendencies. Nonetheless, all the parties to the conflict combined together have taken away the human and democratic rights of the very people they are said to be fighting to safeguard. Under current circumstances, anywhere in the country, there is no space for Sinhala, Tamil or Muslim individuals or groups to exercise their fundamental freedoms of conscience, freedom of thought, opinion, expression, debate, association or movement. Many have had to sacrifice their lives for exercising or committing to these freedoms.
In the seventies and eighties some former Tamil militant organisations with left tendencies attempted to establish political links with the working class movement and the Left in the south. A proposition made to the JVP in 1978, to establish a political dialogue with such organisations, was rejected on flimsy excuses. In the eighties, PLOTE radio broadcast beamed to the south assured Sinhala people that they were not anti-Sinhala movements. However, other militant organisations such as the LTTE took an entirely different approach. Not only did they not try to establish political links during this period but they also assassinated several prominent Tamil leaders who were affiliated with the progressive organisations in the south.
The LTTE including its leadership seem to have been guided more by their military strength and nationalistic objectives that by their political consciousness. In particular, in the diaspora, their opportunistic behaviour is evident in their relationships with progressive organisations. When the going gets tough, they would establish political links with the progressives, but only to pursue their own objectives. Yet, when they are stronger, they seem to entirely disregard them.
Organisations like the LTTE were less considerate of global or regional realities, which was a reflection of their political immaturity, whereas the separatist movements in
Major capitalist powers are increasingly focusing on the Indian subcontinent as a reliable cheap labour source. What interests would be served by any future movements in this direction? Would the LTTE attempt to gain support of major powers to lead them and their policies to be subsumed by the strategic and economic interests of such powers? Their reliance on military power as the method of struggle, rather than on mass mobilisation of Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala working people, seems their major political weakness. Would the LTTE also end up being another armed bourgeois nationalist movement?
Malaiyaha Tamils and the Tamil National Struggle
Malaiyaha Tamils[20] were brought to
In recent decades some Malaiyaha Tamils have migrated to areas in the South for employment opportunities and to the North and East for their safety and security. Their movement to the North and East has reduced since the escalation of the war and their increasing alienation from militant Tamil nationalism. Those who seek employment in the cities still face discrimination, suspicion and harassment and even arrests. Despite many economic issues affecting them, over 80 per cent of them continue to live on the estates.
The Donoughmore reforms implemented in the 1930s and 1940s granted some Malaiyaha Tamils the right to vote. But Sinhala and Tamil capitalist leaders did not see them as being Sri Lankans. Bass (2001) concluded that “
Political marginalisation of Malaiyaha Tamils can be understood in that they were not consulted when government enacted the ‘Sinhala Only Language’ Act, when the Sirima-Shastri pact of 1964 and Srimavo-Indira pact of 1974 were signed, or when agreements were developed with the Tamil movements in the North and East. It is worth noting that in the process of finalising the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam pact of 1957 the government and the Federal Party (FP) agreed to drop the clause concerning the grant of citizenship to Malaiyaha Tamils. This was seen as a betrayal by many Malaiyaha Tamils since FP broke away from the Tamil Congress on the issue of its support for their disfranchisement. To this day, this issue remains a reason why Malaiyaha Tamils act indifferent towards the Tamil national struggle.
The growth of political power of Malaiyaha Tamils coincided with the emergence of the militant movement of non-Malaiyaha Tamils and the ongoing civil war between the government and the LTTE. The LTTE does not seem to enjoy much support among Malaiyaha Tamils. As Malaiyaha Tamils are often on the receiving end of anti- Tamil violence, harassment and discrimination, they show sympathy towards the Tamil militant movement. However, Malaiyaha Tamils do not regard the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil-speaking people of the island and have no affinity with any political parties or groups in the North and East. Also they do not seem to have a desire to support the LTTE demand for a separate state. They seem to prefer to position themselves as a distinct ethnicity.
Despite this situation, any of the major political parties do not seem to have taken the grievances of Malaiyaha Tamil citizens seriously. They are still treated as second class citizens. Although there is a gradual improvement of Malaiyaha Tamils in terms of receiving education, not many employment opportunities are available for the young educated Malaiyaha youth. Bass noted that this decade will be critical for Malaiyaha Tamils because without significant government intervention, “the growing number of over-educated and under-employed Malaiyaha Tamil youths may turn to militant protests and violence, as the JVP and LTTE did before them.”[25]
Muslims and the Tamil National Struggle
The Muslims of Sri Lanka had diverse ethnic origins, but such differences become insignificant compared with their Islamic religious identity. They flourished commercially until the arrival of the Portuguese, who imparted the name ‘Moors' upon them, thus making them a homogeneous ethnic identity. They remained passive to this name change until Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan attempted to show that the Moors were actually Tamils by ethnic origin. The political motive of this attempt was allegedly to discourage the colonial rulers from appointing a Muslim to the Legislative Council. On that Occasion, the Muslim community cleverly used the name ‘Moors’ to differentiate their identity from that of Tamils and hence counter Ramanathan's statement. To this day, this issue has affected the relations between the Tamil militants and the Muslim people.[26]
In the early phase of the ethnic conflict, there was peaceful coexistence between the Tamil and Muslim communities. In 1980s, Muslims of the North-East had reasonably good relationship with Tamil militant groups, and some Muslims had even joined hands with them. However, significant differences surfaced between the Tamils and the Muslims after the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord. Muslims oppose the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces under the Accord, because after the merger the percentage of Muslim population would decline from nearly 35 per cent in the
In the aftermath of the Premadasa-LTTE negotiations of 1989-90, the LTTE’s anger turned towards both the Government and the Muslim community in the North-East. The LTTE massacred hundreds of Muslims in the East, and in the North the LTTE evicted around 100,000 Muslims from the
LTTE made a conciliatory approach towards Muslims immediately after the signing of the cease-fire agreement. Dr Anton Balasingham in a statement apologised for the LTTE's past mistakes, "Let us forget and forgive the mistakes made in the past. Tamil Eelam is also the homeland of the Muslims and we have to live in harmony.[29]
On 13 April 2002, the LTTE leader Mr Velupillai Pirapaharan and the SLMC leader Mr Rauf Hakeem met in Kilinochchi and issued a Joint Communiqué. This Communiqué agreed that “the Muslims are a separate community with their own identity. The political, cultural and other rights of Muslims, as a distinct community of the North-East, must be safeguarded.” It also noted that “Muslims should be represented at the forthcoming peace talks between the Government and the LTTE and such representation should be from the SLMC.”[30]
Nearly three months after the signing of the LTTE - SLMC joint statement, fresh disturbances between Tamils and Muslims broke out. Ameerdeen (2006) attributes the collapse of this agreement to “a sharp wedge between the LTTE's declarations and its actions. It may be that the leadership behaves lethargically or its cadres are very loose.”
Working Class Movement and the Left
On the national question, the working class movement supports the capitalist class only in order to secure national peace, which they “cannot bring about completely and which can be achieved only with complete democracy”. This support is for the purpose of securing equal rights and to create the best conditions for the class struggle ... “What every bourgeoisie is out for in the national question is either privileges for its own nation, or exceptional advantages ... The proletariat are opposed to all privileges, to all exclusiveness....”[31], stated Lenin.
When the language issue first came up in 1956, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP) stood for the parity of languages, democracy and equality. During the anti-Tamil riots in the south in 1958, they also stood by the Tamils. Their policies were based on complete freedom to use Sinhala and/or Tamil, elimination of any privileges for any one language, religion or culture. For instance, the LSSP’s founding convention proclaimed that it was committed to “the achievement of complete national independence, the nationalization of the means of production, distribution and exchange, and the abolition of inequalities arising from differences of race, caste, creed or sex.”[32] In 1950s, the LSSP and the CP also supported a federal setup to administer the island.
The turning point of the left and the working class movement came in1960s, when the LSSP and the CP entered into coalition politics with the SLFP. The SLFP-LSSP-CP coalition opposed the agreement between the Sinhala and Tamil bourgeois parties, Dudley-Chelvanayagam pact of 1968 that proposed to decentralise some power to the Tamil speaking regions. The policy of standardisation combined with a district quota system, which was introduced by the coalition government in 1970, resulted in a steep decline in the proportion of Tamil students (as a percentage of total admissions)[33] accepted for science, engineering and medical faculties[34]. A prominent leader of the LSSP, Dr Colvn R de Silva, was the architect of the 1972 constitution that abolished the protections given to minorities under section 29 of the Soulbury Constitution, offered Buddhism the ‘foremost place’, and institutionalised preferential treatment to Sinhala Buddhists in educational and economic opportunities. On the increase were systematic harassment of Tamil youth, arbitrary arrests, and detention without trial.
These actions by the traditional left were a complete betrayal of the democratic rights of the Tamil people. Yet, what was the basis for this capitulation? Was it because the LSSP and CP did not have a revolutionary program? Why did not they stand up on the rights of Tamils? When the political organisations of the left, which were agitating in 1940s & 1950s against national oppression, started to shift to the right, the Tamil youth movement gathered momentum introducing new nationalist alternatives to the national question.
In 1970s, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) took up the policy of the right to self determination of Tamil people.[35] Sinhala, Tamil and English were recognised as national languages with parity. Secular nature of the state was guaranteed.[36] However, the JVP discarded its policy of recognising the right to self-determination in 1983, just prior to the Black July riots of 1983. Following its proscription in July 1983, the JVP completely reversed its position on the national question.[37] Their campaign in the late 1980s against the Indo Lanka Accord led to assassination of dozens of workers and political opponents for refusing to take part in patriotic protests and strikes. The JVP has now degenerated into a Sinhala nationalist party that opposes even limited devolution of power to Tamil-speaking regions.
Lerski (1968) reveals that the leaders of the Left and the working class movement did not, on a principled basis, demand the fulfilment of the uncompleted bourgeois democratic tasks but merely appealed to the Sinhala capitalist leaders to show common decency and more generosity. The evidence indicates that these leaders were influenced by bourgeois nationalism. They apparently outdid their non-socialist colleagues in xenophobia and at times, liberal capitalists were more internationalist than the Marxists.[38]
According to Samarakkody[39], the leadership of the working class movement was strongly influenced by petty-bourgeois ideology. He states “… obviously the Marxism of the party had no deep roots. The Leninist position on the national question – the right of nations to self-determination – was simply unknown to the party. Thus, the problem of the Tamil nationality was viewed as one of removing some inequalities. That it was bound up with the dynamics of the
The JVP continues to vehemently oppose federation, i.e., any devolution of power to Tamil speaking regions. They voice slogans on national equality, but has not backed them up with any active support for the struggle of the Tamil people, and in Lenin’s words, such proclamations are false and meaningless. He constantly emphasised that there is either bourgeois nationalism or proletarian internationalism, and there can be nothing in between. He wrote: "Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism - these are the two irreconcilably .hostile slogans that correspond to the two great class camps throughout the capitalist world, and express the two policies (nay, the two world outlooks) in the national question”.[40] He showed that depending on changes in the concrete conditions the question of secession or federation can have exactly opposite solutions, and some popular movements attempted “to use the letter of Marxism against the spirit of Marxism."[41]. Marxists often interpreted federation as a tendency to secede.[42] Lenin's position regarding federation during that period was negative, though he recognised that in certain historical conditions federation for some countries was quite warranted. Thus, in his theses on "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", he pointed out that one could be a determined opponent of federation as a matter of principle but still prefer it to national inequality. He said that Marx, for instance, favoured a federation of
As a form of inter-ethnic relations, federation does not automatically ensure a correct blend of local tasks and those facing the whole state, but only creates opportunities for this, while the use of these opportunities depends on how federation interacts with the principle of democratic centralism. If federation is carried out within limits that are rational from an economic point of view, if it is based on important national distinctions that give rise to a real need for a certain degree of state independence, it is not in contradiction with democratic centralism in any way.[44] The form of the federation naturally did not alter its main purpose, which was to ensure a "transition to a conscious and closer unity of the working people, when they have learnt voluntarily to rise above national dissension."[45]
The opportunistic shift of the left parties on the national question was an unprincipled betrayal of working class solidarity. Other socialist groups continue to recognise this right but have marginal influence on the working class. The Sinhala nationalist groups, their coalitions and chauvinist fronts charge that those who recognise the right to self-determination encourage division and disintegration of the country. Lenin and the Bolshevik Party made a special point of educating the Russian working class in a spirit·of internationalism because the success of the whole working class cause, including the national liberation struggle, depended on the internationalism of the Russian working class, its respect for the rights of the working people of other nations, and its constant readiness to support the oppressed nations in their struggle, to defend their interests.[46] The JVP also emphasised this internationalist spirit in the seventies after the insurrection in April 1971.[47] Even during then, there were many who did not understand the spirit of internationalism on the national question. They capitulated and objectively played into the hands of the capitalist class by saying that the slogan on national self-determination should be abandoned, which they ultimately did in 1983.
Conclusion
Conflicts cannot be managed or resolved unless the parties to the conflict have a desire to do so. Unfortunately, in
Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it, said Spanish philosopher George Santayana. It was Marx who said that history repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce. This is what is happening in
The JVP puts forwards the view that a solution to the current conflict can be found once a socialist government is formed in
Marxists consider that a holistic solution to the national question could be sought only through a radical transformation of the entire society. This is true, but currently we live under capitalism. So, do we wait for the socialism to usher in and create a heaven with no conflicts? I do not believe so. The Left and the working class movement need to take a firm and unambiguous stand that any proposed solution to the armed conflict includes guarantees of all democratic rights to all the citizens living anywhere in the island irrespective of their socio-economic and cultural background. It is the duty of the working class movement, socialists and democrats to continue to support the right of Tamil people to determine their own destiny. The Left should move away from their politics of opportunism and take genuine class positions based on working class democracy and internationalism. Otherwise the Left will be increasingly ‘left’ in the past.
The struggle for the democratic rights of the Tamil people should continue, but with different action methods. For its success, all sections of the Tamil people needs to be mobilised on the basis of the demands for struggle against the process of capitalist globalisation. Such mobilisation of the Tamil people need not and cannot be separated from the mobilisation of the Sinhala working people who are also suffering in numerous similar ways. To achieve such a joint mobilisation the Left need to move away from their hypocritical and opportunist policies.
Yet, can individual armed actions bring about an end to the oppression of Tamils and help achieving the objective of the Tamil national struggle? In my view, the only way to achieve their freedom from oppression is not by individual terror, not by creating more oppression on people, not by taking away the democratic rights of people, but by the mobilisation of the oppressed of all nationalities to protect their human and democratic rights. If Sinhala and Tamil working people were to break away from Sinhala and Tamil chauvinism, would that not assist the objective of achieving freedom from oppression?
I would like to deal with two issues that came out of our discussion; firstly, the possible unity between Non-Malaiyaha Tamils, Muslims and Malaiyaha Tamils. Nesiah (2006)[49] notes that the distinctions between them are now sharp; in fact, the Tamil-Muslim divide is widening. In the case of Malaiyaha Tamils, I believe that they and the Non-Malaiyaha Tamils may eventually merge, but such a unity cannot be forced. According to Ali (2001), with the distinguishable peculiarities between the three nationalities, it will be almost impossible to think of their merging together, taking into consideration “the historic resentment and suspicion of Jaffna Tamil domination”. It is quite evident that the North-Eastern Muslim community, with the ascendency of their identity and the LTTE led violence against them, is now demanding for a separate unit for themselves in the Eastern provinces. Nesiah (2001) considers the Malaiyaha Tamils “may eventually come to see the North East as the region to which they can go if they wish to live in a Tamil majority area, and the regional government of which could be expected to promote their language, religion, culture and other concerns.” Yet, given the distinct identity, any solution to the National Question must provide for the full emancipation of the Malaiyaha Tamils wherever they live.
Secondly, it is worth examining the view expressed by Ali (2001) that the concept of nationalism needs to be discouraged in multicultural and multiethnic societies by promoting the concept of civic nationalism based on shared values of democracy, human rights and the public good. Such a concept will respect, accommodate, and even celebrate “the separateness of ethnic identities.”[50] It is important to note that the multicultural environment in countries practising it have some essential characteristics built into to it. All those countries have a devolved state structure based on ethnicity, historicity, or/and geographic realities. All of them promote social values of fairness, co-existence, tolerance, respect, and dignity. Many countries have accepted linguistic and cultural diversity, and government policies in India, Canada, Switzerland, for example, are developed in consideration of this aspect, while in a few countries all migrants have willingly or unwillingly agreed or integrated , in the US, Australia, New Zealand, for example, into working in English. The implication is that
I am in favour of implementing a federal solution to resolve the prolonged and self destructive ethnic conflict in
Whatever constitutional arrangement we may agree on the national question, the agreement itself will not simply bring out a solution. Devolution of power is a necessity but it is not a panacea. Unless we change our attitudes to accommodate and treat each other with mutual trust, respect, and dignity the conflict will drag on. As expatriates, we should engage in constructive dialogue to promote a just and peaceful solution to the conflict that will provide fairness to all nationalities. We, expatriates, do not need to fund a war that destroys all of us and feeds militarism in a vicious cycle engendering more and more poverty. Rather, we should help create more and more opportunities for peace. “We are made wise not by the recollection of our past, but by the responsibility for our future”, said George Bernard Shaw.
No doubt that the overwhelming majority of Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala masses wish an end to the armed conflict. However, the more difficult issue will be agreeing to a political solution that will address the aspirations of Tamil people and the mechanisms that will address concerns of Sinhala and Muslim peoples. Can this be achieved by relying on the various sections of the ruling elites, or on the very same neo-colonial powers that conduct crimes against humanity? What is needed is a non-capitalist political movement that could unite working people in Sri Lanka on the basis of a democratic socialist policy platform, that could reject all special privileges for a particular language, religion, culture, or a region, that could discard all forms of nationalisms, chauvinisms, supremacisms and separatisms. Such a movement need to rely on the support, assistance and solidarity of the working people of all nationalities in
As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr said, the greatest tragedy is not the brutality of the evil people, but rather the silence of the good people. We all need to add our voice and get others to join in, so that our children and grand children will be able to live on with dignity and peace.
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Lenin V.I. 1914, Right of Nations to Self-determination: Practicality in the National Question, In Collected Works, 4th English Edition, Vol. 20, 1972, Progress Publishers, Moscow, Retrieved: 24 February 2007 from http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/index.htm
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Lenin V.I. 1918, Original Version of the Article 'The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government', In Collected Works, 4th English Edition, Vol. 42, 1971, Progress Publishers, Moscow, Retrieved: 24 February 2007 from http://www.marx.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/mar/23b.htm
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Wijeweera R. 1977, Opportunism or Proletarian Internationalism?, Sinhala edition, Niyamuwa Publication, Colombo
Paper 3
Political Demarcation of the Tamil Speaking People
by Ravi Sundaralingam
Slide 1. National Question means
dispute about Ownership
Slide 2. The Ethnic strife in
the question of belongings and Ownership and,
of their rights, and
not simply about ‘Rights’.
Slide 3. The arguments for this ownership are historical:
• going back thousands of years,
• at least a few centuries back, even for an ardent Sinhala chauvinist.
Slide 4. The arguments for this ownership have been characterised
and termed as the
“Unresolved National Question”
by all the progressively thinking Parties, Groups, and
individuals from both the Sinhala and Tamil communities.
• No need to mentioned the LSSP, CPs, NSSP and, even the JVP until the mid 80s, and every individuals we can care to mention.
Slide 5. The arguments for this ownership have been identified by the
Sinhala chauvinists, who took over from the colonialists in 1945, and
have been reinforcing that identification process
with constitutions after constitutions, and oppression beyond endurance.
Do we have to recall, every time, the
• systematic pogroms against the different Tamil speaking communities, starting with the Muslims, culminating in the orgy of violence against the Tamils of the North and East in 1983?
• systematic, state funded colonisation programmes in the Ampahrai district against the belongings of the Muslims, now extending in to further north in East and the North?
• systematic legislating to strip the Tamils their belongings and, of their rights staring with the disentrancement of the Up Country Tamils, leading up to the Sinhala Only Act?
• systematic disinvestment in the areas where non-Sinhala speaking people live; in people or in economy, with those in the Up Country maintained as semi-slaves, in
• systematic destruction of the communities in the non-Sinhala regions by the Sri Lankan state, though its all out full scale military offensive against the entire population?
Slide 6. The Argument for this ownership was collectively agreed by
all the parties attending on behalf of the Tamil communities
in the North and East at the
Slide 7. The arguments for this ownership were made into a
bilateral agreement between
the Government of
the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord (July 1987)
The argument for this ownership were taken a step even further
by the agreements between the GOSL and the LTTE (Tamil Tigers)
• the signing of the MOU agreement; GOSL conceding another socio-political entity within its realm (February, 2002),
• accepting International Monitoring to over see the maintenance of this status quo,
• agreeing to what is known as the
• agreeing a joint mechanism for the Tsunami relief work, the P-TOMS (June, 2005)
Slide 8. CONCLUDE
• There should be no doubt; the Unresolved National Question in
• It is about a non-Sinhala speaking people of different communities, who have Tamil as their mother tongue.
• We call them the Tamil Speaking people of
Slide 9. Eelam;
The Political demarcation of the
Tamil Speaking People (TSP)
Eelam is a complete package of full democratic rights,
possessed by the TSP,
to usurp their ownership and belongings.
• In contrast, Tamileelam was a proclamation of “rights” of the indigenous Tamils living in the North and East; excluding the Muslim and the Up Country Tamils.
Slide 10. Eelam recognises the separate cultural identities, and
the evolutionary nature, and sociological perspectives,
due to the differences in religion, region, cast and Classes.
• In contrast, Tamileelam offers memberships to a political-entity on the basis of loyalty and sacrifice, without recognising cultural differences and identities, and offers ownership only on the basis of ‘rights’.
Slide 11. Eelam is an all inclusive, democratic process,
which is institutionally pluralistic.
• In contrast, Tamileelam is exclusive and undemocratic in its inception as well as in concept, even more so in practice, as it confuses the rights with the ownership, ownership with ethnicity.
Slide 12. Eelam is a proposal for a Nation, a process that recognises
the internal contradictions within the TSP, a ‘statehood’.
• In contrast, Tamileelam assumes a nation and with it a state, a state in terms of membership and ethnicity, and rights without addressing the needs of the different Tamil Speaking communities.
Slide 13. Eelam is a stake-holding political entity, statehood based on
bottom-up empowerment of the people, for all the people,
who are oppressed by the
who also have Tamil as their mother tongue.
Eelam is a socio-political entity, which puts the interests of
the working masses at the helm, most of whom
are predominantly the classical proletariat-
the plantation Tamils, therefore,
inherently an extension of the working class movement
in the island.
• Therefore, resisting the Sinhala-chauvinist state, itself, is a political demarcation of the TSP at the present.
• Furthermore, as the Sinhala-chauvinist state oppresses the Sinhala working masses just the same, except for their linguistic background, resisting the state is also a revolutionary act, that is also inherent to the Eelam proposal.
• Resistance to the state oppression takes many forms, and arm struggle does not necessarily means war. Armed struggle when misinterpreted as a protracted war can only lead to internecine warfare, and acts of historical crimes against persons or people, which we have regretfully chronicled in our short space of armed activities.
Slide 14. Eelam is a counter thesis to the ‘religiously centred
Sinhala nation state’, constituted as
Therefore, it is anti-sectarian, anti-separatist.
Slide 15. Eelam is a proposal to empower the TSP, at the roots of
their communities, therefore an advocacy for each to stand
on their own. It is by safeguarding their own interests,
with that of their working masses; each community of the
TSP can resist, and exercise their right-to-self determination.
Eelam is a counter thesis to the ‘religiously centred
Sinhala nation state’, constituted as
Therefore, it is anti-sectarian, anti-separatist.
Slide 16. Eelam is a proposal to empower the TSP, at the roots of
their communities, therefore an advocacy for each to stand
on their own. It is by safeguarding their own interests,
with that of their working masses; each community of the
TSP can resist, and exercise their right-to-self determination.
Slide 17. Eelam and right-to-self determination are synonymous
in concept and action.
In that, it recognises that Eealm is a socio-political agreement
within the TSP,
and at the same time with other communities,
namely the Sinhala speaking communities
to share
the ownership and belongings and utilise them to the
full benefit of the vast majority of the peoples,
both Sinhala and Tamil speaking.
Slide 18. Conclude
Eelam,
the political demarcation of the Tamil Speaking People is a
• multicultural socio-political entity,
• model in consideration with the advent of globalisation of Capital and Labour,
• anti-thesis to religiously orientated socio-political systems, such the
• a union of people with their empowerment as communities and individuals as the fundamental political dynamism,
• has an inherent philosophy and action of resistance based on empowerment, which is the right-to-self determination.
Slide 19. In this spirit and intellectual vein we would like to forward
our version of a Nation:
• “Nation is a consistent, yet evolving socio-political entity encompassing several communities bound by a common language and an underlying economic life, which also associate the people to a historically claimed geographical domain, with a history and myths manifested as cultural traits.”
“gy r%fq;fs; xU nkhopapdhYk;> nghJthd nghUshjhu thof;if KiwapdhYk;> jkf;nfd;w G+u;tPfg; gpuNjrq;fSld; ,izf;fg;gl;L> ,k;Kj;ju ,izg;Gk; gpuj;jpNafkhd tk;rf; fijfs;> fhtpaq;fshYk;> rupj;jpuj;jhYk; gpd;dpg; gpizf;fg;gl;Lk; cs;s> ];jpukhd> MapDk; vd;Wk; gupzhk tsu;T fhZk;> r%f-murpay; tiuNt Njrk;.”
This definition is
• forward thinking and not inward looking,
• not static, but evolutionary, and
• inclusive, not exclusive.
“A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on
the basis of common language, territory, economic life, and psychological
make up manifested in a common culture.”
- Marxist Philosophers (Origin: Lenin> Buharin >Stalin)
“nghJ nkhop> G+u;tPf epyk;> nghUshjhu tho;T> vd;gtw;whd; rupj;jpuj;jhy; epu;khzk; nra;ag;gl;L>
jdJ nghJg;gl;l r%f-kNdhtpay; ghq;Fjid fhyhr;rhukhfTk; ntspf;fhl;Lk; ];jpukhd
kf;fs; rKjhajaNk NjrkhFk;.”
- khu;f;rpa jj;Jthu;ju;fs; (Mjp: nydpd; > Gfhupd; > ];lhypd;)
“A Nation is the ascriptive membership of a politically organised community
bound by history, ethnicity, and association with an identified territory, and
which demands loyalty and sacrifice.”
- Liberal philosophers (M. Weber> E. Renan > Brubaker)
“rupj;jpuk;> ,dj;Jtk;> vd;gtw;Wld; ,izf;fg;gl;l epyj;Jld; tho;NthuJ nrhj;J-ge;jk;
vd;gtw;wpdhy; vOk; mq;fj;Jtj;jhy; cUthf;fg;gLk; murpay; mikg;G vd;gJld;> mJ
tpRthrj;ijAk; jpahfj;ijAk; filikahff; Nfl;Fk; ];jhgdNk Njrk; MFk;.”
kpjthj j;jJthu;j;jfu;fs;. (kh. ntgu;> v. wPdd;> nwh. G&Ngf;fu;)
Slide 20. Eelam is never complete without those
who speak or work against it.
Finally, we welcome those also to the procession.
Thank you for your Patience
and understanding.
End
Paper 4
Concept of Security in the Uni-Polar world and its regional implications in and around the subcontinent.
By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan
Director of South Asian Analaysis Group
Although the subject covers the security of the entire sub continent1 as a whole, I would restrict myself to the Indian point of view and the experience of
Current Concept of Security:
Traditionally the concept of security related only to the military and economic well being of a country or a group of nations bound by common threats or objectives. Over a period of time, its definition extended to energy security and human security. But the term security today is being understood in the broadest sense which includes almost all aspects of human endeavour. The shift has been from military security to comprehensive security.
Dr. El Baradei in his speech while accepting the Nobel Prize in
The result is there for all to see.
Some analysts feel that the
Where the
Coming back to comprehensive security, threats to security would range from internal armed conflict both within and among the States, to large scale human rights abuses including genocide, national and international terrorism, WMD proliferation, widespread incidence of diseases like HIV, environmental degradation, energy shortages particularly for countries with fast-growing economies like China and India and even incidents like the East Asian melt down of 1997-1998 and natural disasters like Tsunami, Earthquakes and floods.4
The point to note is that many of the threats are ones without borders and therefore unlike the earlier times a cooperative approach is required now to combat these borderless threats. But the experience in the sub continent has been other wise. It is sad to see that despite a common location and history,
Many of the threats mentioned above do exist and across the borders, and yet it has not been possible to have a collective approach. Even a tenuous security relationship that existed between
In the last three decades there been a tremendous upsurge of internal conflicts in the region, some with external inspiration and support and some totally indigenous in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal.
Security Setting in the Sub Continent From the Indian Point of View:
In the Subcontinent, there are three aspects of national security that are very relevant to
Internally,
Externally in the neighbourhood we see the following-
1. The rise of the Neo Taliban in
2. Some of the fundamentalist organisations in Pakistan who are tolerated and in fact allowed to function with immunity that are part of the International Islamic Front of Osama bin laden in Pakistan- These include Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HUJI) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). The LET and the JEM are known to have been involved in many of the terrorist acts in
3. The rise of Maoists in
4. Perpetual unstable political situation created by the leading parties led by Khalida Zia and Sheikh Haseena in Bangladesh and the inability of the Indian Government to arrest the flow of illegal immigrants from across the porous border
5. The unending ethnic strife in
6. The tentative steps taken by Maldives towards political reforms and bringing in multiparty democracy with the opposition MDP ( Maldivian Democratic Party) in a hurry resulting in avoidable law and order incidents in that small country.
7. Introduction of Constitutional monarchy and democracy in
Another external dimension to the Indian security is the case of
Some security analysts in
The questions I would pose is whether it is at all necessary in the region to have a collective approach to security in a uni polar world? Is there a collective threat to the sub continent as such? For the first I would say no but for the second part yes in some aspects like natural disasters, environmental degradation, poverty and hunger and there could be and should be a collective approach. We may recall that the Indian ships were the first to reach Sri Lankan tsunami affected areas bringing relief materials and helpers. But in many other issues like combating international terrorism there is hardly any cooperation though at the end of every visit of leaders of neighbouring countries familiar rhetoric of the menace of terrorism and a joint approach to combat the evils of terrorism are mentioned.
Second, given the historical baggage some of the countries in the region carry, even an economic relationship with open frontiers as we see in the European Union or in the in the neighbourhood appears to be a distant dream. It is also unrealistic to expect for
For creating a peaceful political space
The SAARC Experience:
The SAARC founded in 1985 has continued to be still a largely consultative body and has not produced a single collaborative project so far. The Indian Foreign Secretary while pulling out of Dhaka Summit in 2005 was frank enough to admit that India’s expectation of cross border economic linkages, drawing upon the complementaries that existed among different parts of the region would overcome the mutual distrust and suspicion has been belied.
The record of SAARC has hardly been inspiring. The official thinking in
A good example how the SAARC objectives are getting nowhere can be seen from the experience of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) which at one time was seen as a major tool of implementing the objectives of the SAARC . SAFTA binds the developing members of the agreement including
Uni Polar World-
The term Uni Polar world describes a world political climate in which on super power stands above all others forestalling the prospect of a bi polar world with which nations or factions built round one of two comparatively equal super powers.6 This definition is restricted to define the use of the term uni polar to bi polar and does not take into account the present day realities where not one but many other countries are trying to build a multi polar world as opposed to or as a check to unrestrained activities of the sole super power.
We have seen a lot of literature on the unipolar, bipolar and multipolar world. One school argues that a unipolar world is more stable internationally as threats to the hegemony are minimal and it would give rise to a conflict free world. It further argues that conflicts are inbuilt in a bipolar world with two competing powers and that the most unstable will be the multipolar world where there are too many power centres giving rise to multifarious conflicts.
There is the other school which argues that a uni polar world is the most dangerous with no checks on the single super power whereas the bi polar has checks and balances and the ideal would be the multi polar world with checks and balances at many points. It was President Chirac of
With the collapse of the Soviet Union on 26 December 1991, the world has seen a staggering new development of the rise of
Another example of American mind set before 9/11 given below is indicative of the interpretation of US Military on being the sole super power.8
“ Peace is the unique product of American pre eminence -a failure to preserve that pre eminence allows others an opportunity to shape the world in ways antithetical to American interests and principles. Global leadership is not something exercised at our leisure when the mood strikes or when our core national security interests are directly threatened; the nit is already too late. Rather it is a choice whether or not to maintain American military pre eminence fo secure American geopolitical leadership and to preserve the American peace”. This is nothing but arrogance of power and fortunately restricted to US military.
Recently President Putin of
To me however, it looks that the
The Indian view:
The Indian stand on the unipolar world was publicly articulated by the then Defence Minister Pranab Mukherji, just three weeks prior to the visit of the Indian Prime Minister when he was in USA in June 2005 to sign an agreement on a strategic relationship with US. He said that a unipolar world was clearly not sustainable in the long run and
The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of
Some analysts both abroad and in
But
It is interesting to note that Indian interests in the neighbouring countries other than Paksitan are understood in
Going beyond, I will just point out some bench marks in the evolving India-US relationship
• The agreement between President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee committing both countries to a strategic partnership in November 2001
• The agreement in January 2004 when the United States and India agreed to expand cooperation in three specific areas- civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes and high technology trade followed by modifications to US export licensing policies ( White House Statements on 17th September, 2004)
•
• Agreement signed between Indian Defence Minister and the
• US
• President Bush’s visit to
The Russian Angle-
It needs to be emphasised that
Indo Russian relations have generally been on the upswing in the post cold war period with
But where
President Putin visited
But there are areas where
Conclusion:
With increasing globalisation, the definition of a uni polar world will inevitably change.
End
Paper 5
Constitutional Restructuring?
Importance of an Interim Administration in the Northeast
By V. Kuhanendran
In watching the flow of events over the past year or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that something very fundamental is repeated in
“History” wrote Hegel “teaches that history teaches men nothing”. Despite a quarter century of ethnic conflict in
The cancer that eats at
Sri Lankans of all backgrounds have paid a heavy price for their country’s misguided ethnic policies. The security forces, paramilitaries, and criminal elements continue to operate with impunity, periodically raping, torturing, assaulting, and “disappearing” civilians. The legal system, which was severely compromised under Jayewardene’s regime, has been further politicized; and the rule of law and democratic rights have been opportunistically curtailed.
Ultimately, while ethnic outbidding may have originally been directed against the Tamils, its pernicious influence and illiberal consequences have now affected the entire island. Reversing this trend will require key people and institutions to commit to long term, near revolutionary reforms: eschewing racist outbidding and ensuring that all groups are treated dispassionately and fairly; finding ways to blunt the appeal of hyper-nationalists and the extremist sangha without violating their rights; and instituting a policy of credible devolution that promotes Tamil self governance. For now regrettably, such principled reforms seems hardly likely. Instead, the cycle of divisive political jockeying, violence and ethnic outbidding continues to turn, bringing with it new occasions for grief and fresh excuses for repression.
Broadly speaking, all what I have just said could have been said ten, twenty, thirty years ago with minor variations. There has been no progress in the past thirty years. The Sri Lankan state is still locked in a fierce battle to defeat the just rights of the Tamil people. The political institutions have collapsed. The government has lost its authority over the populace. Civil society is living in fear and human rights are conveniently violated. Draconian laws have again been enacted to suppress civil rights. The government instead of shrinking is now enlarged. Corruption is endemic and embedded in the body politic it now needs over one hundred ministers to mange its affairs. Its only business seems to be to suppress the democratic rights of its entire people under the guise of fighting a perceived terrorist threat. In the process the government is following the well trodden path of other a failed states.
How does this affect the people? The position of the Tamil speaking peoples has not changed during the past thirty years. The Northeast is in ruins. The North is under a curfew for the past six months. The people are living like penned animals in
The Sinhala people in the South are no better. They have not escaped the burden of the cost of this war. The cost of living is escalating at an exponential rate. With the threat to the economy jobs are lost in many key industries. Their civic rights are threatened due to the breakdown of law and order. People are abducted in white vans in government controlled areas and never heard of afterwards. A culture of immunity has taken a firm grip on society. No one is safe within
Meanwhile, President Rajapakse and his policymakers seem to believe that the war on the Tamil people is popular with the majority. There is still life left in anti Tamil pogroms. There is a deafening patter of paws as sundry politicians and pundits rush to the side of this juggernaut of terror. The war mongers speculate that their operations are having success and are trumpeting victory and denouncing those that oppose the war as faint hearts or traitors. The media in general have supported this view. No one is attempting to show the people the divisive nature of this enterprise and the catastrophic political, economic and social cost of this war.
Nationalities and the Crisis of Constitutionalism
So that is where we are! We have been here before. The Sri Lankan government has again committed the country to war against the Tamil people. We know that the President and his advisers willfully chose this course based on what is at the heart of Mahinda Chintanaya – dismantle the peace process that promised a high degree of autonomy and consolidate political power around the concept of a unitary state of
Indeed the rulers since independence were either unwilling to accept or totally disregarded the central limitations of a unitary model in relation to multicultural polities. They conducted the affairs of the state as if the Sinhalese owned the state and all the minorities should be subjected to their will. The inevitable result was the reformulation of the Tamil identity in opposition to it and a corresponding demand for federal autonomy on the basis of Tamil nationhood.
The First Republican constitution of the United Front government in 1972 replacing the existing Constitution of 1948 jettisoned Section 29, which had guaranteed against any discriminatory measures and was then thought of as unalterable, since it ensured the solemn balance of rights between the citizens of Sri Lanka, the fundamental condition on which inter se they accepted the Constitution. The Republican Constitution was aimed at consolidating the gains the Sinhala Buddhists had been systematically making ever since
The final act of this somber and melancholy drama was the Second Republican Constitution of 1978, which later incorporating the sixth amendment outlawing even the peaceful pursuit of secession, totally ignored the aspirations of the Tamil minority and intensified Tamil anger.
The reason for recalling the very recent political history is to place the subject matter in its proper context. It can be said that since 1948, Tamils and the Sinhalese lived in harmony until about 1956. From 1956 to 1976 there was disharmony between the two principal communities and a fragile peace prevailed. Since 1976
Political and Territorial Decentralization
This civil war is a dispute between the two principal communities in
The four principles were
- Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a nation
- Recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for Tamils in
- Recognition of the right of self determination of the Tamil nation
- Recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of the Tamils who look upon the island as their country.
These were then and still the common goals of the Tamil people. The Indo Lanka Accord of July 1987 wrenched out of the Government of Sri Lanka two of them namely,
- Recognition that the Northern and Eastern provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups and resolved to permit the adjoining provinces to join to form one administrative unit and also by a referendum to separate as may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
- Right of citizenship to all the Tamils in the plantation.
So the issue of Tamil homeland and Tamil citizenship was conceded by the Sri Lankan government in 1987. What was left out of the Thimpu principles to be resolved then was the implication of the other two principles, - that is the recognition of the Tamils as a nation and their right to self determination.
Twenty years have elapsed since the Indo Lanka treaty. We have since then continuously engaged in wars and temporary peace to find a way out of this crisis. The
Ladies and Gentlemen, the task before us is enormous, that is, to bring peace, security and economic life to all the people in this island. Presently, the two communities are mobilized against each other. We have to actually engage now in the task of nation creating. We have to forge a social contract with one another. But for
In my judgment, stable resolution of the civil war is only possible, when the opposing groups are demographically separated into defensive enclaves. Both the Indo Lanka accord and the
The best developed blueprint for civic peace in multi ethnic states is power sharing. Ethnic division need not result in conflict, even if political mobilization is organized on ethnic lines, civil politics can be maintained if ethnic elites adhere to a power sharing bargain that equitably protects all groups. The key components are
· Joint exercise of governmental power
· Proportional distribution of government funds and jobs
· Autonomy on ethnic issues by regional federation based on groups who are concentrated territorially
· Minority veto on issues of vital importance to each group
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A SETTLEMENT
How do we achieve a stable peace and what are the characteristics of the settlement?
1. The framing of a new democratic constitution for
The new order must recognize the existence of;
• Two nations, the Sinhalese and Tamils in
• Two distinct territories which have historically evolved to be the traditional homelands of the two peoples
The simple formula “one country, one Union Government, an Autonomous Tamil Region” summarizes these proposals.
2. Their realization calls for the incorporation of the following provisions;
• All people in
• There should be established an Autonomous Tamil Region with its regional government and a Union Government for the
The establishment of an Autonomous Tamil Region (ATR) which will have its own regional assembly and government; these bodies will exercise administrative autonomy and be vested with appropriate legislative powers.
The restructuring of all Sri Lankan institutions, including the legislative, the administrative, the judicial and the armed forces, must be a true reflection of the bi-national character of her people
• The division of powers between the
A proper division of powers between the
The new ATR government must be given the widest possible powers to direct its own development and to radically restructure the economy in respect of both the public and private sectors. Autonomous powers in respect of the generation of public and private investment both internally and internationally must be vested in the ATR. Provision must be made for sharing national revenue between the
The ATR must play an active role in major decisions of the
• Whilst sovereignty will be vested in the people of
In federal and unitary systems the national government is the supreme authority in the country. In
There are a set of basic responsibilities that all governments give to their central government. One of these is the right to defend the country and its territorial waters from invasion by foreign powers. This does not mean that the regional government cannot have its own national guard to help with the defence of the country. However, that force is ultimately under the command and control of the national defense forces. A large percentage of the U.S troops now serving in
Further, the reality of the mutual security threats means that the solution to the ethnic conflict must do more than undo the causes, until or unless the security dilemma can be reduced or eliminated, the Tamil army cannot afford to demobilize.
• The ATR government must have powers to promulgate its own basic laws to guide its own activities.
The promulgation of basic laws to assure that social, religious, ethnic and political minorities in any region of the country are not hindered in the exercise of their fundamental rights and in achieving full development.
There will remain large ethnic and religious minorities within the ATR and non-ATR portions of the country whose rights and privileges must be protected. The principles to be incorporated in the new constitution in respect of fundamental rights - discussed previously – must be supplemented by adequate provisions to ensure that minorities in the different regions of the country are not impeded by linguistic, cultural, religious or other obstacles in their full development
Another area of central government control is human or fundamental rights. The national government must be allowed to spell out what rights all of its citizens possess. Regional governments must respect those basic rights. However, the regional governments are free to expand those rights as long as they respect the declared rights by the central government as the basic rights of the country. They may not remove national rights, only increase them.
• The responsibility for the maintenance of law and order should be distributed between the
The reconstitution of the armed forces must espouse the lines that reflect the new constitutional structure. The ATR and the Union government must maintain police and defence forces in a proportion representing their immediate needs and with provision for their combination in the event of an external threat.
• The independence of the judiciary and the separation of executive and judiciary must be ensured and the separation of regional and Union judicial processes demarcated.
Most federal systems such as the
· The modern world does not recognize impassable barriers even less so between peoples inhabiting the limited confines of a small island. The Tamils do not demand autonomy so as to isolate themselves into a sheltered bunker, but on the contrary to be in a better position to contribute to collective wealth and development. This calls for the correct balance between autonomy and interdependence. For historical reasons, discussed above, it is necessary to first clearly demarcate the division between regional and central governmental responsibilities and then provide the machinery for consultation and cooperation.
In respect of economic policy and planning and in respect of the functioning of the different branches, or ministries, of governmental activity, demarcation of powers and avenues for consultation and mutually beneficial coordination must be worked out in the fine print of a negotiated settlement.
.
• There will have to be an adequate representation of the Tamil people in the institution of central administration and other important services such as the Foreign Service.
• A charter of fundamental rights consistent with international covenants and declarations must be incorporated.
3. The recognition of the Tamil language as an official language of the country and the dismantling of all discriminatory provisions in respect of administration, employment, education and the functioning of courts.
4. The repeal of all politically repressive, anti-democratic or ethnically discriminatory legislation and regulations which have been enacted by successive governments since 1947.
5. The institution of appropriate measures and instruments to ensure that a negotiated settlement is properly implemented with international guarantees. In this respect I suggest that there must be enough regional self defense capability that abrogating the autonomy of the ATR would be more costly than any motive for doing so. The local autonomy must be such that the region can protect its key interests even lacking any influence at the Union level.
Timing for a lasting solution
These are some fundamental issues that have to be grappled with in evolving a new constitutional structure. This is a moment of profound challenge;
The Sri Lankan government and the Tamil people are deeply suspicious of each others agenda for the future. President Rajapakse and his supporters believe that the unitary character of the state should not be changed. They believe that devolution is only a ploy to be used by Tamil people as a stepping stone to separation. Sinhala political leaders find it convenient to brand the civil war between the two major communities not as a demand for self governance but purely as a terrorist problem. They do not believe that negotiations with the LTTE, as the Tamil representative, are likely to achieve the kind of outcome they desire.
On the other hand the Tamil people have no desire to accept a solution based on the concept of a unitary state because of their past experience of the gross violation of their democratic rights under the underlying majoritarian principle embedded in the unitary state. Further the Sri Lankan state willfully misrepresents their just struggle for their democratic right to self determination as a mere terrorist problem and refuses to offer a credible package for self governance. The Tamils believe that President Rajapakse is using all means to divide the Tamils and weaken their resistance to the Sri Lankan state in order to impose a dictated peace. Therefore, they have no reason to do anything to weaken the Tamil struggle for self determination led by the LTTE. Tamil people perceive that they have much more to lose without the LTTE than gain by placing their trust in the Sri Lankan state.
In my judgment, at present, there is so much of mistrust between the parties and they are so far apart they both unfortunately see the war as the main instrument to progress towards the resolution of the National Question. They are now more entrenched in their positions; that the chance to address the lasting solution to the National Question is receding by the day. As the Sri Lankan state mobilizes the Sinhala army for war, Tamils are also mobilizing their resources to resist them. As in the past, a re-strengthened Sri Lankan army would chalk up some victories and a resurgent LTTE would come back in classical guerrilla style to inflict defeats here and there on it and the cycle of violence will continue. The casualties in this game of mutual destruction are the ordinary people who are caught up between them because they have no where to escape.
If we cannot in current circumstances address the final settlement, then the next best thing is to separate the two major combatants, usher in some form of peace and then create the conditions to negotiate a final solution thereafter. In this way the two adversaries can be separated and time can be found to promote some form of peace building. This is nothing new; it is this concept that underpinned both the peace processes under the Indo Lanka accord and the
The
The Sri Lankan economy has suffered a huge setback due to the 50 year conflict between the two principal communities. The Northeast in particular, has been seriously affected by three decades of armed conflict. The human costs of the conflict are not only the result of direct violence – casualties from fighting between combatants, the undisciplined behavior of troops, deliberate terrorizing of civilians and the sowing of landmines – but also arise from hunger, forced migration and the collapse of public services stemming from the wider effects of the prolonged conflict on the economic and administrative structure of the Northeast. The indirect consequence of the conflict – including raised deaths from hunger and disease - generally far outweigh the direct destruction and battle deaths.
The Effect of War in the North East
The greater part of the human cost of the civil war does not result directly from battle deaths and injuries, but rather indirectly from the loss of livelihoods caused by dislocation of the Northeast economy and society resulting from the conflict. The civilian deaths are far greater than military losses, one indication of the proportionate importance of indirect casualties. The economic and social costs of the civil war could be loosely divided into two categories:- the immediate human costs and the longer term development costs. This division is an oversimplification because human costs, such as worsened health and education, constitute development costs, while development costs such as the destruction of infrastructure are among the costs of human suffering..
From the point of view of vulnerable groups the human costs of the conflict arise from the destruction of entitlement (this term famously applied by Sen for his analysis of famines) such as:-
- Market entitlements – employment losses, sales losses, loss of rent from assets, increase in prices of essentials relative to monetary incomes
- Direct entitlements – goods and services which are produced and consumed on a shared basis – subsistence production
- Public entitlements – access to publicly provided goods and services, health services, education etc.
Their destruction during the conflict is one of the major adverse effects of the war, leading to rising mortality and lower living standards.
The major cities in the Northeast once thriving cities are now a decimated skeleton of a town; buildings have been flattened by bombs, homes shot out and deserted. During the course of the war, over 1 million people were forced to leave their homes and all their possessions. Even though they were displaced within their own country, they have lost everything; their livelihoods, their community and often their families.
Further, the average level of income of the Northeast has dropped drastically - an important determinant of what proportion of the population is near or below poverty line. Where people were already near the edge of poverty, the substantial reduction in their entitlements are having a devastating effect on their survival.
This is exacerbated by the loss through migration of some of the most talented, educated, and affluent members of the society. During the conflict they have provided a much-needed source of remittances for family members. The war has also killed a large number of young men and a large number of young refugees are all over the globe. The large subsistence agricultural sector in particular has been affected by these migrations and due to the direct destruction of the war.
There are certain direct effects arising from conflict, which cause other effects as they work there way through the economy. These effects include output loss as people move from their place of work because they join the fighting, are killed or flee. The agricultural sector is very much affected by movement of people and mining. The destruction of capital (such as large energy plants), industrial plant (such as the cement factory) through bombing and consequent loss of output; disruption of transport due to physical destruction of road, rail, sea and air transport networks; the loss of trust between economic agents, reducing market transactions, and the collapse of the financial sector due to bombing or arson.
These effects reduced the aggregate levels of output. Labour markets are disarticulated as unskilled men of prime working age are particularly hit by violent deaths and military recruitment, while skilled labour has virtually left the Northeast. Another important indirect effect is the shortage of ‘foreign inputs’ for the productive sector leading to a further fall in output.
As a consequence the
- GDP per capita in the Northeast is severely affected by the direct and indirect effects of the conflict. The knock on effects of the lack of power plant caused other production facilities like industrial plants, textile plants to close down.
- Domestic savings have fallen in absolute terms, if not collapsed. The present consumption levels are almost at subsistence level for the vast majority of the Northeast population and it is only maintained by the remittances coming from their relatives abroad.
- There is hardly any investment at present in the Northeast. Private domestic investment is non existent due to lack of confidence in the future, lesser trust and greater costs of transport and communications, raising transaction costs. Local investment is finding increasing difficulties in getting access to finance due to the risk to the investment.
- Inflation is at an all time high. The price of food and other necessaries are relatively high due to the loss in food production and the falls in supply due to disruptions in production and trade.
The adverse macro –effects with falling real aggregates of expenditure and output is the background to other changes. Activities that employ capital or dependant on transport are severely hampered. These include not only the manufacturing sector but also agriculture and fisheries.
The vast majority of the poor households are critically affected by the changing economic situation, not least because household composition itself is altered by the conflict; adult men join the fighting forces, are killed or migrate, women acquire greater responsibilities, often as head of household and chief provider.
Both market and public entitlements declined on average during the past 25 years, often disproportionately to poor households. This was the result of reduced employment and real wages with the losses in production and rising inflation. These entitlement losses are dramatic and life-threatening when food prices escalate.
The entitlement losses have affected the Northeast economy itself in a number of ways. The dislocation of small scale peasant and artisan production leads to a loss of food and earnings, reducing the supply of key inputs to the rest of the economy and reducing household consumption levels.
Finally, the reduced capacity of government to deliver services such as health and education leads to declining quality of life. On average, the well being of most households has deteriorated sharply, with falling entitlements of most kinds. Health conditions have deteriorated as immunization levels fall, water supplies break down, people are moved and re-concentrated, and resistance levels decline due to poor nutrition. There are also negative psychological effects, not only from the traumas of war itself but also from forced migration and family separation.
Reconstruction and Development
Reconstruction involves rebuilding of physical infrastructure and facilities, creation of minimal social services, and structural reform in the political, economic, and social and security sectors.
- There are no clear constitutive rules in the form of a peace settlement (unlike
- Warfare continues and the short term requirements of the military campaign often conflict with longer-term goals of peace building. Waging war at the same time as attempting to build peace is extra-ordinarily difficult.
The basic issues and ‘fault lines’ in the vision for
- Relations between the Sri Lankan state and the Northeast region
- Ethnic relations and powers between the two principal communities
Reconstruction will not be possible until these fault lines are addressed, These issues define the content of the constitutive rules, which currently are contested, and this affects numerous aspects of reconstruction and peace building such as infrastructure, financing and security (restoring law and order, and security, is slow because of the fragmentation of military power and lack of agreement about what kind of devolved powers should prevail). In the absence of agreement, there is likely to be only a ‘muddling through’
Peace, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction are not work that can be carried out in a vacuum. It requires a driver with power. Some form of government with authority. The Indo Lankan Accord envisaged the necessity for an interim administration in the North East to deal with these urgent matters until it is replaced with an agreed form of devolved power as part of the Final Settlement between the Tamil Representatives and the GOSL. This is incorporated as the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. The 13th Amendment gave legislative and executive powers to the Northeast Council but it could only exercise them within the limits set by the central government. It was a subordinate body. Real power was vested with the Governor, the Parliament and the President and the Provincial Council was really a dependant on the above bodies for their power of law making, revenue collection and administration. Regardless of these deficiencies the North East Provincial Council was strangled by the then President at birth..
The ISGA is produced against a background of a long drawn out, hard Tamil struggle for rights and the LTTE’s role in it. Since launching the arms struggle against the state LTTE have managed to acquire power and sway over vast tracts of the Northeast province resulting in the political and military dominance of the LTTE over the Northeast. What the LTTE had won in the battlefield it is unlikely to surrender at the peace table. LTTE intends to secure control over the landmass of the Northeast to enable the people of the province to enjoy its benefits.
Realities must be faced and accepted not ignored blindly. It is a fact that the government is not in control of large parts of the Northeast. The government authority is almost non-existent even in government controlled areas of the Northeast. The ISGA is written around this fact. Why spend energy challenging these self evident truths? Any Sri Lankan government, if it is to be a credible partner for peace will have to grasp this nettle. Further, no coordination enhancing institutions can be established in the Northeast without recognizing the ground realities.
Some say that the ISGA is outside the constitution. But then, the civil war itself is extra constitutional, and the Sri Lankan Government has lost its constitutional authority and sovereign rights over more than half of the North-East. This is recognized in the Ceasefire agreement. The ISGA proposal in reality seeks to bring in these areas under some form of development control under the central government, through an interim agreement with the LTTE. This is an important stage in the process of converting a war torn country into a new constitutional union acceptable to all. The ISGA proposal is placed for discussion as a step in the negotiations following the ceasefire, the MOU and the
The high security zones are also another problematic area. High security zones are widespread in the Northeast. The government has designated areas as High security zones and expelled the inhabitants from those areas and large amounts of lands seized from their owners without compensation. No democratic government has the right to seize land without due process and compensation for that land. The government will have to respect the rights to private property owners and at least provide adequate compensation to the owners for the past and current use of the land. A significant proportion of those evicted from the land are living in very harsh conditions. The government’s draconian regulations on land acquisition and re-occupation and restrictions on fishing had deprived thousands of Tamils of rich agricultural lands and denied thousands of Tamil fishermen their livelihood. In the present context, of warring armies, HSZs, and IDPs, an ISGA without adequate powers cannot deal successfully with reconstruction; the normal development mechanisms of third world countries are found to be grossly inadequate to deal with extensive civil war damage. Adverse and abnormal interim conditions demand special responses. In any case, the LTTE has offered to negotiate the terms of the ISGA proposal.
The immediate and the ultimate challenge is war or peace. This fear is being raised by anti-peace war mongers. If the LTTE is not serious about a peaceful solution to the conflict, most likely there would have been no ceasefire and war would have continued. On the contrary, a successfully implemented interim administration will bestow significant economic and social benefits upon the people of the Northeast and more importantly on the people in the South. Over 1.2 millions of Sri Lankan in the Diaspora including 8 lakhs of Tamils, will enthusiastically mobilize resources overseas for investment in Northeast and the rest of the country. The benefits from such inward inflows will gradually flow to the people of the South. There will also be increased trade and business exchanges between the Northeast and the South. Many a development activity will be partly or fully serviced thorough institutions in
If the LTTE were to manipulate the interim administration towards creating a separate state, it would amount to a declaration of war on the Sri Lankan Government. This is no different - however you look at it - from the LTTE confronting the Sri Lankan army. Specialists who have studied the history of ethnic conflicts would argue that delaying a military confrontation would play to the disadvantage of the LTTE. There is no scientific basis to argue that the LTTE would gain any military superiority some years after setting up the interim administration. Evidence from the post 2001- years tends to support this position. These are false arguments invented by anti-peace activists and chauvinists in the South.
The challenge at this moment is to find the leaders with a vision in
The widespread expectation among the civilian population since the beginning of the peace process is that the ending of open warfare would lead rapidly to a recovery of the economy. This perception is encapsulated by the notion of the ‘peace dividend’. This would mean that the armies would return to the agricultural and industrial labour force, and that output would shift from supporting the military towards consumption and productive investment. This is unlikely to be achieved in the immediate future. Presently, on the one hand, the productive system in the Northeast has been destroyed or distorted by the conflict and widespread insecurity persists, personal security is yet to be restored, and property rights remain uncertain. On the other hand, the problems of underdevelopment – widespread poverty, human capital, low investment, and external constraints and so on – have been exacerbated by the years of conflict.
The reconstruction of the economy after a war involves the establishment of ‘solvency’ in the wide sense. There are three basic elements:
- First recovery and expansion of the production base in order to generate income necessary to provide for consumption, undertake debt service and eventually finance the investment required for growth;
- Second the organization of the fiscal sector so that there are sufficient tax revenues, an efficient expenditure system and a manageable debt level;
- Third the building of the institutions necessary to allow the private sector to revive and contribute to sustainable growth, employment creation and rising income levels
In the short run these three functions can be replaced by an international aid effort, but the measure of effectiveness of this effort is not the immediate welfare gains but whether solvency is in fact established and a sustainable development path reached. Obviously, the key player leading the development efforts in the Northeast will be the Interim Administration. Therefore the Interim Administration should have the funds necessary to direct this effort. A crucial issue for the Interim Administration is how to generate adequate sources of revenue for the rehabilitation and reconstruction effort. The failure of the Provincial Council system was largely due to the central government’s failure to give the council adequate sources of revenue. LTTE has been operating a kind of tax regime in the Northeast for the past 15 years. It relies on this revenue not only for its expenditure but also to promote welfare programs. When a highly centralized government as in
The scope of the Interim Administration should be limited to a fixed period sufficient to oversee the reconstruction of the Northeast and to give a chance for the evolution of political institutions. It is clearly to last a fixed reasonable period of say 5 years and intended to bridge the period between the beginning of the Interim Administration and the final settlement of the conflict. The structure of government proposed should provide the necessary leadership to rapid reconstruction of the Northeast. No doubt there are several models that could be considered. But each one has potential costs and benefits associated with various approaches to leadership. Ultimate control and power in the hands of the Interim Administration can be beneficial in that decisions can be expedited. The controlling authority does not need to obtain widespread agreement from other partners to undertake activities. This can be difficult as there will often be competing views on how certain features of reconstruction should be undertaken. Ultimately, someone has to have the final say or operations can be greatly slowed as the various controlling critics coordinate their decisions and effort. However, it must not be forgotten that the long run sustainability of the reconstruction program would require input from other partners not sabotaging it.
The choice of LTTE at the apex of the command structure is another intricate political issue. Economists often highlight the fact that good politics do not necessarily mean good economics. This largely stems from public choice insights highlighting the fact that the incentives provided by political institutions often fail to align with the economic interests of the society at large. These same issues apply to situations of post war reconstruction as well. Whatever views one might have, it is necessary that the control structure should be chosen well in advance of the reconstruction project. It will be extremely difficult to achieve stability, let alone widespread coordination, within the war torn region, if the command structure itself is in a state of disarray. In the context of the political military situation in the Northeastern space only LTTE will have the qualities of leadership to fill this role.
It would be convenient to digress here for a moment and address the issue of democracy. Holding elections is often seen as a key benchmark in the path of democracy. However, this overlooks the critical fact that elections in themselves do not necessarily yield results aligning with a liberal order. In the absence of supporting institutions, elections can be counterproductive and actually impede the achievement of a successful reconstruction. Democracy deals with the method of selecting government officials while constitutional liberalism deals with the goals of government. – the protection of individual rights, the rule of law etc. In the absence of constitutional liberalism democracy will not yield desirable results. The election of Hitler or the election of the military junta in
Democracy can be effective when citizens are committed to a free society. Without these underlying conjectures, democracy can bring tyranny and chaos. The political order serves as the foundation and framework within which economic and social order can evolve. Before elections can occur, a social order, a market structure and the underlying cooperative conjectures must be in place.
Another factor that is important is the issue of ethnic heterogeneity of the region. The magnitude of the issue is unclear. The Northeast have a number of minority Muslim and Sinhalese groups which fear that it could be harmed by the majoritarian system proposed in the ISGA. Both have reasons for the fear. Muslims in particular justly feel they have had a hard time during this civil war. Some of the Muslim people are among the displaced in Puttalam. They have been very shabbily treated. Their rights have to be vindicated without any equivocation. The Tamil leadership have to address their concerns and create the environment for their security and stability for the communities to thrive. It would be a shame if we conspire to brush these matters under the carpet.
Further, it would be an ultimate irony if LTTE were to create a political system which has the same flaws that led to their uprising against the Sri Lankan state. However, ISGA proposes to create district councils. There is sufficient scope within the proposals to create some form of structures that is responsive to the local communities. It is hoped that the Interim Administration would allow maximum decentralization and local governance to the minorities at district level while providing a inclusive systems for consultation with local communities.
Often overlooked is that all populations are heterogeneous on some margins. It is not hetero or homogeneity per se that leads to or prevents a successful reconstruction, but rather the ability of the populace to coordinate around the aims of the reconstruction. In this regard it is important that the leadership embrace a set of informal values and norms shared among the members of all groups that permits cooperation among them. This is critical in serving as a foundation for the Interim Administration and will play a key role in its sustainability over time. When the stock of social capital aligns with the aims of reconstruction it will greatly ease the process and allow the reconstructed order to ‘stick’ and operate in the manner desired. Anything else would result in a dysfunctional Northeast.
Post war reconstruction should strongly consider implementing a civil institutional investment program for the war affected economy. Such a program should prioritize the establishment of independent police and judicial authorities, improve the quality of law making process, strengthen conflict resolution capacities, and improve other civil and market institutions damaged by war, which are pre-requisites for balanced post-war growth.
Successful implementation of an Interim Administration under conditions of relative peace for a number of years will bring major social and economic benefits to all people in the entire country, render ineffective the propaganda of chauvinists who argue that an Interim Administration will lead to chaos and separation, and will firmly motivate the warring groups to formulate a final solution.
When governments intervene to tackle injustice they are not violating rights, they are righting wrongs. Let us tell the people that it is when politics fail and governments walk away that children are malnourished, that men and women go without jobs, that old people die in poverty, that public squalor exists alongside private affluence and potential of its entire people is left unrealized. It is when politics succeeds and governments engage all can begin to have opportunity and no one is left out, that all our people have the chance to make the most of themselves and no one and no area is excluded, and that justice can triumph.
We meet today at a time of more challenging conditions in the Sri Lankan polity and economy. My theme this afternoon is what this generation of Sri Lankans working together, each and all of us, can do – that we are not powerless individuals, but acting together have the power to shape history. The crisis calls for extraordinary courage and resolution. Failure in our efforts to bring peace would without doubt offer people up for military destruction or leave them without support to perish. The leaders of the two nations must earnestly apply themselves to find a way forward, by every decent method which wisdom could invent and avoid the calamities of war. Whilst, we hope that the courageous soldiers and the bold patriots will, in this crisis, sit together and address the very difficult issues confronting them with imagination and in a spirit of accommodation and compromise to end this protracted conflict, we must together, urge all the parties to do more and steer them forward towards peace. The alternative is only separation.
End
Note: The presentation forwarded on this occasion by Lord.Prof.M.Desai (Patron) and Prof.S.Ganesan (Academic Committee) were not submitted in written forms.
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[2] Gililov S. 1982, The Nationalities Question: Lenin’s Approach, Progress Publishers, 17, Zubovsky Boulevard, Moscow, USSR.
[3] Lenin V.I. 1920, Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial Questions, In Collected Works, 4th English Edition, Vol. 31, 1966, pp.144-51, Progress Publishers, Moscow; Retrieved on 20 February 2007, from http://www.marx2mao.com/Lenin/DTNCQ20.html
[4] Dixon N. 1999, Marx, Engels and Lenin on the National Question, In Links, Socialism and Nationalism, No.13, Sept to Dec 1999, Australia; Retrieved on 20 February 2007, from http://www.dsp.org.au/links/back/issue13/Dixon.htm
[5] Anderson B 1991, Imagined Communities, Verso, London and New York; Retrieved on 20 February 2007, from http://www.nationalismproject.org/books/a_b.htm#Anchor-Anderson-23526
[6] Stalin J V 1913, Marxism and the National Question, Prosveshcheniye, Nos. 3-5, March-May 1913, Retrieved from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm
[7] Nesiah D. 2001, Tamil Nationalism, Marga Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka
[8] The First International and After, Pelican, 1974, p. 158 cited in Dixon N. 1999, Marx, Engels and Lenin on the National Question, in Links, Socialism and Nationalism, No.13, Sept to Dec 1999, Australia; Retrieved on 20 February 2007, from http://www.dsp.org.au/links/back/issue13/Dixon.htm
[9] Lenin V.I. 1922, The Question of Nationalities or "Autonomisation", Retrieved: 23 February 2007, from: http://marxists.architexturez.net/archive/lenin/works/1922/dec/testamnt/autonomy.htm
[10] Luxemburg R. 1918, The Nationalities Question in the Russian Revolution, Retrieved from: http://libcom.org/library/nationalities-question-in-the-russian-revolution-luxemburg
[11] Lenin V.I. 1913, Critical Remarks on the National Question, In Collected Works, 4th English Edition, Vol. 20, 1964, p. 34, Progress Publishers, Moscow; Retrieved on 20 February 2007, from http://www.marx2mao.com/Lenin/CRNQ13.html
[12] Kirgis Jr. F,L. 1994, The Degree of Self-determination in the United Nations Era, In American Journal of International Law, Vol. 88, No.2, April 1994
[13] Judgements of the Supreme Court of Canada 1998, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 1998, Retrieved: 20 February 2007, from http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1998/1998rcs2-217/1998rcs2-217.html
[14] Nesiah D. 2001, Tamil Nationalism, Marga Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka
[15] Nesiah K 1945, The Mother Tongue in Education, Ola Books, Colombo; Cited in Nesiah D 2001, Tamil Nationalism, Marga Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka
[16] Lewer N and William J 2002, Sri Lanka: Finding a Negotiated End to Twenty-Five Years of Violence, Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Bradford, 1992
[17] The demands of the Tamils are summarized in the four Thimpu Principles articulated by Tamil negotiators with the government at the Thimpu Talks of 1985.
* Recognition of the Tamils of Ceylon as a nation
* Recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils in Ceylon
* Recognition of the right of self-determination of the Tamil nation
* Recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils in Ceylon
[18] Balasingham A.S. 1983, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam: The Birth of the Tiger Movement, Retrieved 23 February 2007, from http://www.tamilnation.org/ltte/index.htm
[19] Kadirgamar L. 2003, Norwegian Peace Initiative – Statement by the SLFP on the LTTE proposals for an ISGA; Retrieved 26 February 2007, from http://www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/tamileelam/norway/031104slfp.htm
[20] Tamil workers with Indian origin brought by the British to work in their plantations.
[21] CIA 2007, The World Factbook Sri Lanka, Retrieved on 25 February 2007, from https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/ce.html
[22] Bass D. 2001, Landscapes Of Malaiyaha Tamil Identity, Marga Institute, Colombo
[23] Muthiah W. S. and Wanasinghe S 1998, Bracegirdle affair: An episode in the history of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, Young Socialist, Colombo
[24] Leslie Goonewardene L 1960, A Short History of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, Colombo, pages 11-13, In Alexander R J 1991, International Trotskyism 1929-1985: A Documented Analysis of the Movement. Duke University Press; Retrieved 23 February 2007 from http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/alex/works/in_trot/cey1_1.htm#f13n
[25] Bass D. 2001, Landscapes Of Malaiyaha Tamil Identity, Marga Institute, Colombo
[26] Ali A. 2001, Plural Identities and Political Choices of the Muslim Community: The Survival Game, Marga Institute, Colombo
[27] Guruge L. 2006, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Problem and Solutions, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo.
[28] Ameerdeen V. 2006, Ethnic Politics of Muslims in Sri Lanka, Kribs Printers, Colombo.
[29] The Sunday Times, 7 April 2002, Colombo.
[30] The Sunday Times, 14 April 2002, Colombo.
[31] Lenin V.I. 1914, Right of Nations to Self-determination: Practicality in the National Question, In Collected Works, 4th English Edition, Vol. 20, 1972, p. 409, Progress Publishers, Moscow, Retrieved: 24 February 2007 from http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/index.htm
[32] Jupp J 1978, Sri Lanka - Third World Democracy, Frank Cass and Company, Limited, London, 1978, page 74, In Alexander R J 1991, International Trotskyism 1929-1985: A Documented Analysis of the Movement. Duke University Press; Retrieved 23 February 2007 from http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/alex/works/in_trot/cey1_1.htm#f13n
[33] This issue is contested by Sinhala nationalists on the basis of proportion of ethnicities in total population, For example, see International Foundation of Sri Lankans undated, Are the Tamils discriminated in Sri Lanka, United Kingdom
[34] de Silva C.R. 1978, The Politics of University Admissions: A review of some aspects of the admissions policy in Sri Lanka 1971-1978’, in Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences, Issue 1, Vol.2 Dec, pp. 85-123
[35] Bopage L 1977, A Marxist Analysis of the National Question, Niyamuwa Publications, JVP, Colombo
[36] JVP 1978, Policy Declaration of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, Ginipupura Publications, London
[37] Wijeweera R, What is the solution to the Tamil Eelam Struggle?, Sinhala Ed., JVP Publications, 1986, p.277; English translation retrievable from http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/national_question/our_solution_for_national_question.htm
[38] Lerski G J 1968, Origins of Trotskyism in Ceylon, A Documentary History of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, 1935-1942, at http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/document/srilanka/contents.htm, cited in Samarakkody E 1984, The National Question in Sri Lanka, Revolutionary Workers Party, Sri Lanka retrievable at http://www.whatnextjournal.co.uk/Pages/Back/Wnext3/Tamils.html
[39] Samarakkody E. 1984, The National Question in Sri Lanka, Revolutionary Workers Party, Sri Lanka retrievable at http://www.whatnextjournal.co.uk/Pages/Back/Wnext3/Tamils.html
[40] Lenin V.I. 1914, Critical Remarks on the National Question, In Collected Works, 4th English Edition, Vol. 20, 1964, p. 26, Progress Publishers, Moscow, Retrieved: 24 February 2007 from http://www.marx2mao.com/Lenin/CRNQ13.html
[41] V. I. Lenin V.I. Collected Works, Vol. 20, 1972, p. 433, Retrieved 27 February 2007 from http://www.marx.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ch07.htm
[42] Bopage L 1977, A Marxist Analysis of the National Question, Niyamuwa Publications, JVP, Colombo
[43] Lenin V.I. 1916, The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination, Collected Works, Vol.22, Moscow, pp. 143-156, Retrieved 27 February 2006 from http://marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/jan/x01.htm
[44] Lenin V.I. 1918, Original Version of the Article 'The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government', In Collected Works, 4th English Edition, Vol. 42, 1971, p. 68-84, Progress Publishers, Moscow, Retrieved: 24 February 2007 from http://www.marx.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/mar/23b.htm
[45] Lenin V.I. 1918, Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), In Collected Works, 4th English Edition, Vol. 27, 1965, p. 155, Progress Publishers, Moscow, Retrieved: 24 February 2007 from http://www.marx2mao.com/Lenin/ESC18.html
[47] Wijeweera R. 1977, Opportunism or Proletarian Internationalism?, Sinhala edition, Niyamuwa Publication, Colombo
[48] Mao Tse Tung 1938, On Protracted War, Selected Works, Vol. II, pp. 152-53; Retrieved on 28 February 2007, from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch05.htm
[49] Nesiah D. 2006, Towards a North-Eastern Consensus, presented at International Conference on ‘Reviewing the Past for Reshaping the Future, Revised February 2007, Eastern University, Batticaloa.
[50] Ignatief M, 1993, Blood and belonging: journeys into the new nationalism, London: BBC Books
1 By subcontinent one should normally take all the SAARC countries into consideration that includes
2 See
3Some critics point out that the Iraq war has finally exploded the myth of a uni polar world and that the developments in Iraq and its failure to achieve stability over there raise fundamental questions about the limits of American power- “The end of the Unipolar myth” IHT September 27 2004.
4 In an article “The Threat of Insecurity” presented at the New School of Athens conference held in March,2006, Professor Michael had listed 15 issues that included failing and failed countries. This would apply too in the management of national security in
5This point was made by Graeme Wheeler, Managing Director of World Bank in the SAFTA Conference in Mumbai on February 17.
6 This is the definition given in Wiki Encyclopedia, though many may dispute such a definition.
7. One recent example given by them was in
8Rebuilding
9 At the annual
0 It was unfortunate that the Indian Peace Keeping Force had to fight for the implementation of the 13th amendment in a hostile environment and
11At one point the Vajpayee government was almost getting ready a division for deployment in
12 This paper has made wide use of the papers and updates published in www.saag.org of South Asia Analysis Group,
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