Paper submitted to the SAAG

Document 3

Paper no. 2402 05-Oct-2007 SRI LANKA (CEYLON) - Cart before horses: Principles must precede strategies and tactics Guest Column by Ravi Sundaralingam The nature of politics is such that a week is too long. Add bad memories, we develop a mental blockage that plays havoc with our systems. The first casualty is the principles, which all agreed, as the basis for the project a while ago. This is of course a natural process in our own private lives as much as in politics, therefore no specific criticism aimed at anyone serves any purpose, and most often tend to be counter productive. The technique to assess such developed situation is to look at radical ways to relate to its origin and move forward. The history of the civil strife in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) has their origins in pre-colonial times. The Indian involvement that shaped these events also dates well before that time. But, the context of this involvement has changed drastically during the post-colonial period, which has deep impact on the psyche of the various communities in the island. As the tribal and linguistic ties beyond the waters wane into insignificance, newer more defined, yet ever-changing national ‘interests’ have taken their places. As the European notions of nation and state took roots, the idea of involving with kith and kin outside one’s boundary has become a difficult proposition. However, the disappearance of the bi-polar universe, the dominant position of the USA, and the signs of development of a multi-polar universe is allowing us to think again and explore universal concepts that transcend ‘national’ boundaries. Globalisation, in this sense, is a natural dialectical extension, which breaks not only the national boundaries, but also age-old ties and relationships within those national boundaries, in terms of race, classes, and religion. It is in this newly found opportunity, which gives the human condition a modern broader perspective; one should search for solutions for the pre-colonial problems, such as that in Ceylon. During the bi-polar period, governed by cold-war conditions, though India with Ceylon was inaugural members of the Third World Movement, Indra Gandhi entertained the notion of a ‘separate state’ for the Tamils in Ceylon. Thereafter various governments in India, through its agencies, having identified the real basis of the ethnic crisis, ‘worked the problem’ to achieve a solution, which eventually transpired as the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. Rajiv’s murder and terrorism The Accord faltered due to lack of ownership and real political leadership within the Ceylon Tamil communities, and the armed conflict between the Indian peace keepers (IPKF) and the LTTE ensued. The escalation of this conflict consumed the Ceylon Tamils such a manner it ended up in the murder of Rajiv Gandhi, on the soil of Tamil Nadu. It is where the course of the history for the Tamils of Ceylon was redefined, not in terms of pre or post of anything but, the murder of Rajiv Gandhi. The real cost of this single act, allegedly by the LTTE, is still not apparent to the Tamils, and it seems also to the others who are involved. India alone might be in a position of this knowledge; only time will tell. Tamils from Ceylon find these events, leading up to and to the murder of Rajiv difficult to fathom or digest and always looking for a way to skirt around it when compelled. As a community, permanently placed under siege-mentality, and as a victim, its difficulty to see the pain caused to others in the name of their defence or the true consequences of any actions is understandable. One witnesses this phenomenon clearly in the case of Israel, a state stealthily formed on somebody’s land and, established and maintained by shear brutality. This accidental state came into being because their compatriots, in various European countries, saw them as enemies within. Accidental because prior to settling for the Middle Eastern location European Jewish organisation were prospecting for land in Africa and South America. No one doubts the holocaust and the pain endured by the European Jews at the hand of their brethren, victims of a crime proportion only to the genocide of the American Indians or the Aborigines of Australia. During that horrendous process they must have also been incapacitated to a degree that they do not understand the crime and the pain they commit against another community, namely the Palestinians, which had nothing to do with their historical pains. Even the genuine Palestinian arguments for only a portion of a country they rightfully owned until the 40s, and the legitimate struggle for their rights recognised by the UN, have been set aside by Israelis as they feel for their safety today and security tomorrow. Therefore, all historical issues associated with the Palestinians; how they managed to put the entire Palestinians out to dry as refugees, and how contrary to all the humane norms they take the homes and lands of individual Palestinians, are superseded by the issue on ‘terrorism’. The version of this terminology is defined exclusively by those condone and perpetrate it in the name of a legalised state, at times against other states in the name of ‘national interests’. Terrorism is a scourge of the humane society whatever form it takes for whatever course it is supposed to serve. Whether it is the state terrorism or the individual-terrorism by so-called liberation or revolutionary group one should not make any exceptions. At the same time, to equate the legitimate armed struggle in defence of a community or for their legitimate rights with terrorism itself is a form of terrorism. Terrorism perverts the course of any people’s history, whether they are the perpetrators or victims. It also gives a skewed vision of a rightful struggle; yet, it is still a preferred tool for many groups as much as states. Men conditioned by a continuous siege mentality and deprived of free thinking, as well as those who are isolated in their much guarded privacy of their homes, still perceive it as a weapon that can deliver the immediate impact, if not the desired result for their course. These are the reasons why we should seek radical approaches to reaffirm or redefine the original set of problems if we are to find a solution. This is why we argue for the establishments of the set of principles first, for the course as well as the prescriptive methods, well before we engage as participants or as analysts of a crisis. A radical approach the only way to break out of the melee the events of the intervening period has produced, griping the communities with new subjective realities and a deformed mind-set. Objective historical events in Ceylon’s ethnic crisis What are the origins of the crisis in Ceylon? It is the total capture of the state by the Sinhala chauvinists and the majoritarian state terror against all minority communities since the ‘independence’. What is the nature of the state? Its willing to exterminate large section of its Sinhala population in its campaign against the JVP, is a clue. The program to eradicate the Tamils as a viable community within the island was obvious from the beginning, and should have been expected. The push for the ‘Sinhalese solution’ started with DS Senenayake, as soon as the independence and continued relentlessly, taking a fully blown military face with JR Jayawardene declaring his wish to “drive all the Tamils into the sea”. What is the dynamics of the state? Even after all the bloodshed, we have a GOSL president in Mahinda Rajapaksha who is without any qualms says with pride that he is only a President for those who elected him, the Sinhalese. Unlike the ethnic conditions in India, there aren’t many nations or communities to argue for more evenly paced dynamics to prevent a particular brand of majoritianism. Ceylon has numerically vastly superior Sinhala community, and Tamil speaking minority communities, having antagonistic state - community dynamics. Mahinda’s perverse take on democracy should not mask the state’s relationship with the minority communities or his subscription to the Sinhalese solution. Does LTTE or individual-terrorism of the Tamil groups alter the state of this dynamics? No. Military victories against the state’s armed forces, particularly by the LTTE, have changed the approach adopted by the chauvinists to bring a Sinhalese solution to the island’s ethnic aliments. Some Sinhala leaders may have been less vehement in their advocacy for a Sinhalese solution, nevertheless are compelled to continue with the state’s set program. The state and its apparatuses have their own undisrupted program although of some Sinhala leaders’ disassociation with it. Even conceding sovereignty temporally can be turned around and made into an acceptable part of the program against the Tamils. Have these two factors altered the course and perception of the Tamil peoples’ condition and their struggle? Yes. Have they added new dimension to those who analyse the nature of security in the region? Yes. But, how much of this perceived threat to security or stability is projected beyond the island’s border? The alleged murder of Rajiv at the hands of the LTTE is the type of action considered by some Indian policy makers as destabilising for India and the region. They also cite, the killings of various Sinhala Political leaders, including a president and ministers in Sri Lanka, and Tamil leaders including several members of EPRLF leadership in Tamil Nadu as typical characteristics of the process, which constitute an internal dynamics for regional instability. But what is the behaviour of the Tamil groups in the recent past? The arguments and confirmed opinions are that these types of actions were pre-MOU that was signed between the GOSL and the LTTE, and no group since is responsible for any such incidents. However, the elimination process by the use of individual-terrorism continues unabated. Encouraged by the state some Tamil groups commit the same atrocities against the individuals they accuse the LTTE with, and the counter terrorism by the LTTE in response, creating a never ending cycle of terror and violence. Does it mean that there is a case for simply forgetting the murder of Rajiv and move on? No. Just as the killing of Rajiv separates the history of the Tamils’ struggle from its origin to that of something distorted, that contributes negatively to the stability of the region to that in preservation of a people, the mindset of the Indian policy makers into before and after, and the participation of the mainstream Tamil Nadu politicians from active contribution to apathy, it should also separate our approach for the terms of a solution, from regular strategic to more radical-problem-solving-basis. In this respect, we pose the question for ourselves “How did India moved on from the murder of Indra Gandhi?” Strategy against ‘Tamil nationalism’: Elimination or Absorption For states founded on lose economical ground, dominated by a small but powerful ruling-class, nationalism of a people within their domain is an anathema, without even considering its case. When nationalism is played within set of international conditions, it becomes a serious issue, despite its actual role or strategic worthiness of people or the area they occupy. It is not surprising to find many ‘players’ in the field in these circumstances, who are not necessarily in the team sheet. These considerations lead to the convenient and reasonably safe assumption for the policy makers of powerful states to set up strategies to neutralise the probable threats posed by a particular nationalist course. Most preferred among the few is the “Extremisation to eliminate” strategy. The normal approach within any strategy is to seek ways to consolidate something while finding ways, within it, to eradicate the impediments, which serve against the perceived interests, whether in long or medium term basis. For example, if an advanced state wants to eliminate regional nationalism in its midst, its strategy would be to isolate the moderates from the tendency who are firmly in the nationalist camp. Because the moderates represent the classes, that help to articulate and sustain a political movement. Then the politico-military part of the strategy is to ensure the ‘extreme version’ of the nationalism dominates the political spectrum by providing special provisions. It can be used as a means to eliminate the moderates, or set up circumstances such that the moderates no longer have a say in the society: a process of “Extremisation”. Develop this scenario until the subjective conditions are mature and there are natural calls for the elimination of extremism from all corners. The coup d’etat is complete when a knockout blow is given, which brings the automatic bifurcation between nationalism and the moderate elements, which have survived or newly emerged. This is a sound and very practical theory, which has been deployed with success in many theatres. However, its potency is less when applied to areas where the overall control of the factors is either in doubt or there are hidden variables, which spring into action or made into contributing factors much later. We suggest an alternated strategy, well away from knockout blows and eliminations for these situations. We think the best strategy in these circumstances, especially when dealing with regional theatres, should be based on ‘absorption’ as a means rather than eradication through proxies. We also believe this strategy best suited to Ceylon and in particular to the ethnic crisis, where the history takes the cue from the tablet in reference to Rajiv’s murder. Tamil Militancy and Tamil Nationalism Tamil militancy in Ceylon was a natural dialectical development in reaction to the Sri Lankan state terrorism and oppression. It was a unified approach by all the Tamil groups, including the TULF, which encouraged militancy and armed actions while trying to preserve the benefits for itself as the moderate and unarmed group. In contrast, Tamil nationalism was a stratified and staggered response to the Sinhala chauvinism, as there weren’t any program to bind all the Tamil communities for a centralised democratic project. In this sense, there wasn’t a philosophy or comprehensive socio-economic political program available to the Tamil militancy. It naturally sorts to broaden its base and the appeal through ad-hoc theories and programs, which had relative success among the Tamil middle classes in the North and East. But, the conflict between the land owning classes and peasantry is always spiky, particularly in the East where the landless peasants traditionally have been of Islamic faith. It wasn’t surprising the wheels came off the Tamil nationalist course as the Muslims opted out and some Tamils in the East developed second thoughts as they have done time and again in history. Then, this could not have been a totally unexpected outcome for those who seriously belong to the working class movement and observe ‘nationalists’ movements world over. Particularly, for those keep watch intensely since the demise of the bi-polar world and the advent of ‘globalisation’. In most cases one can see the courses have been the verses of the educated classes, as the concepts are borrowed from the European experiences quoting Marx and Mangele, and the workingman and his communities are participants only as providers of fighters, denied of any options. The toiling communities will remain, and if anything made sure they remain, merely as recruitment pools for whatever brand of nationalism one pedals, as they are in most cases held captive in large centres known as Internal Refugee Camps. The conditions are not much better for the workingman on the other side, where he is just a member of state’s armed forces; not even the glory of dying as a martyr is given to him. In a region, the economic advancement lead by India is purely based on human intellectual resources to waste the lot of the workingman, whichever the race or religion he belongs to, is a crime one cannot continue to bear. These arguments alone do not condemn Ceylon Tamil nationalism as a failed project. The failure belonged to the narrow concept the Jaffna Tamil leadership projected and pursued as Tamil nationalism. Assuming a nation, which contained many different communities with differing aspirations, with Muslims excluded for membership while ‘allowed’ to live inside the Tamil nation, thrusting a associated military strategy excluding peoples participation are important contradictions the leaders failed to address, but hoped they can be smoothed over by the spread of the violence. It is now clear, even for those who subscribed to this vision, and the latter-day prophets, that it should have been an all-inclusive struggle, building a nation during a peoples struggle and not asserting by assumption. We should have known this as we experienced it ourselves. We are suffering the horrors of the same monumental mistake with Sri Lanka; trying to assert the entire island as a one state by assumption without ever having a program to include everyone in the island as full members of the country. By grasping and then trying to hold tight what was inside we lost focus and purpose, and failed to notice that we are squeezing different communities out of the struggle. The failure to see all the toiling people in Ceylon as victims of the state, and in particular all Tamil speaking Ceylonese faced the same oppression; because they spoke Tamil was a great mistake. But, the greatest mistake was to assert the Ceylon Tamil nationalism was in some way related to the Tamil nationalism in India. Sound bites may have been the same but the substance is diverse and wider than the Palk Straight would suggest. Therefore, the proposed Tamil nationalism proved to be a simple idea, not even a project, full of internal contradictions, which lacked total mandate thus, the legitimacy it required. Yet, Tamil nationalism is not a simple phenomenon and has its own dialectical basis, which were never explored. Here, opting not to prioritise the double oppression against the Plantation Tamils, as Tamils and toiling masses, and putting the interests of the Tamil middle classes, especially that from Jaffna, shows the short-sightedness to the universal values and the narrowness of minds. Histories, some speak as though are something dead and inorganic. Therefore, for them consciousness is just figment of imagination, a product of the imagined free will. So they saw Plantation Tamils and Islamic Tamils as separate, because they will insist those people themselves wanted it that way. As a result, what was supposed to be a struggle to restore the full democratic rights of all the Ceylon Tamil communities, an argument for inclusiveness, has been reduced to a military war against the state by a single Tamil group. If Tamil Nationalism is to achieve the same legitimacy as much as Tamil militancy, it must embrace the universal values of pluralism and social democracy as part of its struggle. It should also accept that the concepts of nation and state could also be approached consciously, using clear objective-historical analysis as a guide. That means at the present, accepting the need for ‘minimum understanding’ among the Tamil groups and extending that to other Tamil speaking Ceylonese communities. This is beside the case in point here. During all the trials and tribulation that the Tamil militancy has gone though: the Tamil nationalist theories with internal contradictions, unsuited military strategies, alienation of the people from their own struggle, disjointed attempt to involve different Tamil communities in the ‘war’ against the state, internecine warfare within Tamil groups, inter-communal violence between different Tamil speaking communities, constructive and destructive involvement of India, misunderstandings and suspicions of the India’s intentions and as an honest arbitrator, association and alienation of the Tamil Nadu politicians, military victories and defeats against the Sri Lankan armed forces, the change in international arena from favourable to hostility; 9/11 and all that, and Rajiv’s murder and the issues regarding individual-terrorism and regional stability, two things have remained resolutely the same: (1) the desire and the ferocity of the Sinhala chauvinists to enforce a Sinhalese solution to the island and, (2) the legitimacy of the Tamil militancy in self-defence of its communities. The parity, if ever there had been any, between the Tamil militancy and the proposed Tamil nationalism have changed in character and substance. However, the legitimacy of Tamil militancy has remained unquestionable despite the inconsistency and degradation of Tamil nationalism. Therefore, to deny this and attempt to neutralise / mute / eradicate Tamil militancy is a crime against humanity, and should not be entertained even as a thought. However, the process since the Black July 83, and the involvement of India, covertly at the beginning and more openly after the Accord, has seen to that LTTE alone represented the Tamil nationalism and with it the Tamil militancy, nominally because it was the only group to continue with armed resistance against the state. This unnatural condition hoisted upon the Tamil communities is not entirely due to LTTE or its actions. As we pointed out the process also mapped closely with the strategy we speculated earlier. The intertwining of the two strands, the Tamil nationalism and militancy may not have been envisaged within the strategy, by those who deployed it, as much as the working-relationship between the LTTE and GOSL of Premadasa during the IPKF period, which we can describe as hidden variables, associated with the strategy. Hence neutralising one strand without damaging or depleting the other is only a false proposition, insincere and intellectually dishonest. Then the normal, consequential question would be how do we disentangle one from the other? We believe the radical way to pose then same question would be, “How to assure the Tamil communities so that Tamil militancy is no longer needed, and how to assuage Tamil nationalism within the island?” We argued that the Tamil militancy is a legitimate response against the state military oppression, and it was very much associated with the democratic rights of the minority communities, particularly that of the Tamil speaking Ceylonese. Then, any solution that will democratise the state and its apparatuses would suffice to assure the Tamil communities and militancy can be nominated to be redundant. Therefore, Tamil militancy can find a resolution by constitutional arrangements to reorganise the Sri Lankan state in a manner that it recognise the existence of other peoples with full democratic ownership and rights. Tamil nationalism on the other hand is based on the argument that the state and its owners, the Sinhala chauvinists would never allow it to be democratised therefore, entirely separate arrangements have to be made for the Tamils. But, we also argued that the proposed Tamil nationalism is a failed project and it also must democratise itself as a movement and as a project. If such a situation can arise within the Tamil national movement, it can present itself as a movement for reformation in Ceylon than a force that threaten the stability of the region. In this context Ceylon Tamil nationalism has its role defined only within the island and will have no ideological extensions beyond. During all this arguments and prose, we have avoided commenting on the mammoth changes India has gone though in the past two decades. Even at the height of its involvement in Ceylon, the time of the Accord, India was considered by everyone, even by small and far away states like Norway, to be a Third world country with no hope of matching the West in anything. Today India is something else, and need no comments of appraisals from a lowly Ceylon Tamil like me. But for our purpose we note, the Ceylon Tamil nationalism as an ideology should not command the same degree of attention it had at the time of the bi-polar world, when there was external interference in Kashmir and Punjab, to destabilise India. The explosion in IT, globalisation and all that have added newer more subtle meaning to those age-old differences between the North and South, which give pride to a Tamil being Indian. Then providing the Ceylon Tamil groups see themselves into this new role, the strategies for the region or any approach to the ethnic crisis in Ceylon need not adopt anything seriously untoward Ceylon Tamil nationalism. Why? Firstly it is a non-starter as a viable project as its. Secondly if it can be reformed, then it can be a constructive force within the island, therefore loses its reach beyond the island. Thirdly if Tamil militancy is solved by a just solution providing the democratic safety mechanism they require it can be easily decoupled from Tamil nationalism. Fourthly any worry of it being contagious and that can spread among the Tamils in India is no longer a credible premises as Tamil Nadu has vested all its interests completely at centre, to the Indian-ness in every possible forms. Once a clear perspective of Ceylon Tamil nationalism as stipulated above is extracted then a strategy of absorption, instead of elimination or neutralisation, can be put in place in the Southern region of India. Just as the case of Irish nationalism is given a constructive stage within the context of Europe, despite the unresolved issues with England, Tamil nationalism can also find a space within this region, inside the island. Therefore, instead of approaching Ceylon Tamil nationalism as an issue, only contributing to the instability of the region, the entire island could be taken to be in crisis, and it is, therefore practical socio-economic program should be put in place to alleviate some of the fundamental socio-economic arguments that fuel it. The excesses, in the name of Tamil nationalism, could now be placed within radically posed newer strategic configurations, which can have even the luxuries of open-ended long-term objectives. This type of radical thinking needs freed and unrestricted minds, having the skills and ability to learn to unlearn the past, and have real sense of search for solutions to the problems. By seeing the events in the region as events within an extended domain, India can access the region with the same favour as it would one of its states. Then the events within India due to ‘those beyond the borders’ have the same eye of judgement and magnitude as the events caused by any Indian. In this set of axioms and frame of mind, one can understand the callous murder of Rajiv Gandhi, without altering its gravity, in the same context as the treacherous killing of his mother Indra Gandhi herself. Perhaps, Indian thinkers have these thoughts already in their mind. Different civilisations react to such cataclysmic events in their own way, which is indicative of the depth and broadness of their views on human condition and the struggle for life. When Indra Gandhi was killed by her own body guards, despite strong advice from the intelligence services to replace those individuals, India as a country did not react in a retributive manner, except for some Hindi speaking thugs who were, and perhaps still are, soaked in communalism and revenge. We saw its ugliness as the so-called Indians murdered their fellow Indians, the Sikhs, in hundreds. It is reassuring and hopeful that when surveyed recently, during their 60th anniversary of independence, Indians in large numbers saw these events and, to the surprise of some, the attack on the Golden temple in Amrithsar as blots on their history. Of course, those who perpetrated the murderous attacks on their fellow Indians will no doubt regard these assertions as weak sentimental notions, as they want India to become yet another United States. The reaction from the Americans against those who attacked let alone killed their former president, of course, would have been severe indeed. They would have bombed the state or the area, linked to the attack, into dark ages and put anyone captured alive behind Gauntanamo bay like prison. In this Anglo-Saxon context, those who view a country’s strength as arms and brutal might, will not make any exception and will see India as a weak state, unable to punish those murdered their former prime minister on his campaign trail. Then again, even allowing for these inept historians and humane delinquents, India is stronger in knowing its past and the direction towards its future. One must recall, from the imprints in the annals of history, it is the weaker neighbours that invaded the great civilisations of India and China more often than the other way around, even in modern times. It is also worth noting the comments made by the Sikh prime minister, present incumbent, Dr. Manmohan Singh about the Indian Muslim doctor held in custody in Australia in connection with the terrorist attacks in Glasgow and London recently: “As a member of a community accused of having links with terrorism I understand the issues faces by the Indian Muslim communities and the issues terrorism well.” It is why we say, with confidence; it must be the cart before horses for that eternal debate when deciding between the principles and a strategy. For our purpose, namely a just solution for all the peoples in Ceylon, the principles that define and characterise a greater domain and, the universal values that can underpin that greater domain are absolute necessities; a global context and perspectives, if one is addressing ethnic crisis such as that in Ceylon. Not a strategy which perceive inherent problems as alien threats and protests for survival as destabilising forces. India as the regional and global power, having the power to develop that vision of a greater domain, not merely for its narrow ‘national interests’ but, for the benefits of all the peoples in the Indian Ocean, must come forward and take its rightful responsibilities. (Ravi Sundaralingam is the Academic Secretary of ASATiC. The views expressed by the author are his own. He can be reached at e-mail Academic.secretary@gmail.com.) Back to the top Home Papers Notes Forum Search Feedback Links Copyright © South Asia Analysis Group All rights reserved. Permission is given to refer this on-line document for use in research papers and articles, provided the source and the author's name are acknowledged. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes.