Paper submitted to the SAAG

Document 3

Paper no. 2402 05-Oct-2007 SRI LANKA (CEYLON) - Cart before horses: Principles must precede strategies and tactics Guest Column by Ravi Sundaralingam The nature of politics is such that a week is too long. Add bad memories, we develop a mental blockage that plays havoc with our systems. The first casualty is the principles, which all agreed, as the basis for the project a while ago. This is of course a natural process in our own private lives as much as in politics, therefore no specific criticism aimed at anyone serves any purpose, and most often tend to be counter productive. The technique to assess such developed situation is to look at radical ways to relate to its origin and move forward. The history of the civil strife in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) has their origins in pre-colonial times. The Indian involvement that shaped these events also dates well before that time. But, the context of this involvement has changed drastically during the post-colonial period, which has deep impact on the psyche of the various communities in the island. As the tribal and linguistic ties beyond the waters wane into insignificance, newer more defined, yet ever-changing national ‘interests’ have taken their places. As the European notions of nation and state took roots, the idea of involving with kith and kin outside one’s boundary has become a difficult proposition. However, the disappearance of the bi-polar universe, the dominant position of the USA, and the signs of development of a multi-polar universe is allowing us to think again and explore universal concepts that transcend ‘national’ boundaries. Globalisation, in this sense, is a natural dialectical extension, which breaks not only the national boundaries, but also age-old ties and relationships within those national boundaries, in terms of race, classes, and religion. It is in this newly found opportunity, which gives the human condition a modern broader perspective; one should search for solutions for the pre-colonial problems, such as that in Ceylon. During the bi-polar period, governed by cold-war conditions, though India with Ceylon was inaugural members of the Third World Movement, Indra Gandhi entertained the notion of a ‘separate state’ for the Tamils in Ceylon. Thereafter various governments in India, through its agencies, having identified the real basis of the ethnic crisis, ‘worked the problem’ to achieve a solution, which eventually transpired as the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. Rajiv’s murder and terrorism The Accord faltered due to lack of ownership and real political leadership within the Ceylon Tamil communities, and the armed conflict between the Indian peace keepers (IPKF) and the LTTE ensued. The escalation of this conflict consumed the Ceylon Tamils such a manner it ended up in the murder of Rajiv Gandhi, on the soil of Tamil Nadu. It is where the course of the history for the Tamils of Ceylon was redefined, not in terms of pre or post of anything but, the murder of Rajiv Gandhi. The real cost of this single act, allegedly by the LTTE, is still not apparent to the Tamils, and it seems also to the others who are involved. India alone might be in a position of this knowledge; only time will tell. Tamils from Ceylon find these events, leading up to and to the murder of Rajiv difficult to fathom or digest and always looking for a way to skirt around it when compelled. As a community, permanently placed under siege-mentality, and as a victim, its difficulty to see the pain caused to others in the name of their defence or the true consequences of any actions is understandable. One witnesses this phenomenon clearly in the case of Israel, a state stealthily formed on somebody’s land and, established and maintained by shear brutality. This accidental state came into being because their compatriots, in various European countries, saw them as enemies within. Accidental because prior to settling for the Middle Eastern location European Jewish organisation were prospecting for land in Africa and South America. No one doubts the holocaust and the pain endured by the European Jews at the hand of their brethren, victims of a crime proportion only to the genocide of the American Indians or the Aborigines of Australia. During that horrendous process they must have also been incapacitated to a degree that they do not understand the crime and the pain they commit against another community, namely the Palestinians, which had nothing to do with their historical pains. Even the genuine Palestinian arguments for only a portion of a country they rightfully owned until the 40s, and the legitimate struggle for their rights recognised by the UN, have been set aside by Israelis as they feel for their safety today and security tomorrow. Therefore, all historical issues associated with the Palestinians; how they managed to put the entire Palestinians out to dry as refugees, and how contrary to all the humane norms they take the homes and lands of individual Palestinians, are superseded by the issue on ‘terrorism’. The version of this terminology is defined exclusively by those condone and perpetrate it in the name of a legalised state, at times against other states in the name of ‘national interests’. Terrorism is a scourge of the humane society whatever form it takes for whatever course it is supposed to serve. Whether it is the state terrorism or the individual-terrorism by so-called liberation or revolutionary group one should not make any exceptions. At the same time, to equate the legitimate armed struggle in defence of a community or for their legitimate rights with terrorism itself is a form of terrorism. Terrorism perverts the course of any people’s history, whether they are the perpetrators or victims. It also gives a skewed vision of a rightful struggle; yet, it is still a preferred tool for many groups as much as states. Men conditioned by a continuous siege mentality and deprived of free thinking, as well as those who are isolated in their much guarded privacy of their homes, still perceive it as a weapon that can deliver the immediate impact, if not the desired result for their course. These are the reasons why we should seek radical approaches to reaffirm or redefine the original set of problems if we are to find a solution. This is why we argue for the establishments of the set of principles first, for the course as well as the prescriptive methods, well before we engage as participants or as analysts of a crisis. A radical approach the only way to break out of the melee the events of the intervening period has produced, griping the communities with new subjective realities and a deformed mind-set. Objective historical events in Ceylon’s ethnic crisis What are the origins of the crisis in Ceylon? It is the total capture of the state by the Sinhala chauvinists and the majoritarian state terror against all minority communities since the ‘independence’. What is the nature of the state? Its willing to exterminate large section of its Sinhala population in its campaign against the JVP, is a clue. The program to eradicate the Tamils as a viable community within the island was obvious from the beginning, and should have been expected. The push for the ‘Sinhalese solution’ started with DS Senenayake, as soon as the independence and continued relentlessly, taking a fully blown military face with JR Jayawardene declaring his wish to “drive all the Tamils into the sea”. What is the dynamics of the state? Even after all the bloodshed, we have a GOSL president in Mahinda Rajapaksha who is without any qualms says with pride that he is only a President for those who elected him, the Sinhalese. Unlike the ethnic conditions in India, there aren’t many nations or communities to argue for more evenly paced dynamics to prevent a particular brand of majoritianism. Ceylon has numerically vastly superior Sinhala community, and Tamil speaking minority communities, having antagonistic state - community dynamics. Mahinda’s perverse take on democracy should not mask the state’s relationship with the minority communities or his subscription to the Sinhalese solution. Does LTTE or individual-terrorism of the Tamil groups alter the state of this dynamics? No. Military victories against the state’s armed forces, particularly by the LTTE, have changed the approach adopted by the chauvinists to bring a Sinhalese solution to the island’s ethnic aliments. Some Sinhala leaders may have been less vehement in their advocacy for a Sinhalese solution, nevertheless are compelled to continue with the state’s set program. The state and its apparatuses have their own undisrupted program although of some Sinhala leaders’ disassociation with it. Even conceding sovereignty temporally can be turned around and made into an acceptable part of the program against the Tamils. Have these two factors altered the course and perception of the Tamil peoples’ condition and their struggle? Yes. Have they added new dimension to those who analyse the nature of security in the region? Yes. But, how much of this perceived threat to security or stability is projected beyond the island’s border? The alleged murder of Rajiv at the hands of the LTTE is the type of action considered by some Indian policy makers as destabilising for India and the region. They also cite, the killings of various Sinhala Political leaders, including a president and ministers in Sri Lanka, and Tamil leaders including several members of EPRLF leadership in Tamil Nadu as typical characteristics of the process, which constitute an internal dynamics for regional instability. But what is the behaviour of the Tamil groups in the recent past? The arguments and confirmed opinions are that these types of actions were pre-MOU that was signed between the GOSL and the LTTE, and no group since is responsible for any such incidents. However, the elimination process by the use of individual-terrorism continues unabated. Encouraged by the state some Tamil groups commit the same atrocities against the individuals they accuse the LTTE with, and the counter terrorism by the LTTE in response, creating a never ending cycle of terror and violence. Does it mean that there is a case for simply forgetting the murder of Rajiv and move on? No. Just as the killing of Rajiv separates the history of the Tamils’ struggle from its origin to that of something distorted, that contributes negatively to the stability of the region to that in preservation of a people, the mindset of the Indian policy makers into before and after, and the participation of the mainstream Tamil Nadu politicians from active contribution to apathy, it should also separate our approach for the terms of a solution, from regular strategic to more radical-problem-solving-basis. In this respect, we pose the question for ourselves “How did India moved on from the murder of Indra Gandhi?” Strategy against ‘Tamil nationalism’: Elimination or Absorption For states founded on lose economical ground, dominated by a small but powerful ruling-class, nationalism of a people within their domain is an anathema, without even considering its case. When nationalism is played within set of international conditions, it becomes a serious issue, despite its actual role or strategic worthiness of people or the area they occupy. It is not surprising to find many ‘players’ in the field in these circumstances, who are not necessarily in the team sheet. These considerations lead to the convenient and reasonably safe assumption for the policy makers of powerful states to set up strategies to neutralise the probable threats posed by a particular nationalist course. Most preferred among the few is the “Extremisation to eliminate” strategy. The normal approach within any strategy is to seek ways to consolidate something while finding ways, within it, to eradicate the impediments, which serve against the perceived interests, whether in long or medium term basis. For example, if an advanced state wants to eliminate regional nationalism in its midst, its strategy would be to isolate the moderates from the tendency who are firmly in the nationalist camp. Because the moderates represent the classes, that help to articulate and sustain a political movement. Then the politico-military part of the strategy is to ensure the ‘extreme version’ of the nationalism dominates the political spectrum by providing special provisions. It can be used as a means to eliminate the moderates, or set up circumstances such that the moderates no longer have a say in the society: a process of “Extremisation”. Develop this scenario until the subjective conditions are mature and there are natural calls for the elimination of extremism from all corners. The coup d’etat is complete when a knockout blow is given, which brings the automatic bifurcation between nationalism and the moderate elements, which have survived or newly emerged. This is a sound and very practical theory, which has been deployed with success in many theatres. However, its potency is less when applied to areas where the overall control of the factors is either in doubt or there are hidden variables, which spring into action or made into contributing factors much later. We suggest an alternated strategy, well away from knockout blows and eliminations for these situations. We think the best strategy in these circumstances, especially when dealing with regional theatres, should be based on ‘absorption’ as a means rather than eradication through proxies. We also believe this strategy best suited to Ceylon and in particular to the ethnic crisis, where the history takes the cue from the tablet in reference to Rajiv’s murder. Tamil Militancy and Tamil Nationalism Tamil militancy in Ceylon was a natural dialectical development in reaction to the Sri Lankan state terrorism and oppression. It was a unified approach by all the Tamil groups, including the TULF, which encouraged militancy and armed actions while trying to preserve the benefits for itself as the moderate and unarmed group. In contrast, Tamil nationalism was a stratified and staggered response to the Sinhala chauvinism, as there weren’t any program to bind all the Tamil communities for a centralised democratic project. In this sense, there wasn’t a philosophy or comprehensive socio-economic political program available to the Tamil militancy. It naturally sorts to broaden its base and the appeal through ad-hoc theories and programs, which had relative success among the Tamil middle classes in the North and East. But, the conflict between the land owning classes and peasantry is always spiky, particularly in the East where the landless peasants traditionally have been of Islamic faith. It wasn’t surprising the wheels came off the Tamil nationalist course as the Muslims opted out and some Tamils in the East developed second thoughts as they have done time and again in history. Then, this could not have been a totally unexpected outcome for those who seriously belong to the working class movement and observe ‘nationalists’ movements world over. Particularly, for those keep watch intensely since the demise of the bi-polar world and the advent of ‘globalisation’. In most cases one can see the courses have been the verses of the educated classes, as the concepts are borrowed from the European experiences quoting Marx and Mangele, and the workingman and his communities are participants only as providers of fighters, denied of any options. The toiling communities will remain, and if anything made sure they remain, merely as recruitment pools for whatever brand of nationalism one pedals, as they are in most cases held captive in large centres known as Internal Refugee Camps. The conditions are not much better for the workingman on the other side, where he is just a member of state’s armed forces; not even the glory of dying as a martyr is given to him. In a region, the economic advancement lead by India is purely based on human intellectual resources to waste the lot of the workingman, whichever the race or religion he belongs to, is a crime one cannot continue to bear. These arguments alone do not condemn Ceylon Tamil nationalism as a failed project. The failure belonged to the narrow concept the Jaffna Tamil leadership projected and pursued as Tamil nationalism. Assuming a nation, which contained many different communities with differing aspirations, with Muslims excluded for membership while ‘allowed’ to live inside the Tamil nation, thrusting a associated military strategy excluding peoples participation are important contradictions the leaders failed to address, but hoped they can be smoothed over by the spread of the violence. It is now clear, even for those who subscribed to this vision, and the latter-day prophets, that it should have been an all-inclusive struggle, building a nation during a peoples struggle and not asserting by assumption. We should have known this as we experienced it ourselves. We are suffering the horrors of the same monumental mistake with Sri Lanka; trying to assert the entire island as a one state by assumption without ever having a program to include everyone in the island as full members of the country. By grasping and then trying to hold tight what was inside we lost focus and purpose, and failed to notice that we are squeezing different communities out of the struggle. The failure to see all the toiling people in Ceylon as victims of the state, and in particular all Tamil speaking Ceylonese faced the same oppression; because they spoke Tamil was a great mistake. But, the greatest mistake was to assert the Ceylon Tamil nationalism was in some way related to the Tamil nationalism in India. Sound bites may have been the same but the substance is diverse and wider than the Palk Straight would suggest. Therefore, the proposed Tamil nationalism proved to be a simple idea, not even a project, full of internal contradictions, which lacked total mandate thus, the legitimacy it required. Yet, Tamil nationalism is not a simple phenomenon and has its own dialectical basis, which were never explored. Here, opting not to prioritise the double oppression against the Plantation Tamils, as Tamils and toiling masses, and putting the interests of the Tamil middle classes, especially that from Jaffna, shows the short-sightedness to the universal values and the narrowness of minds. Histories, some speak as though are something dead and inorganic. Therefore, for them consciousness is just figment of imagination, a product of the imagined free will. So they saw Plantation Tamils and Islamic Tamils as separate, because they will insist those people themselves wanted it that way. As a result, what was supposed to be a struggle to restore the full democratic rights of all the Ceylon Tamil communities, an argument for inclusiveness, has been reduced to a military war against the state by a single Tamil group. If Tamil Nationalism is to achieve the same legitimacy as much as Tamil militancy, it must embrace the universal values of pluralism and social democracy as part of its struggle. It should also accept that the concepts of nation and state could also be approached consciously, using clear objective-historical analysis as a guide. That means at the present, accepting the need for ‘minimum understanding’ among the Tamil groups and extending that to other Tamil speaking Ceylonese communities. This is beside the case in point here. During all the trials and tribulation that the Tamil militancy has gone though: the Tamil nationalist theories with internal contradictions, unsuited military strategies, alienation of the people from their own struggle, disjointed attempt to involve different Tamil communities in the ‘war’ against the state, internecine warfare within Tamil groups, inter-communal violence between different Tamil speaking communities, constructive and destructive involvement of India, misunderstandings and suspicions of the India’s intentions and as an honest arbitrator, association and alienation of the Tamil Nadu politicians, military victories and defeats against the Sri Lankan armed forces, the change in international arena from favourable to hostility; 9/11 and all that, and Rajiv’s murder and the issues regarding individual-terrorism and regional stability, two things have remained resolutely the same: (1) the desire and the ferocity of the Sinhala chauvinists to enforce a Sinhalese solution to the island and, (2) the legitimacy of the Tamil militancy in self-defence of its communities. The parity, if ever there had been any, between the Tamil militancy and the proposed Tamil nationalism have changed in character and substance. However, the legitimacy of Tamil militancy has remained unquestionable despite the inconsistency and degradation of Tamil nationalism. Therefore, to deny this and attempt to neutralise / mute / eradicate Tamil militancy is a crime against humanity, and should not be entertained even as a thought. However, the process since the Black July 83, and the involvement of India, covertly at the beginning and more openly after the Accord, has seen to that LTTE alone represented the Tamil nationalism and with it the Tamil militancy, nominally because it was the only group to continue with armed resistance against the state. This unnatural condition hoisted upon the Tamil communities is not entirely due to LTTE or its actions. As we pointed out the process also mapped closely with the strategy we speculated earlier. The intertwining of the two strands, the Tamil nationalism and militancy may not have been envisaged within the strategy, by those who deployed it, as much as the working-relationship between the LTTE and GOSL of Premadasa during the IPKF period, which we can describe as hidden variables, associated with the strategy. Hence neutralising one strand without damaging or depleting the other is only a false proposition, insincere and intellectually dishonest. Then the normal, consequential question would be how do we disentangle one from the other? We believe the radical way to pose then same question would be, “How to assure the Tamil communities so that Tamil militancy is no longer needed, and how to assuage Tamil nationalism within the island?” We argued that the Tamil militancy is a legitimate response against the state military oppression, and it was very much associated with the democratic rights of the minority communities, particularly that of the Tamil speaking Ceylonese. Then, any solution that will democratise the state and its apparatuses would suffice to assure the Tamil communities and militancy can be nominated to be redundant. Therefore, Tamil militancy can find a resolution by constitutional arrangements to reorganise the Sri Lankan state in a manner that it recognise the existence of other peoples with full democratic ownership and rights. Tamil nationalism on the other hand is based on the argument that the state and its owners, the Sinhala chauvinists would never allow it to be democratised therefore, entirely separate arrangements have to be made for the Tamils. But, we also argued that the proposed Tamil nationalism is a failed project and it also must democratise itself as a movement and as a project. If such a situation can arise within the Tamil national movement, it can present itself as a movement for reformation in Ceylon than a force that threaten the stability of the region. In this context Ceylon Tamil nationalism has its role defined only within the island and will have no ideological extensions beyond. During all this arguments and prose, we have avoided commenting on the mammoth changes India has gone though in the past two decades. Even at the height of its involvement in Ceylon, the time of the Accord, India was considered by everyone, even by small and far away states like Norway, to be a Third world country with no hope of matching the West in anything. Today India is something else, and need no comments of appraisals from a lowly Ceylon Tamil like me. But for our purpose we note, the Ceylon Tamil nationalism as an ideology should not command the same degree of attention it had at the time of the bi-polar world, when there was external interference in Kashmir and Punjab, to destabilise India. The explosion in IT, globalisation and all that have added newer more subtle meaning to those age-old differences between the North and South, which give pride to a Tamil being Indian. Then providing the Ceylon Tamil groups see themselves into this new role, the strategies for the region or any approach to the ethnic crisis in Ceylon need not adopt anything seriously untoward Ceylon Tamil nationalism. Why? Firstly it is a non-starter as a viable project as its. Secondly if it can be reformed, then it can be a constructive force within the island, therefore loses its reach beyond the island. Thirdly if Tamil militancy is solved by a just solution providing the democratic safety mechanism they require it can be easily decoupled from Tamil nationalism. Fourthly any worry of it being contagious and that can spread among the Tamils in India is no longer a credible premises as Tamil Nadu has vested all its interests completely at centre, to the Indian-ness in every possible forms. Once a clear perspective of Ceylon Tamil nationalism as stipulated above is extracted then a strategy of absorption, instead of elimination or neutralisation, can be put in place in the Southern region of India. Just as the case of Irish nationalism is given a constructive stage within the context of Europe, despite the unresolved issues with England, Tamil nationalism can also find a space within this region, inside the island. Therefore, instead of approaching Ceylon Tamil nationalism as an issue, only contributing to the instability of the region, the entire island could be taken to be in crisis, and it is, therefore practical socio-economic program should be put in place to alleviate some of the fundamental socio-economic arguments that fuel it. The excesses, in the name of Tamil nationalism, could now be placed within radically posed newer strategic configurations, which can have even the luxuries of open-ended long-term objectives. This type of radical thinking needs freed and unrestricted minds, having the skills and ability to learn to unlearn the past, and have real sense of search for solutions to the problems. By seeing the events in the region as events within an extended domain, India can access the region with the same favour as it would one of its states. Then the events within India due to ‘those beyond the borders’ have the same eye of judgement and magnitude as the events caused by any Indian. In this set of axioms and frame of mind, one can understand the callous murder of Rajiv Gandhi, without altering its gravity, in the same context as the treacherous killing of his mother Indra Gandhi herself. Perhaps, Indian thinkers have these thoughts already in their mind. Different civilisations react to such cataclysmic events in their own way, which is indicative of the depth and broadness of their views on human condition and the struggle for life. When Indra Gandhi was killed by her own body guards, despite strong advice from the intelligence services to replace those individuals, India as a country did not react in a retributive manner, except for some Hindi speaking thugs who were, and perhaps still are, soaked in communalism and revenge. We saw its ugliness as the so-called Indians murdered their fellow Indians, the Sikhs, in hundreds. It is reassuring and hopeful that when surveyed recently, during their 60th anniversary of independence, Indians in large numbers saw these events and, to the surprise of some, the attack on the Golden temple in Amrithsar as blots on their history. Of course, those who perpetrated the murderous attacks on their fellow Indians will no doubt regard these assertions as weak sentimental notions, as they want India to become yet another United States. The reaction from the Americans against those who attacked let alone killed their former president, of course, would have been severe indeed. They would have bombed the state or the area, linked to the attack, into dark ages and put anyone captured alive behind Gauntanamo bay like prison. In this Anglo-Saxon context, those who view a country’s strength as arms and brutal might, will not make any exception and will see India as a weak state, unable to punish those murdered their former prime minister on his campaign trail. Then again, even allowing for these inept historians and humane delinquents, India is stronger in knowing its past and the direction towards its future. One must recall, from the imprints in the annals of history, it is the weaker neighbours that invaded the great civilisations of India and China more often than the other way around, even in modern times. It is also worth noting the comments made by the Sikh prime minister, present incumbent, Dr. Manmohan Singh about the Indian Muslim doctor held in custody in Australia in connection with the terrorist attacks in Glasgow and London recently: “As a member of a community accused of having links with terrorism I understand the issues faces by the Indian Muslim communities and the issues terrorism well.” It is why we say, with confidence; it must be the cart before horses for that eternal debate when deciding between the principles and a strategy. For our purpose, namely a just solution for all the peoples in Ceylon, the principles that define and characterise a greater domain and, the universal values that can underpin that greater domain are absolute necessities; a global context and perspectives, if one is addressing ethnic crisis such as that in Ceylon. Not a strategy which perceive inherent problems as alien threats and protests for survival as destabilising forces. India as the regional and global power, having the power to develop that vision of a greater domain, not merely for its narrow ‘national interests’ but, for the benefits of all the peoples in the Indian Ocean, must come forward and take its rightful responsibilities. (Ravi Sundaralingam is the Academic Secretary of ASATiC. The views expressed by the author are his own. He can be reached at e-mail Academic.secretary@gmail.com.) Back to the top Home Papers Notes Forum Search Feedback Links Copyright © South Asia Analysis Group All rights reserved. Permission is given to refer this on-line document for use in research papers and articles, provided the source and the author's name are acknowledged. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes.

Paper presented at the Observer Reaserch Foundation, Chennai Chapter

Document 2

Can we break the cycle of ceasefire, talks and murderous violence in Ceylon (Sri Lanka)?

An Expatriate view for way forward

{Paper presented for discussion at the ORF Chennai Chapter, 21^st of August 2007}

- Ravi Sundaralingam, ASATiC

Abstract: The cycle of ceasefire, talks, and violence have been used by both parties involved in the ethnic strife in Ceylon, allegedly, for their advantage. Meanwhile, the people have seen their civil society destroyed, basic human rights denied, and standard of living diminished. Left on its own the state will continue with this process until the total annihilation of the Tamil communities as viable, strong unit and a tattered economy. These do not leave the Sinhala nation, Sri Lanka, or India morally and practically in better positions. We suggest a tripartite formula for breaking this atrocious cycle. To kick-start this meaningful peace process, we propose the intervention of the Indian elder statesman, and the leader of the world’s Tamils to host a conference, here in Chennai, India.

Tripartite Formulae (for consultation)

The formula we suggest has three major components. They are:

1. Tripartite agreement; which must be signed between the Tamils, Sinhalese (Sri Lanka), and India,

2. Based on two basic universal principles; accepting the multicultural nature within the state’s structure and, the norms of civil societies, and

3. Incorporating all constituencies within the Sinhala and Tamil communities at various stages.

Attempts to settle the “unresolved national question” in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) litter the pages of the island’s history many times one can care to mention. Those who are sincere students of history and social formations would have noticed the colonial period making different paths for India, and the island, which is the teardrop of India. They differ drastically not only in character but also in content, particularly when nation formation and social unification are considered.

The people of India though differing on linguistic and religious basis had a common and shared history, even before the arrival of the Europeans. One of the most striking features was that no single race or creed laid claim for the entire geographical space of India for its wealth exclusively for itself, even if the desire was to unify the vast land. The land of many nations allowed itself the luxury of having as many invented myths and tall legends, none at the expense of another. If the Indo-Aryan and Dravidian, linguistically different, social formations emphasize a natural fault line within the unification process, the dynamics of multilingual nation states saw to it that it was not the primary variable. As a person living in Europe were to identify an enduring character and content of the great Indian civilisation, it would be a personal one, it is the Indian nature of inclusiveness, often mistakenly mentioned as tolerance, term borrowed from the Western Multicultural verbiage. Tolerance, one can note, is a form of psychological accommodation of something without being fond of it. One cannot put this totality of Indian civilisation better than the great Mogul king Akbar himself. Descendent of those who came to conquer the infidels of the verdant and fecund land, eventually circumming to the great Indian truth that left Akbar in no doubt, and in his epitaph wrote, “world is a bridge, cross it, but don’t build your house up on it”. Akbar’s legacy, inherited from great Asoka, continued though his natural heir Mahatma Gandhi, and still present for all to see.

The attempts to unify India from the North or South were based on this shared truth and its historical experiences. As we see the 21^st century come roaring at us, and the new religion of ‘globalisation’ brings new form of material prosperity and with it the reminder of the old challenges, we wait to see how that great Indian truth will reassert itself for the benefit of all mankind, not just for the Indians.

In contrast, all experiences to unify the island of Ceylon into a single unit prior to the colonial period were based on the single principle based on the Sinhala mystery, Mahavamsha, written in the 12^th century, which seizes the entire island for the Sinhala speaking Buddhists and the resistance to this conspiracy by other communities, principally by the Tamils. The process after the departure of the British is the same, except, now the state’s apparatuses are firmly in the hands of the Sinhala chauvinists, who merrily used them to legitimise their belief in their tall stories.

It is this difference in content and character, which marks the difference between India and Ceylon in the context of the colonial period. To put it simply, for India the colonial period was help in its process towards its natural unification, a great experiment nevertheless. British bringing the vast space under a single unit of administration, great Indian railways-the main artery of the new unified land and a world on its own, Gandhi the leader, the independence struggle, and the painful partition, are all further passages added to that common experience, which in part cemented the ‘nation-building’ process.

In contrast, ‘quit Ceylon’ movement, if at all were substantial, was only a process of stealthy campaigns by the Sinhala Buddhists and its Tamil counterpart, which saw the period of Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil-Hindu nationalism grew in relation to the Christian foreigners and their religious conversion centres, the missionary schools.

Colonisation period was help for India in its attempt for greater unity, while for its neighbours it only firmed up the differences between communities with chauvinist elements coming to the fore.

As India celebrates its 60^th anniversary of its independence, with cautious confidence of its future, it can look back with satisfaction of having absorbed the European interlude in its stride, and its subscription to the globalisation scheme with verve and as a new avenue, both contributing further to its nation-building programme. The success of India’s nation building cannot be better illustrated by none other than the Tamil Nadu Chief minister Kraunanithy, the reluctant Dravidian, the man who laid his life on the railway track at Saithaped against the Hindi domination, now transformed into an elder statesman for the whole of the Indian nation.

However, the prospects of its neighbours, whether it is Pakistan, which has yet to define what it is, Ceylon called Sri Lanka by the Sinhala chauvinists who captured it and continuing the fight prior to the arrival of the colonial period to keep the ill-gotten, and Nepal which is yet to be delivered from the early feudal social formations, successful formulae for nation-building are still illusive. All these are failed states in some respect, and India cannot ignore that and therefore, the contrasting human conditions and, its regional responsibilities.

Perhaps, the events of marking the anniversary of launching of Mahatma’s Satiyagraha philosophy, and the UN voting overwhelmingly to make his birthday 2^nd of October as the International Peace & non-violence day, were more poignant reminders of its responsibilities for India than its Independence Day celebrations. It is in these we as neighbours pin our hopes and base our expectations of India, more than of its economical achievements, which can be of huge benefit also. India, Amartya Sen rightly says, which has been very vocal during the time when it was considered a mere 3^rd world country, cannot be silent now when its strength on the world stages has grown, and expected to grow even further.

A resurgent India, therefore, surrounded by failed states, cannot base its foreign policies simply on ‘strategic interests’ or ‘economic interests’, but must be on its willingness to come forward and take its share of the regional responsibilities; the socio-political stability of its neighbours and, economic empowerment of the common man.

Having laid the framework for our arguments, let us start with our first point.

It is our argument, when seeking a solution for a pre-colonial period, one cannot ignore the multidimensional nature of it, and therefore, it requires a globalised solution. When we say globalised we mean pluralism, in terms of structure as well as system of any organisation, which is willing to submit itself to scrutiny according to universally accepted vales and norms.

What is more globalised than India, available for a resolution of any problem in the region?

It is obvious to anyone who can think without bias or tilt, Sri Lanka as a state and a system and, LTTE as an organisation and a system have failed miserably in these respects.

In the Sinhala state, minorities do not have a stake, even from a basic individual human rights point of view, as the structures and the systems of the civil society have been destroyed fundamentally.

Individual opponents of the system, no matter from which community, are not guaranteed of their lives, let alone their right to opinion and protest.

The value of life is too cheap in Sri Lanka, so much so when quoted a figure of 2 lacks for the IDPs in the Eastern Province, the Sri Lankan President dismissed it nonchalantly saying, “you are wrong, only 1 ½ lacks are displaced”.

Let us not go further into the easiest of routes, already raised by MPs in foreign parliaments, and ask “how is that a state can drop bombs on its own people?”

Ordinary humans irrespective of their race or creed cannot argue or protest against their living conditions as the “war against the Tamil Terrorism” perennially takes priority. Every working man and women are subjugated, and sometimes even convinced by this chauvinist argument by those who aspire to capture the seat of government of the Sri Lankan State, an affair that has been going on since the so called ‘independence’. And this war against terrorism has also become a going concern, people in high places making sacks full of money, paid into foreign bank accounts.

One can see the Sinhala nation has not developed large and powerful enough constituency to embrace pluralism and democracy, in a multicultural sense as in India. (However, there are signs, for the first time in the history such a constituency is emerging and as Tamils and Indians we should be fully supportive of it.)

Therefore, intellectuals and humanists from all communities, who yearn for a long-term solution to the ethnic strife, agree that the weakness is in the structure of the state than the governments, which feel compelled or easier to satisfy their Sinhala-communal constituencies to access power. (Except on one occasion when Chandrika Kumarathunga won a clear mandate for peace and to settle the grievances of the Tamil communities.)

Covert attempts to ‘persuade’ the Sinhala-only constituency to adopt a more practical approach to its own wrongs have only contributed to inflame the Sri Lankan state-terrorism and Tamil counter- terrorism. If the terminology alone can put anyone in the docks, then both parties could be put there promptly; Sri Lanka for the state-crime, the genocidal acts against the Tamils, and several Tamils groups, including the LTTE for ‘individual-terrorism’.

But, these talks have no practical value towards peace and just solution than serving as propaganda tools for those who want to persist with their crimes; and we shall be critically more constructive than that.

Bilateral agreements, therefore, between the Sinhalese and the Tamils have no binding qualities, historically before or after the ‘independence’. We can list so many attempts at this: Banda-Selva, Dudley-Selva pacts prior to Tamil militancy and several secret ‘understandings’ between the LTTE and various Sinhala rulers, Premadasa, Chandrika, and Ranil Wickramasingha, including the Oslo accord.

Bilateral agreement between India and the Sinhala state did not bring any solace either due to obvious reasons.

Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was an example, which has brought much more tragedy to the minorities, as one should have expected. The simple problem was, there weren’t anybody to take ownership of this deal; Sinhalese resented it and were looking at it as an ideal opportunity to teach the ‘Indians the taste of their own medicine’; enter the LTTE, not impressed with the fine details and the way it was forced to accept the deal, goes into an ‘agreement’ with Premadasa and exit the IPKF; and for India, especially at the centre pressing issues with Pakistan, Nepal meant the Accord wasn’t that important, even after the murder of Rajiv Gandhi. Consequence of Rajiv’s murder is another story, which played right into the hands of the Sri Lankan state, and what followed afterwards for the Tamils can be witnessed, right now, as we speak.

At least in reflection, one has to accept the fallacy of entering into an agreement on behalf of someone else, irrespective of the events that highlight it.

If anything earlier bilateral agreements without the consent of the Tamils in Ceylon were pointer to it, yet, those lessons were ignored. The agreements India made without even the consent of the Tamils in India (Tamil Nadu), namely the Srima-Shasthri and Srima-Gandhi pacts to expel large number of Ceylon Plantation Tamils from their homes and denying their birth rights should have reminded the Indian authorities of the future difficulties they might have with the Sri Lankan state. We know what kind adverse effects they have had on the Tamils, generally exposing all Tamil communities, and the Plantation Tamils in particular to the will of the majoritarian-terror.

Bilateral deals or agreements between India and chosen ‘Tamil Representative’ did not bear any joy for anyone.

First was the deal that took the LTTE alone to the Bangalore Talks, just a few months after the Thimbu Talks, where collective Tamil representatives were taken. EROS understood the signal from India that LTTE was to be its chosen group, thus wished the best and accepted LTTE’s leadership for the phase of ‘national liberation’. What ensued after was confirmation to all of us, as TELO was virtually wiped out as the other groups counted their days.

After the ‘Delhi Talks’, essentially between the LTTE and India, yet another bilateral deal, we had the Accord and, problems with the LTTE started to snowball. Later

India entered into yet another bilateral deal, with the EPRLF and saw to it until its total demise, supervising the dysfunctional Northeast Province Council under EPRLF for a while.

What are the basic problems with these deals and agreements?

1. They were not base on universal, pluralistic principles.
2. They were all done without proper participation of the parties concerned.
3. They have no transparency or scrutiny.
4. They had no ownership.

We say, lets cut the chase, become realistic for the sake of all the peoples in Ceylon, and come to a Tripartite agreement between the three parties. Instead entering into bilateral deals and agreements, which only help to perpetually fuel the crisis, serving no purpose for the region or the communities involved. In fact, the unresolved national question in Ceylon and the ethnic civil war has become a destabilising influence for the entire region.

Let us also not disguise the fact that India will always have ‘interests’ in the island and waste no valuable time behind the term ‘international community’. These interests can only be served if India can be party to the solution, than a facilitator or endorser or supervisor.

In other words, more than a signatory to an agreement, India should also become party to the solution, a tripartite agreement, as the enabler to improve relationships by facilitating greater access to the Indian economy, dropping visa requirements for all Ceylonese, and providing an economical package. An economical package in concept, similar to the US Marshall plan to Europe to alleviate the devastation of the war waged by the state and its terror, and the resistance and counter terror from the Tamils.

These will go a long way in assuring all the communities in Ceylon of India’s intentions in the island. In these circumstances, even as a hegemonic power, India can be a welcome and resourceful ally to all the communities, recovering its leverages and legitimacy lost during the past years, than thousand plots and covert operations, and deals with the Sinhala state could achieve.

These arguments clearly lead us to the next point of having to have principles for any tripartite agreements.

As we have already pointed out, now a well-established point everywhere, the Sinhala state, Sri Lanka, has to accept its ownership to a compelling solution by agreeing to democratise itself.

The first question is why, as a lot of pundits are already predicting the defeat of the LTTE, the only armed group against its will.

Whether this assertion is true or not is irrelevant from the Tamil point of view. For them it is simply a matter of self-preservation.

Is the fear of the Tamil community real or mere propaganda?

We will not demean ourselves here by recounting course of our history; you can all search your souls.

Would the defeat of the LTTE serve the purpose of finding a lasting solution?

The decision for our generation to opt for the strength of arms was justified and logical to change the very nature of the state we specified above. The fact, now that armed component the Tamil resistance is an exclusive privilege of the LTTE is an unnatural evolutionary process engendered by Indian intervention as we suggestively pointed out. The social structure of the island’s populous is vastly different to that of India, where the dynamics and stability are due to multinational relationships within a union of states. In Ceylon we have singularly dominant Sinhala community and the minorities, who are linguistically Tamil, laying a fractious dysfunctional dynamics.

The arms were taken up to supplement the strength the minorities did not have, against the will and the ‘war’ waged by the state against Tamils in general. That it has caused serious difficulties, in terms of civil society and democracy, does not remove the fact that the minorities still do not have the protection from anyone. The Accord could have paved a way, yet, for reasons of its own failed.

But the question remains. What are the protections in place of the military component to assuage the fear of the Tamil communities?

If disarming the LTTE were to be a principled position for peace and a just solution, how arming other groups against it become credible?

We have seen it all before, one digging a hole for earth to fill the earlier one recently dug, and this cannot continue as a viable mode of policy-making.

Yes, arms have contributed to shore up the strengths of the Tamils, and its role is no longer revolutionary. But, the guarantee has to come from somewhere to remove them from the equation. If removing a group were to be a solution, those who advocate it should pay a little heed to what is happening in the West Bank and Gaza; there is a parallel for all to see.

It is precisely why we seek India’s involvement as a party to the solution than mere endorser. It is India that can provide the assurances that will satisfy both the state, and more importantly the Tamils or any other in the future to give up arms as a ‘means to defence’. Violence begets violence, alas, a lesson we must all have surely learned.

Then the next question is if it is an option, how can the defeat of the Tamils as a viable, strong community serve the interests of India?

As for Sri Lanka, despite the Sinhala chauvinists, the vast majority of the Sinhala people would not want to be the ‘Modern Germans’ always having to disassociate themselves from the genocidal forefathers, committed in the name of duty to a country. If moral arguments are wasted on primitive societies, we ask, even if the Tamils are quietened militarily, wouldn’t the basic nature of the structure of the state bring other minority communities into disrepute, and violence ensue?

Can anyone deny this as a possibility?

Therefore, the Sri Lankan state for its peoples’ sake must accept of its own will, or it should be persuaded to accept, that it should democratise its structure.

The arguments about the system; how it should be phased in, what power the centre should have, etc, are all practical questions which have to be addressed at the same time through a process. Here we state our second principle.

Which is, the state and the Tamil speaking communities must accept civil society and humane values should be restored, without preconditions and prevarications.

If this to be a practical prospect, this requires active participation from India and, other members of the ‘international community’, and all the communities in the island. There have to be stages and targets set by India and others which should lead to a ‘minimum understandings’ among all the groups and communities that speak Tamil, and eventually moving towards to a ‘collegiate’ to represent the collective will of the communities. It is here we should start our process towards a lasting solution, developing a forum for communication and, eventually discussions, leading to a ‘minimum understanding’.

ASATiC as group feels that it has become imperative that there should be a minimum understanding among all Tamil parties therefore, proposes the intervention of Muthalvar Dr. Karunanithi, the elder statesman of India and the leader of the Tamil-speaking world. Such an involvement from India to host All Ceylon Tamil Party Conference, in Chennai can only empower those who seriously want to contribute for peace. We also call on Sri Lanka and all the Tamil groups and, Ceylon Tamil expatriate groups to earnestly undertake this proposition as their mission, and assist its process if they are genuine about a just solution for the Tamil communities in Ceylon.

No one expects a conference alone to be the panacea for all the aliments we experience as Tamil communities. There have to be back stage work and confidence building that accounts for the vast portion of the effort if such a project can be successful. These can only proceed successfully in stages, only if there is a sincere belief among the parties that India and Sri Lanka are fully supportive of this effort.

It is during these stages we all have the opportunities to consider the system and arrangement of governance that will fulfil the expectations of the various Tamil communities in Ceylon.

One must understand we do not base our argument for a democratic representation of the Tamil communities simply on the ‘ground control’, but firmly on principle born out of proper research and consultations. We disputed the LTTE’s claim for the sole representation on two principles. One, it does not categorise the Muslims as part of their nation; while they are also indigenous Tamil speakers with ownership to the land they live. If they are a separate nation as the Tamil Elam nationalists have pronounced, then they have the right to talk separately to the ‘Tamils’ and the Sinhalese, for their solution. These seem contradictory in theory and practice. Two, the claim for separate recognition as a nation, though have in itself all the historical arguments and justification, the main reasoning for demanding that separation have been the historical accounts of the crimes by the state, against the Tamil speaking people irrespective of their origin, religion, region and cast. This situation has not changed, despite the single act with the Accord, now all the Plantation Tamils in principle are assured of their citizenship, thanks to EROS. Yet, Plantation Tamils have bore the brunt of these state crimes ever since. We disagree with the demerger of the North-East provinces and dispute the Sri Lankan claim for ownership, again on principles than who control the ground. The solution we seek, must be the just solution for all Tamil speaking communities if it is to last. As we define the dispute is between the state-structure and different communities in the island, even the Sinhala Southerners and rural youth find that to be true at some stages, and search for a solution, we must embrace broader understanding, and the leadership should reflect that reality. The conference we propose falls into this category, and expect the leadership required to face the challenges will emerge from it, in order to find a complete solution for the unresolved national question in Ceylon.

It is the starting point for our way of constructing a path towards a just solution and peaceful coexistence. If the conference were to happen, we would expect that to transform into a Tamil Political Collegiate, a forum with firm organisational structure. Within this we expect all Tamil communities to have their representation, irrespective of their stands towards a particular issue. We expect, this forum to interact with Sri Lankan and Indian political parties to assist in their progress towards conflict resolution. It is through an all embracing, engaging process such as this we are advocating, the solution, which has to be the Tripartite Solution, can be achieved.

We therefore conclude with a brief recount of the tenets of our argument:

1. India is the key to the resolution of the ethnic war in Ceylon, having been part of it historically and as a contributing factor in recent times.

2. The process towards a lasting peace in Ceylon has to involve India, and the warring parties from the bigining.

3. The process should start with the Tamil speaking communities of Ceylon, therefore, with the Indian involvement through its elder statesman, and the leader of the Tamils all over the world, Muthalvar Dr. Karunanithy hosting All Ceylon Tamil party Conference.

These will hopefully lead us to the just and lasting solution, based on,

• Tripartite agreement; that must be signed between the Tamils, Sinhalese (Sri Lanka), and India.

1. no bilateral arrangements between Sinhalese and Tamil organised by India like that was at Thimbu (Bhutan),

2. not between India and Sinhalese as it was with the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, an agreement without the participation of the Tamils,

3. no secret deals between India and a section of Tamils as it was the case in the “Bangalore Talks”, and

4. including a comprehensive economic package, without visa considerations for all communities in the island.

• Based on two principles:

1. The state’s structure must be democratised, and

2. Both societies must be democratised, restoring civil societies based on universal values.

• Incorporating all constituencies within the Sinhala and Tamil communities at various stages.

1. Leading to a Collegiate of representation for the Tamils,

2. Which incorporates all Tamil Speaking communities, including the Muslims and, Plantation Tamils, and

3. Leading to, ‘Reconciliation Council’ for the entire communities in the island.

Thank you for your kind invite and patience.

NkYs;s fl;Liuapd; jkpohf;fk;;

Aj;j epWj;jk;> Ngr;R thu;j;ij> gLnfhiy #o;e;j Nghu; vd epiy nfhz;Ls;s tl;lj;ij Jz;bl KbAkh?

-xU Gyk;ngau;e;j kdpjdpd; MNyhrid.

- utp Re;juypq;fk;> ASATiC

{,e;j Ma;Tf; fl;Liuapd; Mq;fpyg; gpujp Observer Research Foundation Chennai epWtdj;jpy; 21.08.07 rku;g;gpf;fg;gl;lJ.}

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~,yq;ifia tpl;lfu;| ,af;fNkh Gjpa Njrk; xd;wpidf; fl;Lk; rupj;jpug; ghfkhf mikatpy;iy. vjpu;khwhf> fpwP];jt kjkhw;w Kaw;rpfSf;Fk;> mtw;wpd; Kd;dzpahd fpwP];jt ghlrhiyfSf;Fk; vjpuhditahfTNk mbg;gilapy; mike;J rpq;fs-ngsj;j> ,e;J-jkpo; Njrpa thjq;fSf;FNk ,lkhfpd.

vdNt fhydpj;Jt fl;lk; ~,e;jpau;| vDk; Njrpa xUq;fpizg;Gf;fhd rf;jpfSf;F xj;jhir Mfpw;W. ,yq;ifapNyh mJ Vw;fdNt cUthfpte;j ,d NtWghLfsSf;F cUf;nfhLf;Fk; fhyKkhfpw;W.

,d;W ,e;jpah jdJ 60k; Rje;jpu jpdj;ij jd;dlf;fj;JlDk; mNjNtis Raek;gpf;ifapyhd vjpu;ghu;GfSlDk; nfhz;lhLk;NghJ> fhydpj;Jt fhy cs;sPl;il Kd;du; NghyNt jdJ rupj;jpuk; xj;jpg; Gspe;J cs;thq;fpf; nfhz;lJ vd;Wk;> ~cyfkag;gLj;jy;| vDk; ~nghJr;re;ijahf;fj;jpy;| jd;idAk; jpuhzpAld; mit vt;thW ,e;jpaj; Njrpa xUq;fpizg;Gf;F gadhfpd;wd vd jd;Ds; re;Njhrk; nfhs;tJ epahaG+u;tkhdJ. ,jid> ,t;Nthl;lj;jpd; rhuhk;rj;Jf;F mu;j;jkhd Mjhukhf> ,d;W ,e;jpa murpaypy; mwptpYk; mEgtj;jpYk; %j;j jiytuhf tsu;e;jpl;l> mbnahl;lj; jaf;fk; nfhz;l ~,e;jpaDk;| md;W ,e;jpnkhop ntwpaupd; Mjpf;fj;Jf;F vjpuhf irjhg;Ngl;ilj; jz;lthsj;jpy; jd;Dapiu gzaKk; itj;jtUk; jpuhtplj;jpd; ,UjaKkhd jiytu; fiyQu; fUzhepjpiaad;wp ahiu Kd;itf;f KbAk;?

Mdhy; mz;il ~ehLfspd;| epyikfNsh vjpu;khW. ,];yhkpaUf;fhd-,e;jpah vd [pd;dhthy; ntl;bf;fl;ba ghf;fp];jhd; vg;gbahd ,];yhkpaehL? XUehLjhdh? vd;w Nfs;tpfSld; jd;Ds;Ns Nghupl;ltz;zk; cs;sJ. gy r%fq;fs; thOk; ,yq;ifapNyh> ~rpq;fstuJ ehL| vd murpidf; ifg;gw;wpa rpq;fsr; NrhtdprthjpfNsh ,d;Wk; jhk; mepahakhf ngw;witia ifapy; itj;Jf; nfhs;s kw;iwa r%q;fSld; Nghu; elj;jpf; nfhz;Ls;sdu;. NeghsNkh gz;ila FbahdKiw r%fg;nghUshjhuf; fl;Lg;gpbfspypUe;J xU ~Gjpa| ehlhfg; gpurtpg;gjw;fhd fhyj;ij vjpu;ghu;j;J cl;Nghu;fs; fz;lthWs;sJ. ,t;thW ntt;NtW tpjq;fspy; Giue;JNghd ehLfshf jidr; #o;e;Js;s gpuNjrj;jpy; epyTk; jd;dpy; NtWgl;l kDepiyg;ghLfis ,e;jpah fhzhjpUe;J jdf;fhd gpuhe;jpaf; flikfis jtpu;j;jpl KbahJ.

,d;Wk; kfhj;khtpd; mfpk;]h topfis epidT $u;e;J ,lk;ngWk; epfo;r;rpfs;> I.eh.rig mtuJ gpwe;j ehshd Ig;grp 2k; jpfjpia cyf mfpk;]h-rkhjhd jpdkhfg; gpufldg; gLj;jpaikAk; mijnahl;ba epfo;r;rpfSk;> Rje;jpujpd Muthuq;fSf;F ,izahfTk; ,Ug;gJ ,e;jpah jdJ nghWg;Gfis czu;e;jjhf cs;sJ vd;gNj> ,e;jpahtpd; ghupa nghUhjhu Kd;Ndw;wj;jpYk; ghu;f;f Rw;whlypy; thOk; kf;fSf;F ek;gpf;if jUfpwJ. ,e;jpahtpd; nghUshjhu Kd;Ndw;wKk; gpuhe;jpaj;Jf;F ghupa cjtpahf mikAk; vd;gjpYk; Iakpy;iy. ,g; nghWg;Gfis typAWj;jpNa> ~~ntWk; %d;whtJ cyfehLfspy; xd;whff; fUjg;gl;l fhyj;jpy; epahaj;Jf;fhd Fuy;nfhLj;j ,e;jpah> ,d;W jhd; gyk; nfhs;Sk;NghJ thohjpUf;f KbahJ|| vdf; $Wfpwhu; Nehgy; gupR ngw;w mku;j;jpah nrd;.

kPz;Lk; kWkyu;r;rp fhZk; ,e;jpah> Njhy;tp jOtpa ehLfshy; #og;gl;Ls;sNghJ jdJ ntspehl;L nfhs;ifjid ntWk; ~Nfe;jpu| ~nghUshjhu| Njitfs; vd;w uPjpapy;kl;Lk; mikj;jpl KbahJ. mit> gpuhe;jpaj;jpd; r%f-nghUshjhu ];jpuk;> jdp kdpjdJk; r%fq;fsJk; murpaw;-nghUshjhu gykhf;fk; (empowerment) vd;w Nfhl;ghLfis cs;slf;fk; nfhz;l gpuhe;jpa nghWg;Gzu;thfTk; ,Uf;f Ntz;Lk;.

njhlug;NghFk; thjq;fSf;fhd mj;jpthuj;ij mikj;jjd; gpufhuk; vkJ Kjw; fUj;Jld; ru;r;irfisj; njhlq;FNthk;.

fhydpj;Jt fhyj;jpd; Kd;dhd> mf;fl;lj;jpy; Cu;[pjk; nra;ag;gl;l vkJ ,dg;gpur;ridf;F jPu;T fhz;gjhapd;> mjdJ gy;gupzhkq;fis mrl;il nra;ahJ> cyfkag; gLj;jg;gl;l (globalised) epiyg;ghLfSf;Fs;NsNa mlf;fg;gl Ntz;L;k; vd;gJ vkJ ju;f;fk;. gy;NtW epiyg;ghLfis jd;Ds; mikg;G uPjpapYk; eilKiwapYk; nfhz;L> cyfshtpa Nfhl;ghLfspd;gb mike;j guprPyidfSf;F jd;id cl;gLj;jj; jahuhf cs;s mikg;GfisNa cyfkag; gLj;jg;gl;l mikg;ngd ehk; tiuaWf;fpd;Nwhk;. vdNtjhd; vkf;fhd jPu;itj;ju ,t;tifapy; cyfkag; gLj;jg;gl;l ,e;jpah mz;kpj;J ,Uf;Fk;NghJ Ntwikg;Gfs;jhd; vkf;nfjw;F vd;gJ vkJ Nfs;tp.

,NjtiuTs; ghu;f;Fk;NghJ mikg;G uPjpapNyh ,aq;fpay;> eilKiw uPjpapNyh rpwP yq;fh vd;w muNrh> tpLjiyg; GypfNsh mbj;jsj;jpy; Njhy;tp fz;l mikg;Gfs; vd;gjpy; Iakpy;iy.

rpwP yq;fh vd;w mur ];jhgdj;Js; rpWghd;ikr; r%fq;fSf;F vt;tpjkhd clikfNsh> Vd;> rhjhuz kdpj cupikfs; vd;w uPjpapyhd cupj;Jf;fNsh ,y;iy. rpq;fstu; Ngupy; ehL ifg;gw;wg; gl;ljpypUe;J> ,dg;Nghupd; ce;jYld; r%fj;jpd; jdp kdpju;fspd; mbj;js [dehaf cupikfSk;> mtw;iwj; jhq;Fk; mikg;G tbtq;fSk; rpije;J Ngha;tpl;ld.

kdpj capupd; ngWkhdNkh rpwP yq;fhtpy; mw;NwNgha; tpl;ljw;fhd Mjhuj;ij mjd; [dhjpgjpapd; xU $w;wpypUe;Nj Gupayhk;. mz;ikapy; fpof;fpy; yq;fh uhZtj; jhf;Fjy;fspd; gpd;dzpapy; cs;ehl;L mfjpfshfpa jkpou;fs; gw;wpa Nfs;tpapd;NghJ FWf;fpl;l kfpe;jh uh[gf;\ ~~mtu;fs; njhif 2 ,l;rky;y 1½ ,yl;rk;jhNd|| vd jpUj;jpf; nfhz;ljpypUe;J ahUk; czu;e;J nfhs;syhk;. ,jw;F Nkyhf ~~jdJ kf;fs; kPNj vg;gbj;jhd; tpkhdf; Fz;Lfisg; jhNk nghopa KbAk;?|| vd khw;W ehLfspd; rl;lrigfspy; vOg;gg;gl;l Nfs;tpiaf;$l ehk; ,q;F Mjhukhf;fpl Ntz;bajpy;iy.

~~jkpoUf;F vjpuhf|| vd;W njhlq;fp> ,d;W ~~jkpo; gaq;fu thjj;Jf;F vjpuhf|| vd;w Nfh\j;Jld; elj;jg;gLk; rpwP yq;fh murpd; Nrhtdprg; Nghu; ,yq;ifj; jPtpidNa Kw;whf Ml;nfhz;Ls;sikahy; ~Rje;jpu| fhyk; njhl;Nl ,t;thjk; rhjuz ciof;Fk; kdpjdJ mbg;gil cupikfisj; jpd;W Vg;gKk; tpl;Ltpl;lJld; rpq;fs ciog;ghspiaAk;jhd; Nrhtdprj;Jld; VNjhtpj;jpy;

,yq;ifia cd;dpg;ghf mtjhdpg;Nghu; mq;F ,d;dKk;jhd; gy r%fq;fisAk; [dehaf Kiwapy; mikg;G uPjpahf Vw;Wf;nfhs;Sk; gykhd> gue;j rpq;fs murpaw; njhFjp ,y;iy vd;gij czuNtz;Lk;. Mdhy;> mz;ikf; fhyq;fspy; ,t;thwhd rpwpjhfpYk; jpuz; nfhz;l xU njhFjp cUg; ngw;W tUtijAk;jhd; ehk; fz;L nfhs;sNtz;Lk;.

,tw;wpdhNyNa> ,yq;ifapd; ,dg;gpur;ridf;F epue;jukhd ep[khd jPu;it ehLk; mwpthspfs; rpe;jdhthjpfs;> mtu;fs; vr;r%fj;jtuhapDk; rpwP yq;fhtpd; murikg;gpidNa (state’s structure) gpioahff; fhz;fpd;wdu;. mq;Fs;s mur-rhrdf; Fw;wNk murpay;thjpfspd; mjpfhuNtl;iff;F J}z;Ljyhfp mtu;fis ,dthj murpay; epiyg;ghLfSs; js;sptpLfpw epiyiaAk; nfhLf;fpwJ vd;gJk; Jyf;fkhfpwJ. (re;jpupf;fh Fkhuj;Jq;fh Kjy;Kiw rkhjhdk;-Ngr;Rthu;j;ij vd Nju;jypy; ntd;wJ ,g; Nghf;fpd; tpjptpyf;F.)

kiwKf> epow;Nghu;fshy; ~rpq;fstu;fSf;F kl;LNk| vd;w njhFjpapd; epiyg;ghl;bid khw;wpl ntspapUe;J vLffg;gl;l Kaw;rpfs;> NkYk; vupAk; neUg;Gs; vz;iz thu;j;j fijfshfp> mur-gaq;fu thjj;ijAk; khw;whf jkpoupd; vjpu;-gaq;fu thjj;ijAk; J}z;bajhf mike;jd. ~gaq;futhjk;| vd;w ntw;Wr; nrhy;ypid itj;Nj ahiuAk; $z;by; epWj;Jtjhfpd; jkpo; NgRk; kf;fSf;F vjpuhf ,ioj;JtUk; ,dnthopg;Gf; Nfhuq;fSf;fhf rpwP yq;fhitAk;> jdpkdpj-gaq;futhjj;jpd; Ngupy; jkpoPo tpLjiyg; Gypfs; cl;gl gy jkpou; ~tpLjiy| mikg;GfisAk; cld; nra;ayhk;.

Mdhy; ,t;thwhd Ngr;Rfs; eilKiw uPjpapy; ,yq;ifapd; gpur;ridf;fhd jPu;it jUtjw;F cjtpahf mikahJ vd;gJld; mt;thwhd Fw;wq;fs; NkYk; njhlu;tw;fhd fUtpfshf mike;JjTk;;ehk; mjpYk; ghu;f;f Mf;fG+u;tkhdtu;fshf ,Ue;jpl Ntz;Lk; vd;gJ vkJ mth.

~~Kj;jug;G xg;ge;jk;|| vd;gij ehk; gpNuupf;Fk; NghJ> vJtpj ,Ujug;G xg;ge;jq;fspYk; ehk; ek;gpf;if mw;wtu;fs; vd;gijNa njuptpf;fpNwhk;. ,jw;fhf ,aq;fpay; cwTfisNa fhuzkhff; nfhs;fpNwhk;.

rpq;fstu;-jkpou; vd;w uPjpapyhd ,Ujug;G xg;ge;jq;fNsh gy> mtw;wpid epu;izak; nra;tjw;fhd rf;jp mq;fpy;yhikahy; Njhy;tpfSk; mNj msT. gz;lh-nry;th> ll;yp-nry;th vd jkpouJ uhZtg; Nghuhl;lj;Jf;F KjypYk;> gpNukjhrh> re;jpupf;fh> uzpy; tpf;ukrpq;fh Nghd;NwhUld; Gypfs; Vw;gLj;jpf; nfhz;l> x];Nyh xg;ge;jk; cl;gl gy ,ufrpa cld;ghLfSk; ,t;tifAs; mlq;Ffpd;wd.

,e;jpah-rpwP yq;fh vd;wstpyhd ,Ujug;G xg;ge;jq;fSk; gpuNahrdk; ,y;yhJ Nghapw;W.

,e;Njh-rpwP yq;fh xg;ge;jk; cjhuzkhfpd; mjd; Njhy;tpf;fhd fhuzj;ij cld; fz;blyhk;: ~~mjid nrhe;jk; nfhz;lhbl ahUNk ,Uf;ftpy;iy||. rpwP yq;fhNth mjid ntWj;jJ> ,e;jpaUf;F jf;f ghlj;ijf; fw;Wf; nfhLf;f jf;f jUzkhfNt mjidf; fz;lJ. GypfSf;Nfh mjidj; jpzpj;j tpjNkh ,e;jpah ifahz;l KiwNah> mjDs; mlq;fpa rpW vOj;Jf;fspd; tpguq;fNsh ntWg;ghd tptfhukhfNt mike;jJ> ,tw;wpdhy; vOe;jNj gpNukjhrh-Gypfs; cld;ghL> njhlu;e;J ,e;jpa-mikjpg; gilapduJ ntspNaw;wk;. nly;ypapNyh> ,yq;ifg; gpur;rid ghf;fp];jhd;> Neghsk;> tq;fhsNjrk; vd;w xg;gPl;by; Kf;fpakw;wJ; uh[pt; fhe;jpapd; gLnfhiyapd; gpd;dzpapy;$l Kf;fpaj;Jtk; ngwhjJ.

Mdhy;> uh[ptpd; nfhiy vt;thW rpq;fs murpd; ifrpf;fp> jkpo; kf;fsJ Nghuhl;lj;Jf;F ghjkhd epyikia vq;nfy;yhk; cUthf;fp cs;sJ vd;gij ,d;W ehk; fz;Kd;Nd fw;wtz;zk; cs;Nshk;.

,Ue;Jk;> khw;whUf;fhf VjhtJ cld;ghLfspy; ,zq;FtJ vd;gjd; jtwpid> mtw;wpdhyhd tpisTfis kl;Lk; nfhz;L mZfhJ> mjd; cs;slf;fj;jpy; ,Ue;Nj ehk; Gupe;J nfhs;s Ntz;Lk;.

,e;jpah ,g;gpioia Kjw; jlitahfr; nra;atpy;iy. rpwPkh-rh];jpup> rpwPkh-fhe;jp xg;ge;jq;fs; vd;w Ngupy;> ,e;jpaj; jkpou;fSld;$l (jkpo;ehl;L) xUthu;j;ijAk; NgrhJ> ,yq;ifj; jkpou;fshd kiyafj;jtiu gy;yhapuf; fzf;fpy; ehL flj;Jtjhy; Vw;gl;l tpisTfis ,e;jpah Gupe;jpUf;ftpy;iy. mit vt;thW ,yq;ifj; jkpou;fsJ ];jpuj;jpidr; rPuopj;J> rpq;fs murpid NkYk; jdJ gpioahd ghijapy; ce;jp ngUk;ghd;ikthj (majoritianism) gaq;fuj;Js; jkpo; NgRNthu; ahtiuAk; js;sptpl;Ls;sJ vd;gij ehk; mwpNthk;.

,e;jpah-jkpou; vd;wike;j cld;ghLfshy; moptpd;wp NtnwJTkpy;iy jkpo; kf;fSf;F. jkpou; gpujpepjpfs; vd nghJthfNt Vw;Wf;nfhs;sg;gl;l MW mikg;Gfis jpk;Gg; Ngr;R thu;j;ijf;F $l;br; nrd;w ,e;jpah> gq;fs+u; Ngr;Rthu;j;ijf;F Gypfis kl;LNk $l;br; nrd;wik kw;iwa mikg;GfSf;F ngUk; rkpifahfTk; gpw;ghl;by; jkpoupd; capr; NrjKkhfpw;W.

mjd;gpd; ele;j nly;ypg; Ngr;Rthu;j;ij> eilKiwapy; ,e;jpah-Gypfs; vd;w ,Ujug;G cld;gLkhfp> ngaUf; Nfw;wthW ,aq;fpaypy; ,y;yhj tl-fpof;F khepy Ml;rpf;nfd EPRLF mikg;Gld; Vw;gLj;jg;gl;l ,Ujug;G cld;ghL mt;tikg;gpid mbnahl;l ,y;yhJ Nghf;fpl top nra;jJ.

,e;j xg;ge;jq;fs; cld;ghLfspd; Njhy;tpapd; mbj; jsk;jhd; vd;d?

1. mit ru;tNjrpa gy;nghUs; xw;Wikg;ghL nfhz;l Nfhl;ghLfSs; mikatpy;iy.
2. mit ru;r;irapYs;s rfyuJk; xj;Jiog;Gk; ,y;yhJ nra;ag;gl;lit.
3. mit xspT kiwthf> vJtpj kf;fs; guprPyidfSk; ,y;yhJ xg;Ngwpait.
4. mtw;wpid nrhe;jk; nfhz;lhLgtu; kpfTk; rpyu;.

,yq;ifj; jPtpy; ,e;jpahtpd; vjpu;ghu;g;Gfs; vd;djhd; vd md;whlk; Rl;bf;fhl;bl KbahJ NghfpDk;> mjdJ ftdk; vd;nwd;Wk; mq;F ,Uf;Fk; vd;gjpy; Iakpy;iy. MfNt> Vw;fdNt fhyhfhyj; jiyaPLfis nra;JtUk; NkYk; nra;ag; NghFk; ,e;jpah> jd;id ntWk; ghu;itahsdhf> xOq;FgLj;jpj; jUk; my;yJ xg;ge;jj;ij cj;juthjk; nra;Ak; rf;jpahf> kj;jpa];jdhf jd;idf; fhzhJ ru;r;irfspd; jPu;tpd; gq;Fjhuzdhf jd;id Vw;wpl Ntz;Lk;. ,e;epiy> ,Ujiyg; Ngr;Rthu;j;ij vd;nwy;yhk; fhyj;ij tpuak; nra;ahJ Kj;jug;G xg;ge;jNk rupahdJ vd Vw;W ru;r;irapYs;s rfyUk; Kd;tu Kf;fpa Kbthf mikAk;.

NkYk;> ,yq;ifapy; epyTk; cs;ehl;L Aj;jkhdJ Kj;jug;gpduJ ];juj;Jf;Fk; kl;Lkpd;wp gpuhe;jpa ];juj;jpw;Fk; ghjfkhdJ vd;gij xj;Jf; nfhs;s Ntz;Lk;. MfNtjhd; nrhy;fpNwhk;> gpuhe;jpa uPjpapy;rup> xUtiu xUtu; Vkhw;whJ Kj;jug;G xg;ge;jNk cz;ikahdJ vd;gij ahtUk; xj;Jf; nfhs;s Ntz;Lk;.

vdNt ,e;jpah ,yq;ifj;j jPu;tpy; xU gq;fhspahFtJld; mjid eilKiwapy; xg;Ngw;wp itf;Fk; ce;J rf;jpahfTk;> ,dq;fspilNa kl;Lkpd;wp mtw;wpilNa cs;s r%fq;fapilNaAk;$l cwTfis gyg;gLj;j cjtpl Ntz;Lk;. ,tw;iw jPu;Tf;fhd Kaw;rpfspd; NghJk;> mjd;gpd; mt;TwTfis ];jpug;gLj;jpl ,yq;ifj; jPtpd; r%fq;fspd; nghUshjhu epiyia ,e;jpahTld; ,izj;Jf; nfhs;sf;$ba tpjj;jpy; tsu;e;jpl flT mDkjpr;rPl;L tpjpfis mfw;wp> mkupf;fu; ,uz;lhk; kfhAj;jj;jpd; gpd;du; Inuhg;gpahTf;F toq;fpa ~~kh\y;|| jpl;lk; Nghd;w nghUshjhu cjtpiaAk; Kd;itf;f Ntz;Lk;.

,t;thW ,e;jpa murpaw;-nghUshjhuj;jpd; gpd;dzpapy; mikAk; jPu;thdJ> ,yq;if tho; rfy r%fq;fSf;Fk; ek;gpf;if jUtjhf mikAk;. ,e;epiyg;ghl;by;> ,e;jpah xU gpuhe;jpa Mjpf;f rf;jpahf mz;il ehLfs; fzpg;gpDk;> kdpj Kd;Ndw;wj;Jf;F cjtp jUk; Cw;whf miktjdhy; mz;ikapy; jhd; ,yq;ifapy; ,oe;Jtpl;l ifgpbfis> Mapuk; kiwKf rjpfs+lTk; rpq;fs Njrj;Jldhd cld;ghLfs+lhfTk; ngwKbahjtw;iw> ,yFtpy; va;jplyhk;.

,e;j Kj;jug;G xg;ge;jj;Jf;fhd thjq;fs; Vw;fg;gbd; mit vg;gbahd nfhs;if Nfhl;ghLfSs; mika Ntz;Lk; vd;gJ mLj;j Nfs;tpahfpwJ.

Kjyhtjhf> Vw;fdNt ehk; thjhbagb rpwP yq;fh jd;Ds; mikg;G uPjpapy; mike;Js;s Fw;wj;ijg; Nghf;fpl Kj;jug;G xg;ge;jk; jUk; #oiy xl;b jhdhfNt Kd;te;J jd;id [dehafkag;gLj;jpf; nfhs;s Ntz;Lk; vd;gij xj;Jf; nfhs;s Ntz;Lk;.

,q;Nf ,d;Dk;jhd; rpyu;> mtjhdpfSk; gz;bju;fSk; jkJ murikg;Gf;F xNu uhZtj; jilahf,Uf;Fk; Gypfspd; KbT mz;kpj;Jtpl;lJ> mLj;j mbAld; mw;Wg; NghapLthu;fs; vd;nwy;yhk; $Wk; NghJ> ~~Vd;?|| vd vk;ik Nehf;fp Nfl;bl KbAk;.

,e;jf; fzf;Ffs; rupNah vd;dNth jkpodhfthtJ> Vd; rpWghd;ik kdpjuhfg; ghu;f;Fk; NghJ> murikg;ig [dehafg; gLj;JtJ vd;gJ vkJ ePz;lfhy jq;Fjiy cj;juthjk; nra;Akhjypdhy; mtrpakhdJ> Raeyj;jpy; jq;fpaJ.

,t;tplj;jpy;> ~~jkpouJ my;yJ rpWghd;ik kf;fsJ epiyik rpq;fs Njrj;jpy; mt;tsT ghuJ}ukhdjh?|| vdf; Nfl;ff; $ba NgijfSk; cz;L. ,tu;fSf;F gjpy; je;J vk;ikj; jho;j;jpLk; Nehf;Nfh ,q;F vkf;fpy;iy. mtu;fis ~~cq;fs; ,jaj;Jld; Ngrpf; nfhs;Sq;fs;|| vd;Wk; ~~,yq;ifr; rupj;jpuj;ij myl;rpakhfNtDk; gbAq;fs;|| vd;Wk; Nfl;Lf; nfhs;Nthk;.

mg;gbahdjy;> Gypfis Kwpabj;Jtpl;lhy; epue;jukhd jPu;itf;fhZk; tha;g;G cz;lh?

rpwP yq;fh murikg;igAk; mjdJ ,aq;fpaiyAk;> eilKiwg; Nghf;fpidAk; cz;ikahff; fpufpj;Jf; nfhz;ltu;fs; vkJ jiyKiw fUtp Ve;JtJ vd;W vLj;j Kbit ,d;Wk;jhd; rup vd Vw;Wf; nfhs;tu;.

,yq;ifj; jkpo; NgRNthuJ> Fiwe;jgl;rk; jkpouJ gyj;jpd; gw;whf;Fiwia eptu;j;jp nra;tjw;fhd KbTf;Fk;> ,d;W mJ ntWk; GypfsJ jdpj;Jt mjpfhuj;Jf;F JizNgha; tpl;lJ vd;gjw;Fk; ,ilapyhd ~tsu;r;rp| $u;g;ghdjhf mikahJ ,e;jpaj; jiyaPl;lhy; Vw;gLj;jg;gl;lJ vd;gijAk; ehk; czu Ntz;Lk;.

gue;j ~,e;jpahtpd;| rKjhag; fl;likg;Ngh ,yq;ifapdjpy; Kw;wpYk; NtWgl;lJ. gy Njrq;fs; r%ff; $l;Lfs; nfhz;like;j ,e;jpahtpy; r%f ,aq;fpaypd; tpjpfNsh r%f ];jpuk;> Kuz;ghL vd;gtw;wpd; tpsf;fq;fNsh NtW.

,yq;ifNah rdj;njhifapy; xU ,dj;jtupd;> mjhtJ> rpq;fs kf;fspd; Mjpf;fj;jpy; cs;s gpuNjrk;. vQ;rpNahu; nghJtpy; jkp;o; NgRk; r%fq;fs;. ,q;Nf mike;Js;s ,aq;fpaNyh Kuzhd cuhRk; cwTfspd;gb MdJ. ,e;epiyNa td;Kiwia gf;fgykhf Nru;j;jpLk; thjq;fSf;Fg; NghJk;. ,jidtpl> gd;klq;F gyk; nfhz;l rpq;fs muR rpWghd;ikNahUf;F vjpuhf ~Rje;jpuk;| ngw;w fhyj;jpypUe;Nj ,dxopg;Gj; jpl;lq;fis KLf;fp tpl;Ls;s NghJ rpWghd;ikNahu; ,uhZt gyj;ij vq;fdk; ehlhJ Nghtu;?

,t;thW ,uhZt gyj;ij Nrfupf;f Ntz;b cs;sjhy; mjdJ khw;W tpisTfisAk; Vw;f Ntz;batu;fshfNt cs;Nshk;. ,e;j ,uhZt gykhdJ Nghf;fpy; Gul;rpfuj; jd;ikia ,oe;Jtpl;lijAk;> vjpu;tpisthf mbnahl;ba r%f> kdpjNea rPu;FiyTfSf;F fhuzkhfTk; cs;sJ vd Vw;Wf; nfhs;Sk; ehk;> mNjNtis> ,d;Wk; rpwP yq;fh vd;w murikg;gpd; [dehakw;w jd;ikAk; ngUk;ghd;ikj;Jtk; vd;gjd; gaq;futhjj;jpd; njhlu;ghd epiyiaAk; Rl;bf;fhl;bl Ntz;bAk; cs;Nshk;. vdNt> ,uhZt gyk; vd;w mq;fj;ij

,t;topapy; Gypfis epuhAjghzpfs; Mf;fpdhy; jPu;Tf;fhd re;ju;g;gq;fs; $Lk; vd;W $Wk; mNjjWthapy; khw;W mikg;Gfis MAghzpfs; Mf;FtJ rkhjhdk; NjLk; fUkkhf vg;gb mikAk;?

gioa fplq;fpid %Ltjw;F kz;Njb Gjpa fplq;F ntl;LtJ rhjfkhd jpl;lq;fisj; jUk; xU jpwdha;T Kiwahf ,dpNkYk; nfhs;s KbahJ. Mdhy; ,jidNa ehk; vkJ ru;r;irapy; ,d;Wk; mEgtkhff; fhz;fpNwhk;.

MdgbahNy> ,e;jpahit ntWk; cWjpjUk; rf;jpahf ,y;yhJ jPu;tpd; gq;fhspahf ,Uf;f Ntz;L;k; vd;fpNwhk;. td;Kiw> ,uhZtgyk; vd;w mk;rq;fs; ,d;W jkpoupdJk;> vjpu;fhyj;jpy; kw;iwa r%fq;fsJ [dehaf clikfis kPl;gjw;fhd topahf Vw;Wf; nfhs;Sk; #o;epiyik xUGwkhf ,Uf;f> mjd;Nky; mitNa mtu;fsJ murpaw; ghJfhg;ghfTk; khwpLtij jLf;f Ntz;Lkhapd; fhj;jpukhd khw;wPL nra;ajpLk; topfSk; Ntz;Lk;. td;Kiw vd;gNj vjw;Fk; gjpyhf mikapd; NkYk; td;Kiw njhluNt toptFf;Fk; vd;gij ,dpNkyhtJ ahtUk; czuNtz;Lk;. NkYk; mbj;jsj; jPu;Tfis Kd;itahJ ntWk; ,uhZj;jPu;tpdhNyNa VjhtJ kf;fsJ ru;r;iria Kwpabj;Jtplyhk; vd rpe;jpg;Nghu; ghy];jPdu;fsJ Nghuhl;lj;ijAk; mq;Nf njhlu;e;Jk; gupkhzk; fz;L td;Kiw vd;gij kl;LNk Kd; nfhz;L nry;Yk; mikg;GfisAk; kjuPjpapy; Nghuhl;lj;ij elj;Jk; mikg;GfisAk; ftdj;jpy; nfhs;tJ nghUj;jkhdJ.

,tw;wpf;F nghWg;ghd gjpy;fs; ,Ug;gpd; vkJ mLj;j Nfs;tp Nfe;jpu mbj;jsk; nfhz;lJ. jkpou;fs; jpuz;nfhz;l RamOj;jk; nfhz;l r%jhakhf ,y;yhJ ntWk; rpWghz;ikauhf khw;wpLk; tifapy; ,yq;ifj; jPtpdpy; rpq;fs kf;fsJ Mjpf;fk; kl;LNk vd Cu;[pjk; nra;ag;gLtjhy; ,e;jpahtpdJ vjpu;fhy vjpu;ghu;g;GfSf;F vd;d ,yhgk;? vd;gNj.

,f; Nfs;tpjid vkJ rpq;fsr; rNfhjuu;fsplKk; Nfl;bLtjpy; jg;gpy;iy. rpq;fsr; Nrhtdprthjpfs; vd;w gjj;ij jhNk #bajhy; mt];ijg;gLk; vkJ cld; gpwg;Gfs; ,dg;gLnfhiyQu; vd;w ehkj;ij vg;gbj;jhd; jhq;fpf; nfhs;tu;? ,d;Wk; `l;yupd; J}z;LjYf;F ,rkhfp> ehl;Lf;Fk; ,dj;Jf;Fkhd Nritfspyhd cj;juTfs; vd;wthNw A+ju;fis G+z;Nlhlopf;f Kide;jtuJ topj; njhlu;fs; vd;w fhuzj;jhy; kNdhtpay; Mj;k uPjpfspy; jhz;L jj;jspf;Fk; ~Gjpa N[u;kdpau;fsJ| rupj;jpu ghlk; ,tu;fSf;F Nghjhth? kNdhjj;Jt> kNdhtpay; thjq;fs; gpd;jq;fpa r%fSf;F Gupahj tplak; vd;why;> ~~jkpou;fis ,uhZt uPjpapy; Kwpj;JtpLtjhy; kw;iwa r%fq;fSld; jfuhWfs; tuhJ> mit td;Kiw nray;fSs; Ngha;r; NruhJ vd vd;djhd; cj;juthjk;|| vd;w rhjhuz eilKiwf; Nfs;tpahtJ Gupahjh?

rpwP yq;fhtpd; mur mikg;G khw;wp mikj;jplhj gl;rj;jpy; ,t;thW epiyikfs; cUthfhJ vd ahuhYk; mbj;Jf; $w KbAkh?

vdNt jkJ vjpu; fhyj;Jf;fhfthtJ rpq;fsg; ghuk;gupaj;ij rupj;jpug; ghjhsj;jpy; js;sptplf; $lhJ vd;w kNdhtpay; Xl;lj;ij Gupe;jtu;fshf jkJ ngaupy; cs;s mur mikg;gpid khw;wp [dehafg; GdUj;jhdk; nra;a rpq;fs kf;fs; Kd;tu Ntz;Lk;. mjid jkJ ,yl;rpa Nehf;fhf gpufldk; nra;a Ntz;Lk; vd;fpNwhk;.

,k; khw;wj;jpD}lhd Gjpa tbtikg;G vJ> vt;tifahd [dehaf murikg;ig Vw;gLj;j Ntz;Lk;> rk];bah khfhzrigah vd;w Nfs;tpfs; ,uz;lhk; jukhdit. mbg;gilapy; khwj; jahu; vdr; gfpuq;fkhfr; nrhy;yhJ> ,aq;fpay; eilKiwj; jpl;lq;fs; gw;wp tpthjpg;gJ Vl;Lr; Ruf;fha; Nghd;wJ.

rpwP yq;fh murikg;ig khw;wpl jahu; vd gfpuq;fkhf Kd;tUkhapd; gpukhz;lkhd ru;r;ir ghjpahfj; njupaj; njhlq;fptpLk;. ,Ue;Jk; mjidj; jhq;fpl gpuNahfg;gLj;jpl VJthf kf;fSf;Fk; jj;jkJ ,yl;rpag; gpufldq;fs; mtrpak;.

mJjhd;> ,yq;ifapYs;s rfy r%fq;fSk;> Fwpg;ghf jkpo;r; r%fq;fs; jk;ik [dehaf topf;F kDjha r%fmikg;Gfis (civil society) kPz;Lk; epiy nfhs;s top nra;J ju Ntz;Lk; vd;gjhFk;.

Mdhy;> rpq;fs murpd; mlf;F-xLf;F Kiwf;Fk; jk;Ks;Ns fhZk; MAjf; Fof;fSf;Fk; jk;tYit ,oe;Jtpl;l jkpou;fisAk;> rpq;fs Nrhtdprj;Jf;Nf mbikahfptpl;l rpq;ftiuAk; nfhz;l gpuNjrj;jpy; kDjha r%f mikg;Gfs; kPz;Lk; Jspu;tpl Ntz;Lkhapd; mjw;Fk; ,e;jpahNt topnra;jy; Ntz;Lk; vd;gJk; ,aq;fpay; epajp. ,t;tplaj;jpy; ~ru;tNjrpa rKjhak;| vd;w Kfg;gpd; gpd;dhy; ,e;jpah xspe;J nfhs;s KbahJ.

,e;jpah kw;w ehLfsJ cjtpfSld; ,t;tplaj;jpy; Kidg;Gf; nfhLj;J> fhy mtfhrq;fSld; mike;j gbkhdfl;lq;fisAk; Kd;itf;f Ntz;Lk;. ,jd; njhlu;r;rpahf tpiutpy; jkpou;fspilNa xU ~Fiwe;jgl;r fUj;jpd; xUikg;ghl;bidAk;| (minimum understanding) mtu;fsJ rfy r%fq;fisAk; gpujpepjpj;Jtk; juf;$ba xU ~fUj;jhf;ff; $lj;ijAk;| (Forum) jkpou;fs; ngwf;$ba epiyikiaAk; juNtz;Lk;. jkpou;fsJ vjpu;ghu;g;G vd;d? vd;w Nfs;tpiaf; nfhz;Nl Fog;gk; cUthf;fg;gLtijAk;> xUtUf; nfhUtu; NgrplKbahj epiyikiaAk; czu;e;jtu;fs; vkJ rpe;jid Xl;lj;ij Gupe;J nfhs;tu;.

ASATiC vd;gijg; nghWj;jkl;by; jkpou;fspilNa> jkpo; NgRNthupilNa xU ~Fiwe;jgl;r fUj;njhUikg;ghL| mj;jpahtrpak; vd;gjpy; IaNk ,y;iy. vdNt mjw;nfhU topia jpwe;J itf;f> mjd; gpd; topfhl;bahfTk; ,Uf;f ,e;jpaupd; KJikahd murpay; jiytUk;> cyfj; jkpouJ ,aw;ifj; jiytUkhd fiyQu;. fyhepjp. K. fUzhepjp Kd;tu Ntz;Lk; vd gpNuupf;fpd;Nwhk;. ,t;thwikAk; ,e;jpaj; jiyaPL ~~rfy jkpo; mikg;Gfspd; kfhehlhf|| nrd;idapy; ,lk;ngwpd; ,yq;ifg; gpur;ridapd; jPu;Tf;fhd ghijapy; ntF J}uj;ij Mf;f G+u;tkhff; fle;jpl cjTk;. ,g; gpNuuizia> ,yq;if tho; rfy rKjhaq;fspdJk; ePjpf;fike;j jPu;tpy; eg;gpf;if ,Uf;Fkhapd;> ,e;jpahTk; rfy jkpo; mikg;GfSk; kl;Lkpd;wp> ,yq;ifapypUe;J Gyk; ngae;NjhuJ mikg;GfSk; $lNt> rpwP yq;fhTk; fUj;jpYk; eilKiwapYk; Vw;W mjw;fhd MjuitAk; Mf;fG+u;tkhd xj;Jiog;gpidAk; ju Ntz;Lk; vdTk; miof;fpd;Nwhk;.

ve;jnthU jdp kfhehLk; cldb ntw;wpahFjpy;iy vd;gijAk;> VjhtJ ew;gaid mjD}lhf ngWtjhapd; mjd; gpd;dzpapy; gy fhyq;fshf Mu;g;ghl;lq;fspy;yhJ nra;a Ntz;ba flikfisAk; ehk; mwpNthk;. mjdhNyNa rfy jkpo; NgRNthuJ mikg;GfspdJk; rpwPyq;fhtpdJ mEruizAk; mtrpak; vd;Nwhk;. ,f;fhyj;jpNyjhd;> xUtiuxUtu; mz;kpg;gjw;fhd Kaw;rpfspd;NghJjhd; mbg;gilj; jPu;tpd; mikg;G tbtk; gw;wpa cz;ikahd fUj;Jg; gupkhwy; ,lk; ngWtjw;fhd tha;Gk; cz;L vd;fpNwhk;.

rfy jkpo; NgRk; rKjhaq;fspdJk; [dehafg; gpujpepjpj;Jtk; vd ehk; $Wk;NghJ mjid ehk; ntWk; ~epyj;jpd; mjpgjpfs;| vd;w msTNfhiyf; nfhz;L nrhy;ytpy;iy. khwhf> ve;j ,yl;rpaf; Nfhl;ghLfisf; nfhz;L tpLjiyg; GypfsJ jiyj;Jtj;ij kWjypj;NjhNkh mNj ,yl;rpaf; Nfhl;ghLfisf; nfhz;Nl ,d;Wk; $WfpNwhk;. Kjyhtjhf> ,];yhkpau;fs; jkpou;fs; vd ,U Njrpa ,dq;fis fz;ltu;fs;> jkpouJ g+u;tPfg; gpuNjrnkd cr;rupf;Fk;NghJ ,];yhkpau;fs; gpwk;ghdtu;fshapd; mtu;fSk;jhd; jkJ jPu;Tfis jhkhfNt rpwP yq;fhTld; NjbLk; cupik cz;nld;gij Vw;Wf; nfhz;bl Ntz;Lk; vd;gjhy; eilKiwapYk;> ,yl;rparupj;jpu uPjpapYk; Kuz;ghLfisf; ,tu;fsplk; fhz;fpNwhk;. ,e;j thjq;fspd; mbapy; mikAk; ,yl;rpar;rupj;jpuj;jpd; mbg;gilapNyNa tpLjiyg; GypfsJ gpuj;jpNaf jiyikj;Jtk; vd;gij ~Njrpa tpLjiy| vd;w fl;lj;jpYk;$l Vw;fhJ NghNdhk;.

,uz;lhtjhf> jkpo; NgRNthuJ ~Njrpaj;Jtk;| (nationhood) vd;gjw;fhd rhl;rpaj;ij rk;gpujha rupj;jpuq;fshy; Vw;gLjplf;$ba NghjpYk;> ehk; mjid ,yl;rparupj;jpuk; kl;Lk; nfhz;Nl thjplyhk; vd;Nwhk;. mjhtJ> fhyhfhykhf jkpo; NgRNthu; vd;w xNufhuzj;jhy; Kjypy; ,];yhkpaj; jkpoUld; njhlq;fp> jkpouJ gz;ila ghl;lhspfshd kiyafj; jkpou;fsPlhf> rhjp kj gpuhe;jpa NtWghLfspd;wp> rfy jkpo; r%fq;fSf;Fk; vjpuhf rpq;fs muR elj;jptUk; ,d xop;g;gpy; mlq;Fk; murf;Fw;wNk NghJnkd;Nwhk;> mJNt ,d;Wk; ~milahsk; fhl;b| (identifier) vd;fpNwhk;. kiyafj; jkpoUf;F ,ioj;j nfhLikfs; ,e;Njh-rpwP yq;fh xg;ge;jj;jpD}lhf xj;Jf;nfhs;sg;gl;l NghJ mtu;fs; ahtUk; ,yq;ifaNu vd rpq;fs muR Vw;Wf; nfhz;lijAk; jkpou;fsJ Nghuhl;lj;jpy; Mf;fg+u;tkhf iffpl;ba xNutplak; ,Jjhd; vdTk; Rl;bf;fhl;b> kiyafj;jtuJ ru;r;iria Kjd;ikg;gLj;jpa

NkYk;> mNj ,yl;rparupj;jpuk; nfhz;Nl tl-fpof;F kfhzq;fspd; ,izg;ig gpupj;jikia epuhfupg;gJld;> ,q;Fk; rpq;fs murpd; fUtpfs; vt;thW gpuNahfpf;fg; gLfpd;wd vd;gij kPz;Lk; Rl;bf;fhl;b> ,it vJTk; ntWk; ~epyj;jpd; mjpgjpfs;| vd;w thjj;Js; kl;Lk; mlq;Fgit my;y vd;Wk; $Wfpd;Nwhk;.

ehk; NjLk; jPu;T rfy jkpo; NgRk; r%fq;fSf;Fk; ePjpgfu;tjhf mika Ntz;Lk;. ehk; ,tu;fsJ ru;r;irahdJ ,yq;ifapd; murtbtikg;GldhdJ vd epu;izak; nra;tjhy; mjdJ mbg;gil khw;wk; rfy r%fq;fSf;Fk; jPu;thf mikAk; vd;fpNwhk;. ,Nj murikg;ig jkpo; NgRNthu; kl;Lkpd;wp njw;Fr; rpq;fstUk; ehl;Lg;Gw rpq;fs ,isQu;fSk;jhd; jkf;F vjpuhdJ vd;W fhyh fhyq;fspy; NghuhLtijAk;jhd; ehk; fz;LtUfpd;Nwhk;. vdNtjhd; ehk; gpNuupf;Fk; kfhehlhdJ ,itaidj;ijAk; fUj;jpy; nfhz;litahf mike;jhNy jPuf;fg;glhj ,yq;ifapd; ,dg;gpur;ridf;F rupahd topia fhz KbAk; vd;fpNwhk;.

mt;thwikAk; kfhehL fhyj;jpy; jkpo; NgRNthuJ ~murpay; kd;wkhf| khw Ntz;Lk; vdTk;> mJ rpq;fs ,e;jpa murpay;thjpfs; mikg;GfSld; Ngrp Gupe;Jzu;it Vw;gLj;Jk; jd;ikiaAk; ngWk; vdTk; vjpu;ghu;f;fpNwhk;. ,t;thW xUtUld; xUtiu njhlu;GgLj;jp tupj;jpLk; eilKiwj; jpl;lk; xd;wpdhNyNa ~ru;r;irg; gpuhar;rpj;jk;| (conflict resolution) vd;gij mZfKbAk; vd;fpNwhk;. ,it midjpdJk; jhq;F J}z;fshfNt ~Kj;jug;G xg;ge;jk;| vd;w vkJ mbj;jsj; jpl;lj;ijAk; Kd;itj;Njhk;.

Kbthf ,e;j Ma;Tf; fl;Liuapd; rhuhk;rk;

Kjypy; %d;W tplaq;fs;:

1. ,e;jpahNt ,yq;ifapy; ,lk;ngWk; ,dg; Nghupy;> rupj;jpu uPjpahf mq;fkhfTk; mz;ikf;fhyq;fspy; gq;fhspahfTk; ,Ue;jikahYk;> gpuhe;jpaj;jpy; kl;Lkpd;wp cyf ty;yurhdikahYk;> jPu;T juf;$ba xNu jpwTNfhy;.

2. ,yq;ifapd; epue;jur; rkhjhdj;Jf;F ,e;jpahtpdJ gq;F Muk;gj;jpypUe;Nj mtrpak;.

3. ,jw;fhd njhlf;fk; ,e;jpa mEruizAld; jkpou; NgRNthuplkpUe;J> Fwpg;ghf jkpouplkpUe;J njhlq;f Ntz;Lk;. mjid> ,e;jpa Kjpa jiytUk; cyfj; jkpouJ jiytUkhd fiyQu; fUzhepjp Muk;gpj;J itf;f Ntz;Lk; vd;w Ntz;Ljy;.

vk; topapd; mbg;gilapy; Kd;W Nfhl;ghLfs:;

,tw;wpd; gpufhuk; mikAk; eltbf;iffs; vk;ik epue;jukhd ePjpf;Fs; mike;j jPu;Tf;Fk; ,l;Lr; nry;Yk; vd;gJ vjpu;ghu;g;G.

• rpq;fstu; (rpwP yq;fh)> jkpo; NgRNtuJ gpujpepjpj;Jtk;> ,e;jpah vd;w uPjpapyhd ~Kj;jug;G xg;ge;jk;|.

1. ,J gpd;dzpapy; ,e;jpahitf; nfhz;likAk; ~jpk;G| Nghd;w rpq;fs-jkpo; ,Ujug;G Ngr;R thu;j;ijfs;> ,zf;fq;fs; rupg;gl;L tuh.

2. jkpou;fNsh my;yJ jkpo; NgRNthNuh mw;w rpq;fstu;-,e;jpah vd ,e;Njh-rpwP yq;fh Nghd;w ,Ujug;G xg;ge;je;fSk; ruptuh.

3. VjhtJ jkpo; mikg;G-,e;jpah vd ~gq;fs+u;| ~nly;yp| Nghd;w ,ufrpa ,zf;fq;fSk; ruptuh.

4. ,e;jpahTk; gq;fhspahd> KOikahd nghUshjhu jpl;lj;ij cs;sf;fpaJld;> ,yq;ifau;f;F flT mEkjpr; rPl;L tpjpfisAk; mfw;wp rfy r%fq;fSk; Kd;Ndwpl cjt Ntz;Lk;.

• ,k; Kaw;rpfs; ,U Nfhl;ghLfSs; mikAk;:

1. rpwP yq;fh murpd; mikg;G tbtk; [dehafkag; gLj;jg;gLk;.

2. rpq;fs jkpo; r%fq;fs; ,uz;LNk [dehafkag; gLj;jg;glf;$ba tpjj;jpy; cldbahffNt ru;tNjr Nfhl;ghLfSf;Fs; mike;j kDjha r%f mikg;Gfs; cUthf top nra;ag;gLk;.

• rfy fl;lq;fspYk; vy;yh r%fq;fs; kl;Lkpd;wp mtu;fsJ rfy njhFjpfSk;

1. mit jkpo; NgRNthUffhd murpay;kd;wj;Jf;F ,l;Lr; nry;y Ntz;Lk;.

2. mJ jkpou;fs;> ,];yhkpau;> kiyafj;jtu; MfpNahu; midtiuAk; cs;slf;f Ntz;Lk;.

3. Kbtpy; ,yq;if tho; rfy r%fq;fSk; Ngrpf; nfhs;Sk; ~midj;J kf;fs; ru;r;irj; jPu;T kd;wkhfTk;;| (peace council) gupzkpf;f Ntz;Lk;.

vd;id cq;fs; kj;jpy; mioj;J Ngr mDkjp;j;jikf;Fk; nghWikAld; Ngr;ir Nfl;Lf; nfhz;likf;Fk; ed;wp.

utp Re;juypq;fk;